2. To insist that the best of those privileged to wear the uniform should serve in the army, and there acquire the military knowledge and strength of character necessary for war.
GENERAL GRIPPENBERG
In the first of these two particulars we have succeeded, for in Russia the military uniform has been particularly honoured for years; but we have by no means approached near the second desideratum. The majority of the best men wearing military uniform have not only never served in the army, but are absolutely unconnected with it. In the eighteenth century a custom crept in of dressing the sons of grandees in military clothes, and they could get promotion at an age when they were riding toy horses round drawing-rooms. Then, little by little, military uniform, military rank, even that of General, ceased to become the absolute prerogative of the army, or, indeed, to denote any connection with war. The members of the Church were the only people not arrayed in it. Members of the Imperial Council, Ambassadors, Senators, Ministers of the different departments and their assistants, Governor-Generals, Governors, Mayors, Superintendents of Police, officials in the various Government departments and in the military institutions, all wore military uniform, and were graded in different ranks. With few exceptions, all that they had to do with the army was to be a source of weakness to it. Amongst the many names in the long list of generals, only a few belong to officers on the active list, and, what is worse, those who are serving in the army get superseded in rank by, and receive less emoluments than, those who are not. Consequently, the best elements in the service are naturally anxious to leave. The posts of Minister of the Interior, of Finance, of Ways and Communications, of Education, and of State Control, used to be held by generals and admirals, as well as the appointments of Ambassador at Constantinople, Paris, London, and Berlin. Service uniforms were therefore conspicuous at all diplomatic and ministerial gatherings. Military clothes also had a great attraction for other departments, and several of them tried to assimilate their uniforms as much as possible to those of army officers. The worst offender in this respect was the Ministry of the Interior, which adopted a uniform for police-officers and even for constables which could hardly be distinguished from that worn by military officers. The private soldiers were naturally unable to make anything of this multitude of uniforms, and never knew whom to salute or obey; indeed, the police-officers’ great-coats and caps with cockades were enough to puzzle the most discriminating. This all seems incomprehensible; but the ambition to wear military uniform is easily explained. It is largely due to the ignorance of the people. Not long ago, anyone wearing even a hat with a cockade was taken in the country for a person in authority; caps were doffed to him, and in winter heavily laden sledges would be turned into snow-drifts to give him the road, while his vulgar abuse would be patiently accepted.
Thirty years ago, when a young officer, I spent about a year on service with the French in Algiers, and travelled a great deal. I was astonished to find that it was found convenient, even under republican rule, to keep to a system of semi-military government for the native population—Arabs and Kabyles. It was, in this case, entrusted mainly to army officers, and those civilians who were also appointed had to adopt a uniform similar to that worn by the military. These officials told me in all seriousness that their spurs and the gold braid round their caps assisted them in their dealings with the Arabs, in collecting taxes, settling land questions, and other matters. It was so in our case. Undoubtedly the wearing of military clothes did facilitate the difficult work which our police-officers have to do; but a great change has recently come over the country, and a uniform alone is not now enough to command obedience. It is sometimes a drawback, if not a danger. It is, of course, to be hoped that such an unnatural state of affairs will not last; but it is very desirable to take advantage of the present indifference displayed by the civil population to uniform to take it from all who are not actually serving in the army. The time has come when the prestige appertaining to our uniform should be restored, and the status of those serving in the army should be raised.
With the same object in view, we must continue to try and improve the material position and prospects of the corps of officers. An important matter, and one to which I have given much attention—so far without entire success—is that service on the staff, in offices and in branches of the War Department, should not pay better than service with the troops. Many of the officers now so employed in semi-civil duties can well be replaced by civilian officials. It is, moreover, essential that service in the Frontier Guards, in the Customs, police, gendarmerie, on the railway, and as tax-collectors, should cease to be financially preferable to service in the army.
As senior officers get on in the service, they must not be allowed to forget what they have previously learnt, a thing which is now only too common. It is essential that they should be practised in peace in commanding troops, and not be mere administrators, inspectors, spectators, and umpires. They should therefore be in a position to spend most of their time with troops in the field and in cantonments. With our military system the command of troops is at present almost entirely in the hands of the regimental, brigade, divisional, corps and district commanders.[31] Thus our infantry and cavalry regiments used to be under five masters. But, in the words of the proverb, too many cooks spoil the broth, and in war all was not for the best in all our regiments. Often while the ingredients and the fire left nothing to be desired, the cooks did not know what to do. How can such a state of things be explained? It will be said that the selection of commanders was not always happy. That is true; but it must be remembered that selections had to be made from those men who were qualified according to the regulations and the reports drawn up by various commanding officers. In some cases seniority was considered to be by itself a qualification for promotion. Efforts of a sort were undoubtedly made to get the best men we had, but they were insufficient. All the commanders in the five degrees of our military hierarchy are so occupied with their daily work of routine and correspondence, while many are so overburdened with the administrative details of their appointments, that they have little time to attend to the business of actual war. Yet, as they get on in the service, more knowledge of war is required of them. The short periods of concentration in summer, with only a few days of instructional work on both sides, give little practice in command, and at other times the number of responsible duties connected with administration places that art on a far higher plane than mere soldiering. And what is most important is that the whole of our service—of our lives almost—is spent doing things which do not go to form character. Of the five posts above mentioned, only two—the divisional and corps commanders—are in any way independent, and their occupants are immersed in office work. The relative amount of time spent on the different sorts of duties tends to turn the regimental commander into an administrator rather than a fighter, while a brigade commander has absolutely no independence; in fact, his absence or presence is scarcely noticed. Finally, the same tendency to produce office men and bureaucrats is noticeable even in the work of those on the highest rungs of the ladder—the general officers in command of military districts. Instances might be multiplied of men who, though long in charge of military districts, never once commanded troops on manœuvres, and for several years never even got astride a horse. How can this impossible state of affairs be remedied, and a body of leaders, constantly practised in the execution of those duties in command of troops that would be required of them in war, be formed?
I.
On active service the rôle of the regimental commander is both wide and important. To issue successfully from the test of modern war, he must have character, experience, and facility in manœuvring his unit in the field, must know his men well, and therefore have found the time both for intercourse with his officers and for perfecting himself in his profession. In battle it is men he has to deal with, and not files of papers and storehouses. But, situated as he is at present, he is so overburdened with important administrative details that most of his time is passed dealing with requisitions and inventories instead of with flesh and blood. The penalties he incurs by neglect of his administrative duties are far heavier and more tangible than those incurred by neglecting the tactical training of his regiment. The greater part of these duties—those such as are connected with clothing, transport, and rationing—should be removed from his shoulders. He should be made the controller of these sections of duty, and not the person actually responsible. Nor is his position easy in respect to the personnel. The great shortage of officers, especially in those units quartered in inferior barracks, is the cause of many difficulties. When mobilization is ordered, some of the already too small number of officers are told off for the innumerable miscellaneous duties and detachments; commanders of battalions and of companies are interchanged; many of the men are transferred to other units, a mass of reservists join, and, if there is not time for the new arrivals to settle down with the few old hands, the commander has to lead into action a regiment which he does not know, and which does not know itself. Our mobilization schemes, therefore, require revision in this respect, and every regiment should have in peace-time a permanent establishment of officers and men who would accompany the regiment on service. The company commanders in particular should not be removed from their companies. But to make such an arrangement possible, it is essential that one of the senior captains (who might be appointed to the staff) should run the regimental school. It is also important to keep the regimental commander as a man apart as far as possible; he should be made to realize upon all occasions the peculiar importance of the duties entrusted to him, and the respect due to himself personally by reason of these duties.