Kléber, however, was the most popular of the generals among the soldiery. His name was hailed by them with entire confidence, and somewhat cheered them for the loss of the illustrious commander who had just left them. He returned to Cairo, assumed the command with a sort of ostentation, and took possession of the fine Arabian mansion which his predecessor had occupied in the Ezbekieh Place. But it was not long before the solicitudes of the chief command, which were insupportable to him, the new dangers with which the Turks and the English threatened Egypt, and the grief of exile, which was general, filled his soul with the most gloomy discouragement.
Kléber, together with Poussielgue, the administrator of the army, at once prepared and addressed despatches to the Directory, placing the condition of the troops, the finances, and the number of the enemy in the most melancholy light. These despatches fell into the hands of the English, and the duplicate reports found their way into the hands of Bonaparte himself. Bonaparte had left instructions with Kléber to meet every possible contingency during his absence, even to the necessity of an evacuation of Egypt. “I am going to France,” said he, “either as a private man or as a public man; I will get reinforcement sent to you. But if by next spring (he was writing in August, 1799) you have received no supplies, no instructions; if the plague has carried off more than fifteen hundred men, independently of losses by war; if a considerable force, which you should be incapable of resisting, presses you hard, negotiate with the vizier: consent even, if it must be so, to an evacuation; subject to one condition, that of referring to the French government; and meanwhile continue to occupy. You will thus have gained time, and it is impossible that, during the interval, you should not have received succour.”
The instructions were very sound; but the case foreseen was far from being realised at the time when Kléber determined to negotiate for the evacuation of Egypt. Murad Bey, disheartened, was a fugitive in Upper Egypt with a few Mamluks. Ibrahim Bey, who, under the government of the Mamluks, shared the sovereignty with him, was then in Lower Egypt towards the frontier of Syria.. He had four hundred horse. Djezzar Pasha was shut up in St. Jean d’Acre, and, so far from preparing a reinforcement of men for the army of the grand vizier, he viewed, on the contrary, with high displeasure, the approach of a fresh Turkish army, now that his pashalik was delivered from the French. As for the grand vizier, he was not yet across the Taurus. The English had their troops at Mahon, and were not at this moment aggressive. At Kléber’s side was General Menou, who viewed everything under the most favourable colours, and believed the French to be invincible in Egypt, and regarded the expedition as the commencement of a near and momentous revolution in the commerce of the world. Kléber and Menou were both honest, upright men; but one wanted to leave Egypt, the other to stay in it; the clearest and most authentic returns conveyed to them totally contrary significations; misery and ruin to one, abundance and success to the other.
In September, 1799, Desaix, having completed the conquest and subjugation of Upper Egypt, had left two movable columns for the pursuit of Murad Bey, to whom he had offered peace on condition of his becoming a vassal of France. He then returned to Cairo by the order of Kléber, who wished to make use of his name in those negotiations into which he was about to enter. During these proceedings, the army of the grand vizier, so long announced, was slowly advancing. Sir Sidney Smith, who convoyed with his squadron the Turkish troops destined to be transported by sea, had just arrived off Dami-etta with eight thousand janizaries, and on the first of November, 1799, the landing of the first division of four thousand janizaries was effected. At the first tidings of this disembarkation, Kléber had despatched Desaix with a column of three thousand men; but the latter, uselessly sent to Damietta, had found the victory won,—the Turkish division having been completely destroyed by General Verdier,—and the French filled with unbounded confidence. This brilliant achievement ought to have served to encourage Kléber; unfortunately, he was swayed at once by his own lack of confidence and that of the army. In this disposition of mind, Kléber had sent one of his officers to the vizier (who had entered Syria), to make new overtures of peace. General Bonaparte, with a view to embroiling the vizier with the English, had previously entertained the idea of setting on foot negotiations, which, on his part, were nothing more than a feint. His overtures had been received with great distrust and pride. Kléber ‘s advances met with a favourable reception, through the influence of Sir