The special attention of commanding officers was also called to the necessity for providing their men with hot food during action, and to the excessive expenditure of ammunition in our fights.
Instructions issued during September.
The following were the main instructions given by me while preparing for an advance after the fighting in August:
“It is a regrettable fact that so far, whenever we have taken the offensive, we have met with reverse. Owing to our lack of information, to which I have already drawn attention, instead of delivering a confident attack according to a clearly-thought-out plan, we have acted in a half-hearted manner. We often deliver our main attack too soon, and regardless of the enemy’s intentions. Instances have occurred where we have detailed attacking columns as small as a battalion; in others we have operated without any definite plan of action. Finally, there have been cases where not enough determination has been shown in pressing forward to the objective.”
The importance of gaining even slight successes over the enemy’s advanced troops at the beginning of a forward movement, the fact that in the attack of positions turning movements should always be made in combination with frontal attacks, and the advantage of pushing on energetically when once an advance had commenced, were all points specially noted. The necessity of holding on determinedly to every yard of ground gained was accentuated, and leading units in a frontal attack were warned not to deliver the assault until the synchronous turning movement had been fully developed. Every use was to be made of fire-effect of every sort. I wrote:
“A glaring case of that lack of co-operation from which we suffer so much was the fight of September 2,[7] when the left column began the action far too soon, and therefore finished by retiring in disorder. This had the worst results on the success of the whole operation.
“I must again remind all ranks of the great necessity for economizing ammunition, especially gun ammunition. At Liao-yang we used up in two days our special artillery reserve of more than 100,000 rounds. The conveyance of gun ammunition to the front is very difficult, and batteries which have expended theirs become mere dead-weight to the army.”
GENERAL LINIEVITCH.