ON THE YALU RIVER

The action of Russia upon the Yalu River at the present time, her action in respect of Won-san in the past, are each animated by this motiv. Russia regards Korea as the completion of her dominions in the Far East, while Japan looks upon the little kingdom as the corollary to that expansion which is essential to the existence of the Island Empire. Russia in Manchuria and Korea, with her shadow projected over China, would mean a sentence of perpetual restriction and shrinkage for Japan. But, similarly, Russia from her position at Vladivostock and Port Arthur must regard the occupation of Korea by Japan as a wedge with its point projected towards the centre of her Manchurian communications. Just as, therefore, the fear of a Russian descent upon Korea has excited Japan, the necessity for such action has brought the crisis in the relations between Japan and Russia so perceptibly nearer. Private agreements and secret overtures have paved the way for the denouement which long since was disclosed. When Russia endeavoured to requisition the harbour of Ma-san-po for the requirements of her Pacific Squadron, an indication was afforded that Russian activity in Korea would be concealed no longer. Ma-san-po has since become an open port, the Government of Japan at once formulating ingenious objections to the Russian scheme at the same time that they threatened the Government of Korea with threats of immediate reprisals. But prior to the conditions laid down by Russia in the Ma-san-po Convention of 1900 with the Korean Government, this magnificent harbour had already attracted the attention of the Japanese and Chinese settlers. By force of circumstances, therefore, the place became an open port, the local authorities being powerless to check the influx of foreigners and the creation of a foreign zone around the harbour. That M. Pavloff, the clever Russian diplomatic representative in Seoul, succeeded in bringing about any agreement at all is remarkable, taking into account the panic-stricken state to which the Imperial Government was reduced by Japanese intimidation. The secret convention between the Russian and Korean Governments, entered into during 1900, preserved the independence of the harbour, and, failing to confirm Russia in the definite occupation of Ma-san-po, provided that none of the land about Ma-san-po harbour or its approaches should be permanently ceded or sold to any foreign Power. The same conditions applied to the island of Keu-chai, situated in the mouth of the harbour. This curtailment of the ambitions of Russian policy, in this particular direction, due, of course, to the energetic action of Japan, did not make the position of Russia in Ma-san-po in any sense secure. Japan, even then upon the eve of her declaration, would have gone to war with Russia, if that Power had attempted to maintain an isolated and complete domination of this harbour and its approaches against her wishes.

There is nothing in the present condition of Ma-san-po which suggests that it may become a centre of Russian influence in Southern Korea. The Japanese demanded, even before the incident had quite blown over, a large tract of land at Ma-san-po for the purposes of making a settlement there. In addition to this, the quarter, marked off for foreign settlements, has been almost wholly appropriated by the Japanese, who have erected shops and houses of some importance to the extent of several hundred, upon the more suitable sites. Japanese postal and telegraphic offices have been opened in Ma-san-po, and an uncomfortable hostelry disturbs the rest of the weary. A large permanent staff of Japanese police has been detached for duty in Ma-san-po, and the next feature in the development of affairs will be the detailing of a port guardship and the usual infantry garrison to protect the Japanese settlement. These acts imply a permanent lease and constitute the methods by which the Japanese propose to invalidate the Russo-Korean Convention. The aim of Japanese policy in Ma-san-po is to discount as far as possible the rights of the Russians, and to deprive their existence in the harbour of any special significance. The Russians accept the position with extreme philosophy and indifference. If they wished to do so, they might raise protest after protest against the intrusive character of Japanese action in the areas affected by the clauses of the Agreement of 1900.

Twelve months ago the foreign population of Ma-san-po consisted of two hundred and thirty Japanese, forty-one Chinese, eighteen Russians, and two Germans. These figures include male and female heads of population, but no children. The actual strength of the Russian colony in this harbour was eight men, ten women, three children; of the Japanese only seventy-eight were females. There is little import and export traffic. The nearness of Fusan, which is only six hours distant, makes it unnecessary to trade direct with the settlement. Japanese steamers from Fusan call daily, local produce being brought round by native junks. There is a large fishing industry off the harbour; it is, however, quite controlled by Japanese fishermen from Fusan. The principal industry on shore is the construction of the settlement, some little agriculture, and no little gossip.

Since the failure of her efforts to secure Ma-san-po, Russia has endeavoured to obtain the lease of Ching-kai-wan, sometimes called Chin-hai or Shin-hai, a bay situated in the extreme south of the Korean peninsula, as a naval station. The position of this harbour is exactly midway between Vladivostock and Port Arthur. Owing to its geographical situation, the presence of Russia in sole possession of Ching-kai-wan would be certain to give rise to even greater demonstrations of hostility from the people and Government of Japan than did the Ma-san-po incident. Nam-pu, which it was then Russia’s object to secure, is about twenty miles outside the limits of the treaty port of Ma-san-po. While the Japanese Government could not prevent Russia from obtaining a coaling-station for the Russian Steamship Company within the boundaries of the foreign settlement of Ma-san-po, she most strenuously protested against a grant of land for Russian naval purposes twenty miles away. Japan likewise resists the establishment of a Russian naval depôt at Ching-kai-wan, where there is no treaty port, and to which, were the “lease” confirmed, only Russia would have a right of access.

Ching-kai-wan is within a few hours’ steam of that Port Hamilton which Great Britain was induced to relinquish, upon the understanding between Russia and China that Russia would not seek to acquire territory in Korea. The excuse, since put forward by Russia for the flagrant violation of this compact, is that it was a bargain made with China, and not with us. There is another, and still more extraordinary feature in connection with this affair, which Li Hung Chang confided to a diplomatic representative of a foreign Power, at Pekin, some years ago. The Chinese statesman admitted that the contract between China and Russia contained a private stipulation that it should be good for ten years only. In other words, Great Britain was led to withdraw from Port Hamilton on the pretence that Russia would never trespass on Korean soil, although there was a secret understanding between China and Russia at the time, that this arrangement should only be in force for one decade.

Although the position of affairs in regard to the action of Russia at Yong-an-po is of recent prominence, the question goes back in reality to the autumn of 1896, when a Russian merchant in Vladivostock, M. Brünner by name, obtained from the Korean Government the right of felling lumber and planting trees on the banks of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, as well as on the island of Ul-lyang, for twenty years. The concession was to be forfeited unless work was begun in five years. As the close of the period drew near, the Russian agent in Seoul applied for an extension of three years. At the moment it was reported in Seoul that this request of M. Pavloff had been refused, but it transpired subsequently that an agreement had been drawn up to the following effect between the superintendent, appointed by the Korean Government to oversee the matters, and the inspector in charge of the interests of the company in Yong-an-po:

1. The said district in Yong-an-po shall be rented to the Russian company.