[16]. “The Influence of Sea Power upon History,” pp. 25–59. Mr. S. G. W. Benjamin has pointed out (N. Y. Times Book Review, Feb. 2, 1902) that it was in the preface and opening chapter of this book, “comprising only eighty-nine pages, that Captain Mahan brought forward his famous presentation of the theory about the influence of sea power on empire.” The present selection includes the major part of the first chapter.—Editor.
[17]. For the author’s later opinion on the need of a navy, see pp. [355]–357.—Editor.
[18]. Written before 1890.—Editor.
[19]. By a base of permanent operations “is understood a country whence come all the resources, where are united the great lines of communication by land and water, where are the arsenals and armed posts.”
[20]. “Naval Administration and Warfare,” pp. 199, 206. For the distinction drawn, see also pp. [4], [12].—Editor.
[21]. “Naval Strategy,” pp. 31–53.
[22]. An interesting instance of the method and forethought which cause German naval development of all kinds to progress abreast, on parallel lines, is found in the fact that by the time the three Dreadnoughts laid down in 1911 are completed, and with them two complete Dreadnought squadrons of eight each, which probably will be in 1914, the Kiel Canal will have been enlarged to permit their passage. There will then be a fleet of thirty-eight battleships; including these sixteen, which will be stationed, eight in the North Sea, eight in the Baltic, linked for mutual support by the central canal. The programme contemplates a continuous prearranged replacing of the present pre-Dreadnoughts by Dreadnoughts.
[24]. “Naval Strategy,” pp. 130–163.
[25]. “Naval Strategy,” pp. 166–167. For illustration and further discussion of strategic lines, see “General Strategy of the War of 1812,” in this volume, pp. [229]–240.—Editor.