Sidney Smith, who was preparing to play a prominent part in the affairs of Egypt. This officer had largely contributed to prevent the success of the siege of St. Jean d’Acre; he was proud of it, and had devised a ruse de guerre by taking advantage of a momentary weakness to wrest from the French their valuable conquest. With this view, he had disposed the grand vizier to listen to the overtures of Kléber. Kléber, on his part, despatched Desaix and Poussielgue as negotiators to Sir Sidney Smith; for, since the English were masters of the sea, he wished to induce them to take part in the negotiation, so that the return to France might be rendered possible. Sir Sidney manifested a disposition to enter into arrangements, acting as “Minister Plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty,” and attributing to himself a power which he had ceased to hold since the arrival of Lord Elgin as ambassador at Constantinople. Poussielgue was an advocate for evacuation; Desaix just the reverse. The conditions proposed by Kléber were unreasonable: not that they were an exorbitant equivalent for what was given up in giving up Egypt, but because they were not feasible. Sir Sidney made Kléber sensible of this. Officers treating for a mere suspension of arms could not include topics of vast extent in their negotiation, such as the demand for the possession of the Venetian Islands, and the annulment of the Triple Alliance. But it was urgently necessary to settle two points immediately: the departure of the wounded and of the scientific men attached to the expedition, for whom Desaix solicited safe-conduct; and secondly, a suspension of arms, for the army of the grand vizier, though marching slowly, would soon be in presence of the French. It had actually arrived before the fort of El Arish, the first French post on the frontiers of Syria, and had summoned it to surrender. The negotiations, in fact, had been going on for a fortnight on board Le Tigre, while floating at the pleasure of the winds off the coasts of Syria and Egypt: the parties had said all they had to say, and the negotiations could not be continued to any useful purpose without the concurrence of the grand vizier. Sir Sidney, availing himself of a favourable moment, pushed off in a boat which landed him on the coast, after incurring some danger, and ordered the captain of Le Tigre to meet him in the port of Jaffa, where Poussielgue and Desaix were to be put ashore, if the conferences were to be transferred to the camp of the grand vizier.
At the moment when the English commodore reached the camp, a horrible event had occurred at El Arish. The grand vizier had collected around him an army of seventy or eighty thousand fanatic Mussulmans. The Turks were joined by the Mamluks. Ibrahim Bey, who had some time before retired to Syria, and Murad Bey, who had descended by a long circuit from the cataracts to the environs of Suez, had become the auxiliaries of their former adversaries. The English had made for this army a sort of field-artillery, drawn by mules. The fort of El Arish, before which the Turks were at this moment, was, according to the declaration of General Bonaparte, one of the two keys of Egypt; Alexandria was the other.
The Turkish advanced-guard having reached El Arish, Colonel Douglas, an English officer in the service of Turkey, summoned Cazals, the commandant, to surrender. The culpable sentiments which the officers had too much encouraged in the army then burst forth. The soldiers in the garrison at El Arish, vehemently longing, like their comrades, to leave Egypt, declared to the commandant that they would not fight, and that he must make up his mind to surrender the fort.
The gallant Cazals indignantly refused, and a struggle with the Turks ensued. During this contest, the recreants, who insisted on surrendering, threw ropes to the Turks; these ferocious enemies, once hoisted up into the fort, rushed, sword in hand, upon those who had given them admission into the fort, and slaughtered a great number of them. The others, brought back to reason, joined the rest of the garrison, and, defending themselves with desperate courage, were most of them killed. A small number obtained quarter, thanks to that humane and distinguished officer, Colonel Douglas.
It was now the 30th of December: the letter written by Sir Sidney Smith to the grand vizier, to propose to him a suspension of arms, had not reached him in time to prevent the melancholy catastrophe at El Arish. Sir Sidney Smith was a man of generous feelings: this barbarous massacre of a French garrison horrified him, and, above all, it made him fearful of the rupture of the negotiations. He lost no time in sending explanations to Kléber, both in his own name and that of the grand vizier, and he added the formal assurance that all hostility should cease during the negotiations.