Fortune was, meanwhile, preparing for Bonaparte the most terrible of all reverses. On leaving Alexandria, he had earnestly recommended to Admiral Brueys to secure his squadron from the English, either by taking it into the harbour of Alexandria, or by proceeding with it to Corfu; and he had particularly enjoined him not to leave it in the road of Abukir, for it was much better to fall in with an enemy when under sail than to receive him at anchor. A warm discussion had arisen on the question whether the ships of 80 and 120 guns could be carried into the harbour of Alexandria. As to the smaller ships, there was no doubt; but the larger would require lightening so much as to enable them to draw three feet less water. For this purpose it would be necessary to take out their guns, or to construct floats. On such conditions, Admiral Brueys resolved not to take his squadron into the harbour. The time which he spent, either in sounding the channels to the harbour, or in waiting for news from Cairo, caused his own destruction.
Admiral Brueys was moored in the road of Abukir. This road is a very regular semicircle, and his thirteen ships formed a line parallel to the shore, and so disposed that he believed no British ship could pass between him and the shore, if an attack were made.
Nelson, after visiting the Archipelago, and returning to the Adriatic, Naples, and Sicily, had at length obtained the certain knowledge of the landing of the French at Alexandria. He immediately steered in that direction in order to seek and put to flight their squadron. He sent a frigate to look out for it, and to reconnoitre its position. The English frigate, having made her observations, rejoined Nelson, who, being informed of all the particulars, immediately stood in for Abukir, and arrived there August 1, 1798, at about six o’clock in the evening. Admiral Brueys was at dinner. He immediately ordered the signal for battle to be given; but so unprepared was the squadron to receive the enemy, that the hammocks were not stowed away on board any of the ships, and part of the crews were on shore. The admiral despatched officers to send the seamen on board, and to demand part of those who were in the transports. He had no conception that Nelson would dare to attack him the same evening, and conceived that he should have time to receive the reinforcements for which he had applied.
Nelson resolved to attack immediately, and to push in between the French ships and the shore at all hazards. “Before this time to-morrow” said he, “I shall have gained a peerage or Westminster Abbey.”
The number of vessels was equal on both sides, namely, thirteen ships of war. The engagement lasted upwards of fifteen hours. All the crews performed prodigies of valour. The brave Captain Du Petit-Thouars had two of his limbs shot off. He ordered snuff to be brought him, and remained on his quarter-deck, and, like Brueys, waited till a cannon-ball despatched him. The entire French squadron, excepting the two ships and two frigates carried off by Villeneuve, was destroyed. Nelson had suffered so severely that he could not pursue the fugitives. Such was the famous battle of Abukir, the most disastrous that the French had ever sustained, and involved the most far-reaching consequences. The fleet which had carried the French to Egypt, which might have served to succour or to recruit them, which was to second their movements on the coast of Syria,—had there been any to execute,—which was to overawe the Porte, to force it to put up with false reasoning, and to oblige it to wink at the invasion of Egypt, which finally, in case of reverses, was to convey the French back to their country,—that fleet was destroyed. The French ships were burned. The news of this disaster spread rapidly in Egypt, and for a moment filled the army with despair. Bonaparte received the tidings with imperturbable composure. “Well,” he said, “we must die in this country, or get out of it as great as the ancients.” He wrote to Kléber: “This will oblige us to do greater things than we intended. We must hold ourselves in readiness.” The great soul of Kléber was worthy of this language: “Yes,” replied Kléber, “we must do great things. I am preparing my faculties.” The courage of these men supported the army, and restored its confidence.
Bonaparte strove to divert the thoughts of the soldiers by various expeditions, and soon made them forget this disaster. On the festival of the foundation of the republic, he endeavoured to give a new stimulus to their imagination; he engraved on Pompey’s Pillar the names of the first forty soldiers slain in Egypt. They were the forty who had fallen in the attack on Alexandria; and the names of these men, sprung from the villages of France, were thus associated with the immortality of Pompey and Alexander.
Bonaparte, after the battle of the Pyramids, found himself master of Egypt. He began to establish himself there, and sent his generals into the provinces to complete their conquest. Desaix, placed at the entrance of Upper Egypt with a division of about three thousand men, was directed to reduce the remnants of Murad Bey’s force in that province. It was in the preceding year (October, 1798), at the moment when the inundation was over, that Desaix had commenced his expedition. The enemy had retired before him, and did not wait for him till he reached Sediman; there, on October 7th, Desaix fought a sanguinary battle with the desperate remainder of Murad Bey’s forces. Two thousand French had to combat with four thousand Mamluks and eight thousand fellahs, intrenched in the village of Sediman. The battle was conducted in the same manner as that of the Pyramids, and like all those fought in Egypt. The fellahs were behind the walls of the village, and the horse in the plain. The field of battle was thickly strewn with slain. The French lost three hundred men. Desaix continued his march during the whole winter, and, after a series of actions, reduced Upper Egypt as far as the cataracts. He made himself equally feared for his bravery and beloved for his clemency. In Cairo, Bonaparte had been named Sultan Kebir, the Fire Sultan. In Upper Egypt, Desaix was called the “Just Sultan.”
Bonaparte had meanwhile marched to Belbeys, to drive Ibrahim Bey into Syria, and he had collected by the way the wrecks of the caravan of Mecca, plundered by the Arabs. Returning to Cairo, he continued to establish there an entirely French administration. Thus passed the winter between 1798 and 1799 in the expectation of important events. During this interval, Bonaparte received intelligence of the declaration of war by the Porte, and of the preparations which it was making against him with the aid of the English. Two armies were being formed, one at Rhodes, the other in Syria. These two armies were to act simultaneously in the spring of 1799, the one by landing at Abukir near Alexandria, the other by crossing the desert which separates Syria from Egypt. Bonaparte was instantly aware of his position, and determined, as was his custom, to disconcert the enemy and to forestall any offensive movement by a sudden attack. He could not cross the desert which parts Egypt from Syria in summer, and he resolved to avail himself of the winter for destroying the assemblages of troops forming at Acre, at Damascus, and in the principal towns. Djezzar, the celebrated pasha of Acre, was appointed seraskier of the army collected in Syria. Abd Allah Pasha of Damascus commanded its advanced-guard, and had proceeded as far as the fort of El Arish, which is the key to Egypt on the side next to Syria. Bonaparte resolved to act immediately. He was in communication with the tribes of the Lebanon. The Druses, Christian tribes, the Mutualis, and schismatic Muhammedans offered him assistance, and ardently wished for his coming. By a sudden assault on Jaffa, Acre, and some other badly fortified places, he might in a short time gain possession of Syria, add this fine conquest to that of Egypt, make himself master of the Euphrates, as he was of the Nile, and thus command all the communications with India.