Feeling that the force allotted to the defence of the Peninsula was inadequate, on February 11 I telegraphed as War Minister to Alexeieff that I considered it imperative that the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division—then under formation—should be sent there in place of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division, ordered to the Ya-lu. The Viceroy did not concur in this view, but he temporarily retained the 13th and 14th East Siberian Rifle Regiments.
On February 20, 1904, I was appointed to the command of the Manchurian Army. In my first communication to the Viceroy (No. 1 of February 24) I again expressed the opinion that, in view of the possibility of it being besieged by four or five Japanese divisions, our first efforts should be directed to strengthening Port Arthur. And I further stated:
“If Port Arthur is weakly garrisoned, and should be besieged, I might be tempted by that fact to assume the offensive before there has been sufficient time to concentrate our forces. It is for this reason that I have already advised the concentration of the 9th Division in Kuan-tung to replace the 3rd.”
However, the Viceroy again disagreed with me, and wrote in a despatch of March 1:
“Separate operations against the fortress would only be really worth undertaking if the enemy could make certain of seizing it by a coup de main, and the moment for this has passed. The land front is becoming more formidable every day, and, though not complete, the works are now well advanced; 200 additional guns have been mounted in Port Arthur itself, and more than forty at Chin-chou; the strength of the garrison is being brought up by the reservists arriving from Trans-Baikalia, and the stocks of supplies are being increased. All the bays nearest the fortress, as well as the port of Dalny, have been mined, and for the rest—the oft-proved stubbornness of the Russian soldier in defence can be relied on.”
He had already reported to the Tsar that—
“Although separate operations against Port Arthur would threaten the fortress itself with all the hardships of a siege or blockade, they would be rather advantageous to our arms as a whole, for they would entail a division of the enemy’s forces.”
As regards my own recommendations upon the plan of operations to be followed against Japan, I drew up two memoranda, which I submitted to the Tsar on February 15 and March 4. In the former I stated:
“In the first phase of the campaign our main object should be to prevent the destruction of our forces in detail. The apparent importance of any single locality or position (fortresses excepted) should not lead us into the great error of holding it in insufficient force, which would bring about the very result we are so anxious to prevent. While gradually growing in numbers and preparing to take the offensive, we should only move forward when sufficiently strong, and when supplied with everything necessary for an uninterrupted advance lasting over a fairly long period.”
Against this the Tsar was pleased to note in his own handwriting the words “Quite so.”