This danger being temporarily averted, I ordered the 31st Infantry Division back to Hai-cheng. As the defence of Liao-yang from the east was the next most urgent matter, a brigade of the 9th Division, which had just arrived from Russia, was moved to Lang-tzu-shan to act as a reserve to the eastern force, which had been previously augmented by the return to it of two regiments of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division. The other brigade was sent, under General Hershelman, who commanded the division, to Hsi-kei-an village [at the junction of the Liao-yang and Mukden roads], so as to cover the left flank of the eastern force and guard the road to Mukden. Taking into consideration the considerable increase of the eastern force, I ordered Count Keller to take the offensive, so as again to get possession of the passes. He did so, but although he had forty battalions under his command, he advanced with only twenty-four. Though our troops were successful in the early hours of July 17, thanks to the gallant conduct of the 24th East Siberian Rifles under Colonel Lechitski, the result of the day’s action was not favourable. Keller stopped the advance before even bringing into action his strong reserves, with the result that at nightfall the eastern force was once more on its former positions on the Yang-tzu Ling (Pass). On the 19th the brigade of the 9th Division was driven from its position at Chiao-tou, and fell back towards Hu-chia-tzu.[69]
By the middle of July the disposition of the enemy’s forces was approximately as follows: Kuroki, with three field divisions and reserves, had captured the three Fen-shui Ling and Mo-Tien Ling (Passes), and, with his outposts thrown out on the roads to Liao-yang, had reached the valley of the Tang Ho, a tributary of the Tai-tzu Ho. Nodzu, with an army of approximately the same strength, had captured the passes on the Kai-ping, Ta-shih-chiao, and Hai-cheng roads, and had two divisions and a brigade in reserve on the Hai-cheng line of advance and one on the Ta-shih-chiao line. Oku, having moved up from Kuan-tung with his army of some four divisions, had driven back our outposts and occupied Kai-ping. Two brigades were left in reserve on the line Feng-huang-cheng—Kuan-tien-chang. Thus, according to our information, two armies of about 90 to 100 battalions had advanced against us from the east, and one of about 50 to 60 battalions from the south, whilst Nogi’s army of 3 divisions and 2 reserve brigades had been left to operate against Port Arthur. Our dispositions were briefly: 44 battalions against Kuroki’s army; 28 battalions on the line Fen-shui-ling—Hai-cheng against 2 divisions and 1 reserve brigade of Nodzu’s army; 48 battalions against Oku’s army, and 1 division of Nodzu’s; 16 battalions were in the general reserve at Hai-cheng, and four in garrison at Liao-yang. It must, however, be borne in mind that the effective strength of our battalions was very far short of the prescribed establishment.[70] From the beginning of the war up to July only 3,600 men were received in the way of drafts.
With the above dispositions of the opposing forces, we should, according to the theory of the art of war, have been able to operate on “interior lines.” But for us this was extremely difficult, as, in the first place, we had not enough men to attain the necessary superiority over any one of the hostile groups without laying ourselves open to defeat by the other two; and, in the second, the rains had so seriously damaged the roads as to prevent the rapid movement (as we had heavy guns and baggage) necessary for successful action even on interior lines. Finally, as their bases (Korea, Ta-ku-shan, Pi-tzu-wo) were enveloping it was possible for each of their groups to refuse an unequal battle, and fall back without exposing its communications. Still, notwithstanding these unfavourable conditions, it was proposed to attack Kuroki, who menaced our communications most, at the earliest favourable moment. The troops which could be employed to strike him were distributed in two directions: twenty-four battalions of the eastern force on the main road from Liao-yang to Lang-tzu-shan, with its outposts on the Yang-tzu-ling heights; and twenty-four battalions of the 10th Army Corps on the line Liao-yang—Sai-ma-chi, with its outposts five miles short of Chiao-tou. Twenty-four battalions of the 17th Corps were told off to remain as a reserve to these two groups at Liao-yang, while to prevent our left flank being turned, and to cover the Mukden road, the 11th Pskoff and 2nd Dagestan Regiments, which had just arrived from Russia, were ordered to Pen-hsi-hu. But on July 23, when I inspected the 10th Corps, I found that it was absolutely incapable of operating in the hills, as it had no pack-animals. In fact, those companies on outpost duty on steep or high ground had actually to remain all day without food or water. As the units of the 17th Corps were in a similar condition, it was impossible even to think of at once assuming the offensive.
