“5. The Work of the Artillery.
“Artillery positions were in most cases skilfully chosen, but the fire discipline was often bad. As batteries can only carry a limited number of rounds in the field, it is vital that the gunners should be taught to economize every round; this is, of course, particularly important with quick-firing guns. But we often fired more rounds than were necessary: fire was opened too hurriedly, at quite unimportant targets, with the result that, at the critical moment of the attack, batteries had to signal that they were in action, for all their ammunition had been expended.[1]
“6. The Work of the Sappers.
“The bloody lessons of Plevna and Gora Dubniak put fresh life into our military engineering, which lasted for a certain time after the Turkish War. Our sappers became skilful at constructing trenches and redoubts, and the other troops were also trained in field-works, and began to like entrenching themselves. But a reaction soon set in. This was largely due to General Dragomiroff, who did much to bring about a return to the old order of things, when it was held that everything was decided by the bayonet. He was quite opposed to the use of cover, and carried his orders on this subject to the height of absurdity, even forbidding his men to lie down while advancing to attack!
“To dig oneself into the ground means labour, and takes much time. Moreover, instructions used to be issued that all trenches dug had to be filled in again, and all redoubts dismantled. This at once limited the scope of trench-work in the army. The entrenching tool, which after the Turkish War had been valued next to cartridges and biscuits, was relegated to the mobilization store, and never brought out for use or even for inspection. At many manœuvres the men were not practised at all in the fortification of positions; at others the alignment of trenches was traced only. While giving the sapper units full credit for their excellent training, I cannot but express my fear that they specialize far too much in a mass of detail, and ignore the fact that their main duty in war is to co-operate in every way with the infantry, both in strengthening defensive positions and in the attack of them.
“7. Criticism by Commanders.
“It is gradually becoming the custom to omit all criticisms[2] at grand manœuvres. Mistakes, therefore, pass unnoticed, are repeated, and tend to become chronic. I remember some very instructive manœuvre criticisms made by General Gurko, and I have listened with interest and advantage to others made by General Roop. Discussions after the operations are always held in the Kieff and St. Petersburg Military Districts, but nowadays some officers in command of districts neither make any remarks themselves when present at manœuvres, nor expect them to be made by the officers commanding sides or the other seniors. Orders issued after a long period—though they may enumerate the various points noticed—and the reports eventually printed of large concentrations and manœuvres, are comparatively useless for instruction. To be of use, criticisms must be made by the commanders, and made on the spot.
“It is, however, important to realize how rare the power of good criticism is. The remarks usually made are either quite colourless or too highly pitched. Some of our most capable general officers also seem peculiarly ‘unlucky’ in the way they manage unnecessarily to hurt the feelings of commanding officers by their harsh way of putting things. They forget that to lower the prestige of a senior in the presence of his juniors always produces a bitter harvest, especially in war. They forget the infinite variety of the conditions of different tactical situations, and that at peace manœuvres there is no need for one side to win or lose. Again, independent action, though certainly not wrong in itself, is often put down as a mistake and adjudged to be wrong because the senior commander has his own opinion in the matter. Such narrow-minded criticism deprives officers in command of units of the spirit of independence, of initiative, and of the desire for responsibility. Instead, they try to discover the fads of the officer in command, in order to ‘play up’ to them.
“8. Conclusion as to the Tactical Instruction of our Troops.