In such discussions, he wrote without the slightest trace of jingoism or sensation mongering; and it would be a fanatic advocate of immediate disarmament and universal arbitration who would deny the steadying and beneficent effect of his opposition, with its grip on realities and steadfast respect for truth. Whatever he wrote was not only backed by firm conviction but inspired by the highest ideals.
His style naturally varied somewhat with the audience and the theme. His historical writings have been justly described as burdened with qualifications, and marked by a laborious fullness of statement, which strains the attention, while it adds weight and dignity to the presentation. This in general is true of the histories; but there are many passages in these where the subject inspires him to genuine eloquence. In the “Life of Nelson” and “Types of Naval Officers” there is little of the defect mentioned, and there are few more entertaining volumes of naval reminiscence than “From Sail to Steam.” “The besetting anxiety of my soul,” writes the author himself, “was to be exact and lucid. I might not succeed, but my wish was indisputable. To be accurate in facts and correct in conclusions, both as to application and expression, dominated all other motives.”[[12]] One might dispense with reams of “fine writing” for a page of prose guided by these standards.
On December 1, 1914, Rear Admiral Mahan died suddenly of heart failure. A month before, he had left his home at Quogue, Long Island, and come to Washington to pursue investigations for a history of American expansion and its bearing on sea power. His death, occurring four months after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, was perhaps hastened by constant study of the diplomatic and military events of the war, the approach of which he had clearly foreseen, as well as America’s vital interest in the Allied cause. It was unfortunate that his political and professional wisdom should have been lost at that time.
His work, however, was largely accomplished. By his influence on both public and professional opinion, by prevision and warm advocacy, he had done much to further the execution of many important naval and national policies. Among such may be mentioned the peace-time concentration of fleets in preparation for war, the abandonment of a strictly defensive naval policy, the systematic study of professional problems, the strengthening of our position in the Caribbean, the fortification of Panama. “His interest,” writes Mr. Roosevelt, “was in the larger side of his subjects; he was more concerned with the strategy than with the tactics of both naval war and statesmanship.” In this larger field his writings will retain a value little affected by the lapse of time.
Allan Westcott.
United States Naval Academy,
June, 1918.
CONTENTS
| PAGE | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Introduction | [v] | ||
| PART I | |||
| NAVAL PRINCIPLES | |||
| 1. | The Value of Historical Study | [3] | |
| 2. | “Theoretical” versus “Practical” Training | [8] | |
| A Historical Instance | [8] | ||
| What is Practical? | [10] | ||
| 3. | Elements of Sea Power | [16] | |
| 4. | Definition of Terms: Strategy, Tactics, Logistics | [49] | |
| 5. | Fundamental Principles | [50] | |
| Central Position, Interior Lines, Communications | [50] | ||
| Concentration | [60] | ||
| 6. | Strategic Positions | [68] | |
| I. | Situation | [69] | |
| II. | Military Strength | [70] | |
| III. | Resources | [74] | |
| 7. | Strategic Lines | [75] | |
| Communications | [75] | ||
| Importance of Sea Communications | [76] | ||
| 8. | Offensive Operations | [79] | |
| 9. | The Value of the Defensive | [87] | |
| 10. | Commerce-Destroying and Blockade | [91] | |
| Command of the Sea Decisive | [98] | ||
| 11. | Strategic Features of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean | [100] | |
| 12. | Principles of Naval Administration | [113] | |
| Opposing Elements | [113] | ||
| The British System | [118] | ||
| The United States System | [122] | ||
| 13. | The Military Rule of Obedience | [125] | |
| 14. | Preparedness for Naval War | [128] | |
| PART II | |||
| SEA POWER IN HISTORY | |||
| 15. | A Nation Exhausted by Isolation | [137] | |
| France under Louis XIV | [137] | ||
| 16. | The Growth of British Sea Power | [141] | |
| England after the Peace of Utrecht, 1715 | [141] | ||
| 17. | Results of the Seven Years’ War | [147] | |
| 18. | Eighteenth Century Formalism in Naval Tactics | [155] | |
| 19. | The New Tactics | [159] | |
| Rodney and De Guichen, April 17, 1780 | [159] | ||
| 20. | Sea Power in the American Revolution | [164] | |
| Graves and De Grasse off the Chesapeake | [164] | ||
| 21. | The French Navy Demoralized by the Revolution | [171] | |
| 22. | Howe’s Victory of June 1, 1794 | [175] | |
| 23. | Nelson’s Strategy at Copenhagen | [184] | |
| 24. | England’s First Line of Defense | [191] | |
| 25. | The Battle of Trafalgar | [196] | |
| “The Nelson Touch” | [200] | ||
| The Battle | [208] | ||
| Commerce Warfare after Trafalgar | [223] | ||
| 26. | General Strategy of the War of 1812 | [229] | |
| Results of the Northern Campaign | [235] | ||
| 27. | Lessons of the War with Spain | [241] | |
| The Possibilities of a “Fleet in Being” | [241] | ||
| 28. | The Santiago Blockade | [250] | |
| 29. | “Fleet in Being” and “Fortress Fleet” | [256] | |
| The Port Arthur Squadron in the Russo-Japanese War | [256] | ||
| Divided Forces | [269] | ||
| 30. | Rozhestvensky at Tsushima | [276] | |
| PART III | |||
| NAVAL AND NATIONAL POLICIES | |||
| 31. | Expansion and Over-Sea Bases | [285] | |
| The Annexation of Hawaii | [285] | ||
| 32. | Application of the Monroe Doctrine | [288] | |
| Anglo-American Community of Interests | [288] | ||
| 33. | Changes in the United States and Japan | [296] | |
| 34. | Our Interests in the Pacific | [299] | |
| 35. | The German State and its Menace | [302] | |
| The Bulwark of British Sea Power | [306] | ||
| 36. | Advantages of Insular Position | [309] | |
| Great Britain and the Continental Powers | [309] | ||
| 37. | Bearing of Political Developments on Naval Policy and Strategy | [317] | |
| 38. | Seizure of Private Property at Sea | [328] | |
| 39. | The Moral Aspect of War | [342] | |
| 40. | The Practical Aspect of War | [348] | |
| 41. | Motives for Naval Power | [355] | |
| APPENDIX | |||
| Chronological Outline | [359] | ||
| Academic Honors | [360] | ||
| Published Works | [361] | ||
| Uncollected Essays | [362] | ||
| References | [362] | ||
| INDEX | [365] | ||