As before said, Ladysmith is surrounded on three sides by hills which overtop it; railroad lines and stations, indeed, do not commonly prefer summits to valleys. On the 30th of October the Boers had already mounted a 40-pounder gun on Peppworth's Hill, north of the town, with which on that day they opened fire at a distance of over 6,000 yards, much outranging the army field artillery. It was in connection with the general sortie of the garrison to seize that position that the disaster of Nicholson's Nek was incurred.
This first threatening outlook was materially modified by the arrival the same day of the six naval guns from Durban, two of which were of power equal to the Boers' heavy pieces, and all of a range superior to those previously at White's disposal. By the 3rd of November a second long gun had been placed by the besiegers some 8,000 yards—between four and five miles—south-east of the town, upon Mount Umbulwani; from which, and from an eminence known indifferently as Lombard's Kop and as Little Bulwana, three miles to the northward, and also east of the place, the worst of the heavy gun fire upon the town itself, as distinguished from the lines of defence, seems to have proceeded. On the 28th the Boers had established within 5,000 yards—less than three miles—of the western defences a third 40-pounder, to which, we learn from Joubert's despatches, his gunners with grim military humour gave the name of "Franchise"—in mockery, doubtless, of the British Government's demands on behalf of the Uitlanders. It may be mentioned here that throughout the war the Boers have shown a remarkable facility in transporting these heavy cannon, placing them with surprising rapidity in positions unexpected by their opponents. On the 29th the besieged could count twenty-six guns in place upon the lines of attack; but of these, at that time, only the three specified were guns "of position," to be reckoned as units of a siege train. The British defensive works, when finally established, measured in circuit some sixteen miles. The range of the heavier hostile guns, as revealed by their early practice, compelled an extension to this degree, in order to hold them back beyond easy command of the town. Fortunately this perimeter, which would indicate the enclosed area to have a diameter of from five to six miles, could be manned without overtaxing the numbers of the garrison. At the moment of investment the British force fit for duty was 572 officers and 12,924 men; total, 13,496. Of these, during the siege, 88 officers and 732 men were killed or wounded; but sickness and want of food had so far further reduced the numbers that on the day of relief there were of effectives only 403 officers and 9,761 men, and of these it was significantly added that "they are the only troops fit to do even a two-miles march."[17]
Long before this condition of destitution and debility was reached the besiegers found their hands so occupied by the British relieving forces that the besieged had little more to do than to hold on. When the danger to Ladysmith had decided the British authorities to depart from the original plan, of a single forward movement in mass through the Free State, and to organise instead a double advance, with divided forces, for the simultaneous relief of Ladysmith and of Kimberley—as well as certain other subsidiary operations by French and Gatacre—heavy reinforcements were at once directed upon Natal. Hildyard's brigade, which had left England before the news of Talana Hill was received, went on at once from Cape Town without disembarking, reaching Durban before November 17. Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Clery continued on to the same port from his original destination, Port Elizabeth, and upon arrival, November 18, took command of all the forces in the colony south of Ladysmith. He was followed exactly a week later by the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Redvers Buller, drawn in person by the irresistible logic of events to the scene which his own action, or that of the Government, had determined to be the chief among several centres of active operations.
Meantime, since the day of investment, much had been happening, and conditions were rapidly taking shape. Upon the 9th of November Joubert directed an attack upon the defences of Ladysmith. This delay of a week has not yet been explained, and is to be justified only upon grounds of necessity, in the Boer commander's inability, however occasioned, sooner to get his numbers together, concentrated and disposed for so grave an enterprise. The solution is probably to be found partly in his own natural temperament, which his previous career, though political rather than military, indicates to have been cautious, and lacking in the aggressive quality that has given President Kruger, in civic contests, a continuous triumph over his more cultivated and progressive, but less combative, rival.
It is to this trait of wariness, seeking to compass ends by indirection and compromise rather than by open conflict, that Joubert's failure to achieve success in public life has been plausibly attributed, and from it arose the nickname "Slim (crafty) Piet" attached to him by his countrymen. "It was this want of assertiveness and of determination in following any marked line of action which prevented Joubert from playing a great part in the fortunes of the Republic. Opportunities occurred again and again after the advent of the Uitlanders when a vigorous assertion of himself would have placed him in a position to defeat Mr. Kruger. But the habit of indolence, so often found associated with a big physical frame, and a certain element of Scotch 'canniness,' which led him to refuse to accept risks, prevented his offering serious opposition to the Kruger clique."
