The Government of England (Vol. I)

by A. Lawrence Lowell

In a small district where the voters are few, and an interchange of opinions naturally takes place by informal conference, public officers may be elected by popular vote without the existence of any machinery for nomination; but in a large constituency, where the voters are not personally acquainted with each other, men who have the same objects in view must get together, agree upon a candidate, and recommend him to the public. Otherwise votes will be thrown away by scattering them, and it will be mere chance whether the result corresponds with the real wishes of the voters or not. In short, there must be some process for nominating candidates; that is, some party organisation; and the larger the electorate the more imperative the need of it. Now the electorate that practically chooses the President of the United States is by far the largest single constituency that has ever existed in the world. It is, in fact, noteworthy that democracy throughout Europe adheres to the custom of dividing the country for political purposes into comparatively small electorates; while in the United States it is the habit to make whole communities single constituencies for the choice of their chief magistrates—state governors or national president—a condition of things that involves elaborate party machinery for nomination, and hence the creation of huge party organisations on a popular basis.

The form of government in the United States has thus made parties inevitable; and yet they were furnished with no opportunity for the exercise of their functions by the regular organs of the state. There were no means provided whereby a party could formulate and carry through its policy, select its candidates for high office, or insure that they should be treated as the real leaders of the party and able to control its action.[441:1] The machinery of party, therefore, from the national convention to the legislative caucus, has perforce been created outside the framework of the government, and cannot be nicely adjusted thereto.

In Continental Europe.

The European countries, on the other hand, that have adopted the English parliamentary system, have usually copied those features, like the responsibility of the ministers, which were most readily perceived, without acquiring at the same time the substructure on which the system rests, the procedure which prevents friction, or the national traditions which supply the motive power. The result has been that a form of government well fitted to the great English parties has proved very imperfectly suited to the numerous political groups that exist in most of the continental legislatures.[441:2] In France the conditions have indeed changed much in the last few years, the procedure has been gradually better adapted to the parliamentary system, and the ministries have gained in stability; but as yet the difficulties are by no means overcome. In some of the smaller countries, such as Belgium and Switzerland, the organs of government and the system of parties are less inconsistent; in Belgium because she followed British precedents more faithfully; in Switzerland because she was enabled by her small size, coupled with a federal structure, to create a novel polity of her own, in which parties are given no constitutional sphere of action, and play an unusually subordinate part. In none of these countries, however, is the form of government so fully consonant with the party system as it is in Great Britain.

English Parliamentary System Grew out of Parties.

In England the party system is no more in accord with the strictly legal institutions, with King, Lords and Commons, than it is elsewhere; but it is in absolute harmony with those conventions, which, although quite unknown to the law, make up the actual working constitution of the state. It is in harmony with them because they were created by the warfare of parties, were evolved out of party life. Government by a responsible ministry was not the inevitable consequence of the long struggle between the House of Commons and the Crown. Some other means might very well have been devised for taking the executive power out of the personal control of the King. It was rather the result of the condition of the House itself; for it is inconceivable that this form of government should have appeared if Parliament had not been divided into Whigs and Tories. In fact the whole plan would be senseless if parties did not exist. The reason for the resignation of a ministry upon the rejection of a measure it has proposed is that the defeat indicates a general loss of confidence in the policy of the party in power, and the preference for another body of leaders with a different policy. If this were not so, the Swiss practice of remaining in office, but yielding on the point at issue, would be far more sensible. The parliamentary system is thus a rational expression of the division of the ruling chamber into two parties.

It has Made Parties Stronger.

Neither the parliamentary system nor the party system, neither the responsibility of ministers to the House of Commons nor the permanent division into two parties, grew up in a day. Throughout the eighteenth century the principle of cabinet responsibility was but dimly recognised; while parties at times disintegrated, and the wheels of government were kept going by means of corruption, which has served in all ages as a lubricant for ill-adjusted political machinery. But little by little, with halting steps, the rivalry of parties built up the responsibility of ministers, and this in turn helped to perpetuate the party divisions; for the parliamentary system, like every rational form of government, reacts upon and strengthens the conditions of its own existence. It is based upon party, and by the law of its nature tends to accentuate party. Ministers perceived that their security depended upon standing together, presenting a united front, and prevailing upon their friends to do the same. The leaders of the Opposition learned also that their chance of attaining to power was improved by pursuing a similar course. In this way two parties are arrayed against one another continually, while every member of Parliament finds himself powerfully drawn to enlist under one banner or the other, and follow it on all occasions. He cannot consider measures simply on their merits, but must take into account the ultimate effect of his vote. As soon as men recognise that the defeat of a government bill means a change of ministry, the pressure is great to sacrifice personal opinions on that bill to the greater principles for which the party stands; and the more fully the system develops, the clearer becomes the incompatibility between voting as the member of Parliament pleases on particular measures, and maintaining in power the party he approves. In short, the action of the House of Commons has tended to become more and more party action, with the ministers, as we have already seen, gradually drawing the initiative in legislation, and the control over procedure, more and more into their own hands.