“6. The tendency to use up reserves too quickly. As a result, there are frequently no troops with which to meet turning and enveloping movements.
“7. The disbelief in cold steel.
“8. The inclination to avoid enclosed and, in particular, hilly ground.
“9. The inclination to use direct frontal attacks without turning movements.
“10. The neglect of field fortifications in the defence; infantry fire trenches, gun-pits and epaulements alone are made.
“11. The complete absence of any idea of pursuit.
“12. The tendency to retire too rapidly: the infantry of the main body withdraws first; this is followed by the whole of the guns, and then the remaining infantry.
“13. The disinclination for night operations.
“14. The absence of contact between divisions: each division operates independently without keeping in touch with others; this is due to the lack of general control by the officer in chief command.
“In reviewing their own operations against China in 1900, the Japanese Press expressed the opinion that the operations of small bodies were excellently carried out, but that the troops, if operating in force, would probably be considerably inferior to Europeans. In the last grand autumn manœuvres in 1903 it was noticed that the troops were well trained. Considerable initiative was observed amongst the junior officers, which was more than could be said of the seniors; great interest was taken in the work, and everything was very thoroughly done. The technical services were excellent. The artillery and infantry manœuvred well; the cavalry were learning to ride, and appeared keen, but the generals did not know how to use cavalry, and employed it little; the instruction, however, was good. The thing which most attracted attention was the rapidity with which the mountain artillery came into action. On being ordered out from column of route, they got into action and opened fire in three and a half minutes.”