The war shows very clearly the immense importance of rapidly repairing the wastage in units directly after an action. The Japanese succeeded in doing this, with the result that they were greatly superior to us in numbers. It was more important for us to be able to replace casualties by drafts than to receive reinforcements, and it would have made us stronger. For instance, with five troop trains available in the twenty-four hours, a complete army corps with its baggage and parks took twenty days to reach the front, and increased our strength by some 25,000 rifles. If drafts had been sent up during those twenty-days instead of an army corps, we should have received 90,000 to 100,000 men. In place of cavalry, baggage, artillery, parks, and a small number of infantry, we should have got a large number of the latter. It was infantry we wanted, for in our big battles it was the infantry that suffered so heavily. The number of guns per 1,000 rifles was too large, and the amount of transport and baggage was prodigious, with the result that the 10,000 to 12,000 rifles left in corps resembled an escort to the artillery, parks, baggage, etc.,[43] more than anything else.
Troops in Rear—Communication Troops.
By troops in rear I mean those at rest camps, railway troops, road working parties, telegraph sections, motor troops, transport of various kinds, all of which should be under the general officer commanding communications. There is also a large number of men in the departments, institutions, and depôts of all the field administrations, but as in Manchuria these were mostly fixed by the authorized establishment, I will not refer to them. The absence of any prepared organization of troops for the line of communication, however, led to their being formed at the expense of the fighting strength of the infantry. While officers commanding regiments complained of the great wastage of their men on duties in the rear, those in rear complained that the numbers they had were insufficient. Troops for the duties in rear should of course be formed on mobilization. In the part of my report upon the 1st Army which deals with the organization of the communications there is much valuable material which is based on war experience, and may be a useful guide for the future. By the end of August, 1905, the strength of the 1st Army alone was 300,000. Its own communications in rear had a depth of 150 miles and a frontage of 330 miles, including the detachments guarding the extreme left flank and the left flank corps under General Rennenkampf, with which we permanently occupied a front of about 70 miles. Under the general commanding the communications of the 1st Army, which consisted of six army corps, were 650 officers and officials, 12,000 men, and 25,000 horses, and this number was considered inadequate. In my report, I gave as my estimate for the numbers required for one army corps per day’s march in length of communications—
| Men. | |
| 1. Half company infantry | 120 |
| 2. Transport | 320 |
| 3. Road troops | 25 |
| 4. Postal telegraph working parties | 5 |
| Total | 470 |
Engineer Troops.
The great development of science in warfare is very marked, but the late war did not display the employment of scientific forces that will be made in a struggle between two European Powers. In this respect the Japanese were much better served than we were, but even they were not technically equipped in the way that will soon be necessary. The speedy construction of strong fortifications, the laying of railways (especially of field railways) and construction of metalled roads, the organization of aerial and wireless telegraphy, of signalling by heliograph, lamps, and flags, the employment of balloons, motors, and bicycles, are all duties for which the demand increases every day, while the great quantity also of artificial obstacles, wire, mines, hand-grenades, explosives, reserves of entrenching tools, etc., now required must exist ready for use in large quantities. A much larger number of engineer troops, including sappers, telegraph and railway units, than we had available in Manchuria is necessary, in order that all this technical equipment may be used to the best advantage. Without touching here upon the railway troops necessary for the proper service of the communications, the number of which must depend upon the length of the existing lines, and of those proposed to be laid during operations, let us consider the question of the number of sapper and telegraph troops required for one army corps of three divisions.
The spade, which had been forgotten since the Turkish War, has once more regained its true position. With the volume and murderous effectiveness of modern fire, neither the attack nor the defence can be conducted without enormous losses, unless proper and intelligent use is made of digging. For a protracted defence strong fortified positions with both open and closed works and all possible kinds of artificial obstacles are absolutely necessary. Consequently, for the attack of such positions, special troops are required trained in the use of explosives and the destruction of obstacles, and in road-making, for heavy artillery demands good roads and strong bridges.
While every Japanese division of twelve infantry battalions had one strong sapper battalion, we had on an average only one company of sappers with each division. This proved to be too small a proportion. Our sappers worked nobly in the construction of earthworks and roads, but they did little in actual contact with the enemy, and, strange as it may appear, were often forgotten when an action began, even when we attacked the enemy’s strongly fortified positions. In the 2nd Army we had several sapper battalions, and yet in the assault on San-de-pu[44] not a single company was told off to accompany the storming columns. As our sappers were so scarce, we took the greatest care of them, as their small number of casualties as compared with those of the infantry proves. To get the best results from this arm, it seems to me necessary to associate them more with other troops, and therefore to attach them to divisions, instead of including them in the corps troops. If we succeed in getting strong regiments of 4,000 rifles, I consider it essential that every regiment should have attached to it, for offensive as well as defensive operations, one sapper company of 250 men, which would mean a four-company sapper battalion, 1,000 strong, for every division. They should be trained to put up obstacles very rapidly, and should possess the necessary tools and equipment for their destruction. A large supply of wire is also very important; it may be taken that every division should have a sufficient supply of wire for two defensive points, say 1 ton for each.
Moreover, there should be attached to each division a field-telegraph company of six sections, in order to organize rapid communication between each party of troops thrown out in front and the divisional staff. Each regiment should have with it a section which should be equipped to establish communication by telephone,[45] flag, cycle or motor. With every three-division army corps there should be a sapper brigade of three battalions, a field-telegraph battalion of five companies, a mining company, a balloon section, and a railway battalion. Two of the telegraph companies should keep up communication from the corps to army headquarters, to other corps, to its own divisions, to the parks, the baggage, and reserves.