Critics and apologists both assert that the English political system is not logical; and the statement is true in the sense that the system was not excogitated by an a priori method. But on the other hand the very fact that it has grown up by a continual series of adaptations to existing needs has made it on the whole more consistent with itself, has brought each part more into harmony with the rest, than is the case in any other government. In this it is like a living organism. There are, no doubt, many small anomalies and survivals that mar the unity for the purpose of description; but these, like survivals of structure in animals, like the splint bones in the leg of a horse for example, do not interfere seriously with the action of the whole. It may be said that in politics the Frenchman has tended in the past to draw logical conclusions from correct premises, and that his results have often been wrong, while the Englishman draws illogical conclusions from incorrect premises, and his results are commonly right. The fact being that all abstract propositions in politics are at best approximations, and an attempt to reason from them usually magnifies the inaccuracy. But in England the institutions being empirical have resulted from experience, although men have often tried to explain them afterwards by a somewhat artificial and incongruous process of reasoning. In this sense French political principles may be said to be the more logical, the English government—not the theories about it—the more scientific. It is more important, therefore, to describe the organs of the English government and their relations to one another than to consider the traditional principles that have been supposed to underlie the system. But the very nature of the English government renders it peculiarly difficult to portray. As the laws that regulate its structure are overlaid by customs which moderate very greatly their operation without affecting their meaning or their validity, it is necessary to describe separately the legal and customary aspects of the constitution. It is almost unavoidable to pass in review first the legal organisation of each institution, and then its actual functions. Such a process is sometimes tedious, especially for a person already familiar with the subject, but an attempt has been made in the following pages to separate as far as possible the dry legal details from a discussion of the working forces, so that the former may be skipped by the judicious reader.
FOOTNOTES:
[1:1] La Démocratie en Amérique, I., Ch. vi.
[1:2] 30-31 Vic., c. 3, § 11.
[1:3] 63-64 Vic., c. 12, Const., §§ 64-65.
[2:1] The provisions about the responsibility of the ministers are almost identical in the constitutions of Belgium (Arts. 63, 64, 65, 88, 89, 90) and Prussia (Arts. 44, 45, 60, 61); but in Belgium the cabinet is politically responsible to the chamber, while in Prussia it is not.
[2:2] "Studies in History and Jurisprudence," Essay III.
[3:1] Cf. Brusa, Italien, in Marquardsen's Handbuch des Oeffentlichen Rechts, 12-16, 181-82.
[3:2] Professor Dicey points out ("Law of the Constitution," 5 Ed., 116 and Note 2) that De Tocqueville considered the Charter unalterable by reason of this omission, but that it was, in fact, changed like an ordinary law.