3. The Fu-shun coal-mines, which were most necessary to us (for railway fuel), were right in front of the position.
These drawbacks, as well as our great desire to prevent any of the enemy’s forces being detached for the reinforcement of Nogi’s besieging army, drove us to try and take the offensive as soon as possible.
Meanwhile the drafts whereby to replace our losses were still arriving at the front very slowly; during July and August only 4,200 men were received. On September 29 the eight corps composing the Manchurian Army could only muster 151,000 rifles, the deficit in officers being 670. Besides these corps, the Viceroy put the 6th Siberian Corps[76] under my command, with the proviso that it should not be included in the army, and should not be split up.[77] It was concentrated at Mukden on October 8. My requests that the units of the 1st Siberian Division—some ten battalions—which were not included in the army, might be made over to me were not acceded to. But although we were really too weak, an advance seemed more advantageous than waiting for the enemy to attack, for there seemed little chance of our being able to hold our ground on the Mukden positions.
According to our information, the Japanese main forces had crossed on to the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, between Liao-yang and Pen-hsi-hu, and were disposed approximately as follows: In the centre, behind the line Yen-tai station–Yen-tai mines, six divisions with brigades in reserve; on the right, écheloned along the line Pan-chia-pu-tzu–Pen-hsi-hu, two divisions with brigades in reserve; on the left, more or less along the line San-de-pu–Sha-tai-tzu, two divisions with their reserves. The enemy had fortified their positions on the Yen-tai heights and at Pan-chia-pu-tzu. It was decided, therefore, that the first object of our advance was to hurl the Japanese back on to the left bank of the Tai-tzu Ho. To do this we were to deliver a frontal attack, and at the same time endeavour to turn their right, so that, if successful, we should dislodge them from the hills. Orders were issued for the forward movement to commence on October 5. The following was the plan of advance decided upon by me:
1. Western Force.—This force, under Bilderling, consisting of the 10th and 17th Corps (total, 64 battalions, 40 squadrons and sotnias, 196 guns, and 2 sapper battalions), was to make a demonstration in front against the enemy’s main force.
2. Eastern Force.—This force, under Shtakelberg, consisting of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Siberians (total, 73 battalions, 29 squadrons and sotnias, 142 guns, 6 mortars, 32 machine-guns, and 3 sapper battalions), was to attack the right flank of the enemy, moving round it from the east. The first objective of this force was the enemy’s positions at Pan-chia-pu-tzu.[78]
3. The General Reserve.—This, consisting of the 1st Army Corps and 4th Siberians, with Mischenko’s brigade (total, 56 battalions, 20 sotnias, 208 guns, 30 mortars, and 2 sapper battalions), was to move up in rear of the interval between the western and eastern forces.
4. The 6th Siberians (32 battalions, 6 sotnias, 96 guns, and 1 sapper battalion) was to remain temporarily in Mukden (with a brigade at Tieh-ling), so that it might either be moved to a flank or added to the reserve, according as the operations developed.
5. Flank Guards.—A force of 30½ battalions, 39 sotnias, 82 guns, and 1 sapper battalion was told off to protect the flanks. Of this, 19½ battalions, 25 sotnias, 64 guns, and the sapper battalion were to take part in the attack of the enemy’s position while keeping touch with Dembovski’s and Rennenkampf’s columns of the eastern and western forces respectively.
6. Should the enemy concentrate towards their right, an endeavour was to be made to break through their centre in the direction of the Yen-tai mines by the 6th Siberians, with Bilderling’s force and the general reserve.