The insufficient tactical preparation of our troops—
Measures taken to improve it.
I have touched upon the fact of how our want of tactical training was shown up in the Crimean and second Turkish Wars. Especially conspicuous was the inability of our senior commanders—relying as they usually did upon quite inadequate information as to the enemy’s strength and dispositions—to co-ordinate the operations of the different arms towards one end, and their ignorance of where to deliver the main attack. The minor part played by our cavalry and our comparatively great power of defence were also remarked. Finally, attention was drawn to the fact that our lack of the power of manœuvre compelled us to place superior numbers in the field against the Turks, a course which had not formerly been necessary.
After the war of 1877–78 we set to work to study our weak points, in order to eliminate our faults. Much must have been accomplished since then, for the tactical training of the army at the beginning of the recent war was undoubtedly of a higher standard than it was twenty-five years ago. Still, in some matters we had not progressed, while in others we had actually gone back. The duty of training the troops rests with commanding officers of all ranks, and the responsibility for this extends right up to those in command of military districts. Although the same drill-books and manuals are used by the whole army, there is considerable variety in the way that the tactical instruction is imparted, owing to the diverse views held by the district commanders. I have taken part in many manœuvres, and was in command of the army at the grand manœuvres at Kursk in 1902, and I noted down what I considered to be our principal failings in this respect. In October, 1903, I submitted a report on the subject to the Tsar, in which my conclusions on certain points were as follows:
“1. Staff Work with the Main Army and with
Detached Columns at the Grand Manœuvres.
“Generally speaking, the staff work cannot be characterized as entirely satisfactory. The principal reasons for this were the somewhat unhappy selection of the officers appointed to be chiefs of the different staffs, the poor organization of the staffs themselves, due to a limited personnel and to an insufficient supply of the means of communication [telegraph and telephone equipment] for both the troops and staffs, and the neglect to arrange proper intercommunication between units by making use of mounted orderlies, automobiles, or cyclists. Intelligence of the enemy as well as of the disposition of other units was always received late by those whom it concerned, because the cavalry was badly organized, and could not carry out its orders properly.
“The amount of writing done by the various staff-officers was colossal. They worked the whole evening and all night; their effusions were lithographed or printed, and were sent off in all directions; but the orders were rarely received by the troops in proper time. At the manœuvres of the Warsaw Military District in 1899, cases came under my notice of general officers commanding divisions receiving the order to move in the morning two hours after the time appointed for them to start.
“In many instances staff-officers with troops seemed ignorant of how a reconnaissance should be carried out, and consequently did not gauge the dispositions of the enemy’s forces with sufficient accuracy. This reacted in turn on the dispositions made by the chief commanders, more particularly in their employment of the reserves (Kursk manœuvres and those at Pskoff and Vlodava). Similarly, they did not know how to arrange for the maintenance of touch along the front and to the rear, a defect which caused a delay in the receipt of orders and information which was quite avoidable.
“2. Work of the Cavalry at Manœuvres.