Meanwhile, on the 23rd and 24th, the enemy themselves took the initiative by attacking the 1st and 4th Siberian Corps south of Ta-shih-chiao. In spite of the fact that the position held by these corps was very extended (eleven miles), and was divided in the centre by a rocky ridge, and that its left flank could have been easily turned, all the enemy’s efforts were repulsed. The regiments of the 4th Siberians, who bore the heat and burden of the day, behaved splendidly, but “in view of the great superiority of the enemy and the development of an attack from the direction of Ta-ling,” Zarubaeff, who was given general instructions but allowed freedom of action, decided early on the morning of the 25th to withdraw his force towards Hai-cheng. On learning of this, I ordered General Sluchevski to make immediate preparations for offensive operations, and, if Kuroki should cross the Tai-tzu Ho and move towards Mukden, at once to advance, whether his troops were prepared for operating in the hills or not, and endeavour to strike Kuroki’s communications. However painful the abandonment of the port of Newchuang was for us after our tactical success at Ta-shih-chiao—for the enemy could now make use of it as a new base—the strategical position of our army was improved. With the departure of the southern force towards Hai-cheng, our greatly extended front was diminished by twenty miles.
On July 31 the enemy advanced all along the line. As far as our southern group was concerned, their blow was directed against Zasulitch, who was holding a position west of Hsi-mu-cheng, especially against his right flank, which was driven back in spite of the devoted efforts of the Voronej and Kozloff Regiments. As any further success on their part threatened to cut off the 2nd Siberians from the main body of the southern group, I withdrew Zasulitch’s force to Hai-cheng. On the same day, the enemy’s operations on the eastern front were directed against both our groups. In the action on the Yang-tzu Ling (Pass) General Count Keller was killed, and the unexpected death of this gallant commander, together with the abandonment without orders by the 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment[71] of the position which protected his left flank, greatly influenced Kashtalinski (Keller’s successor) in coming to his too hasty decision to withdraw the force to Lang-tzu-shan. At the same time the 10th Corps was taken partly by surprise,[72] and driven from its advanced posts towards Hu-chia-tzu. Sluchevski, learning of the retirement of the eastern force towards Lang-tzu-shan, and fearing for his right flank, then withdrew his corps to An-ping. In these operations the corps commander displayed a lack of energy, and several regiments showed great unsteadiness, especially the reservists, many of whom actually left the ranks during the progress of the fight.
The complicated nature of the situation now necessitated extreme caution on our part, lest anything should prevent our concentration in strength at Liao-yang, and there fighting a decisive battle against all three Japanese armies with some hope of success. From Liao-yang to our position on the eastern front, An-ping–Lang-tzu-shan, was twenty miles, and to Hai-cheng forty miles. In order to insure the movement of the troops on the southern front to their positions at Liao-yang in good time, it was necessary to move them from Hai-cheng to the position at An-shan-chan—fifteen miles from Liao-yang—which was fortified at the beginning of the war. The retirement began early on August 2, and on the following day the troops were concentrated on the position. In my report to the Tsar of August 4, I gave the following general reasons for withdrawing to the line An-shan-chan–Lang-tzu-shan–An-ping after the July fighting:
1. The Japanese superiority in numbers.
2. They were accustomed to hills and hot weather; they were younger, carried lighter loads, and had numerous mountain artillery and pack transport.
3. Their energetic and intelligent leadership.