“The Japanese are fortifying the positions along our front, converting villages, knolls, and hill-tops into strong, defensible points, and strengthening their positions with obstacles. These positions should be carefully studied, their strong points noted, and in every section of our line a plan of possible operations against the corresponding portions of the enemy’s position should be made. The early organization of the artillery preparation of any attack on these selected points is important.
“Detachments of sappers and scouts should be sent ahead of the assault to destroy the obstacles round fortified villages, which should be well shelled. Till the assault is made the advance should be under cover, and if the leading troops find they are not strong enough to capture the point on which they have been directed, they must hold on to a point as near to the enemy as possible, in order to press forward again when reinforced.”
Finally, in my instructions issued in December, 1904, I recapitulated the most important points brought out by our recent experiences, such as—
“1. The necessity, in order to avoid loss, for our attack formations to be better adapted to the ground.
“2. Economy in artillery ammunition.
“3. The more intelligent employment of rifle-fire, and the necessity for volley-firing at night.
“4. The great value of night operations.
“5. Proper communication between all senior commanders.
“6. The necessity for the mutual co-operation of all arms, and the maintenance of touch in battle.
“The surest road to success is the determination to continue fighting, even when the last reserve has been exhausted, for the enemy may be in the same, if not in worse plight, and what is not possible in daylight may be accomplished at night. Unfortunately, in recent fights, some commanders even of large forces have confessed themselves unable to carry out the operation entrusted to them, at a moment when they still had in hand big reserves which had not fired a shot.”