This estimate of Joubert's characteristics is recently confirmed by two sympathetic observers from within the Boer lines. "Mr. Davitt, in a letter from Kroonstad to the Dublin Freeman's Journal, declares that the Boers were not at all dismayed by the death of General Joubert, which they agreed was in no sense a misfortune. He was too merciful in his notions of warfare. Ladysmith could easily have been taken on more than one occasion had Joubert not vetoed the proposed assaults."[18] The second correspondent relates that General Joubert overruled the desire of the burghers to assault Ladysmith, saying "at a War Council that the city was not worth to the Boers the lives of 500 burghers." If Joubert really said that, he ought unquestionably to have been at once relieved from command; but as the incident is preceded by the statement that "the burghers were confident of their ability to take it in a hand-to-hand fight, notwithstanding that the English outnumbered them more than two to one,"[19] the source of the correspondent's information is open to some question.
To make war without running risks—not mere risk of personal danger, but of military failure—has been declared impossible by the highest authority. Yet such a temperament, betrayed in politics, being constitutional, will enter into all actions of life, and one is not surprised to read that "this characteristic of caution was the chief mark of Joubert's conduct in the field as a military commander. His idea of warfare was to act ever on the defensive." Let this be qualified so far as to say that his idea appears always to have been to act within limits of safety, to consider self-preservation—the preservation, that is, of his own forces—more important than the destruction of the enemy, and we have a view, not of Joubert only, but of his race, which goes far to explain the failures at Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking, and likewise the inefficient action at that early period of the war when alone success was locally possible, and, if locally attained, might have even compassed an ultimate victory. If to this idea be linked that which is closely akin to it—of attaining results, not by superior dexterity in the use of means, but by subtlety and ambush—and we have the explanation both of the numerous artful traps into which British detachments were led, like game into the snare of the hunter, and yet also of the sure failure to achieve success in war, for the craft of the hunter is not the skill of the warrior.
The cognate words "stratagem" and "strategist" sufficiently indicate that craft and wile are part of the professional equipment of great warriors, but with them these are not, and cannot be, predominant. Their skill is not so much to contrive success by deceiving an enemy as to command it by local superiority of force, either exerted in violence, or imposing submission by mere evidence of overpowerment. Circumvention with them aims at permanent results which it alone cannot obtain. It is but a means to the end, which is the crushing, the military annihilation, of the enemy. That can be accomplished only by force, not by mere guile. In his temperament, as shown by his action, Joubert reflected the fighting characteristics of his people, of whom he has been the most conspicuous military representative, honoured by friend and foe alike for his fearlessness, his intelligence, and his humanity. Courage of the highest proof as regards personal danger, but not the courage that throws away the scabbard, much less that which burns its ships. The hunter, meeting superior strength with superior cunning, without even the very least willingness to lose his life in order to carry his end, may be brave even to recklessness; but he rejects habitually the tone of mind distinctive of the soldier, who counts life naught if only by its sacrifice the end may be attained, or honour preserved. In so far, that element of stupidity which has been somewhat lavishly attributed to the British officers' too single-minded attention to their end, to the exclusion of care for their own persons and those of their men, has a military value not only great, but decisive. The quality needs direction and control, certainly; but, having been reproached for now two centuries, the question is apt—Where has it placed Great Britain among the nations of the earth?
The assault of November 9 began, as is usual in such cases, with a heavy artillery fire, intended to shake the endurance of those subjected to it. The Boer guns opened at 4 A.M., and under their cover the assailants moved forward. The attack was made from all sides, but the principal effort came from the northward, between the railroads leading north-east to Glencoe and north-west to the Free State. As before said, particulars are wanting; but the British had only to hold their own, except when by a rush, after a repulse of the enemy, they gained ground over which the latter had passed; whereas the Boers, having to break cover frequently in order to advance, underwent necessarily the greater burden of exposure and of loss. How large this was is still uncertain. Sir Redvers Buller, on the 5th December, telegraphed to the War Office that it was "very difficult to make any statement as to the enemy's losses. For instance, at Belmont, 81 of their dead were accounted for; they gave 15 as the number of killed. There is every reason to believe that in the fight at Ladysmith, on November 9, the enemy's loss was over 800 killed and wounded." The Boer practice of removing or concealing their slain has already been noted. The British casualties on this occasion were at the time reckoned at about 100. Whether subsequent estimates materially changed this figure is not particularised; but probably it is nearly correct, for the total losses during the investment, exclusive of the great assault of January 6, were only 355. The enemy were effectually repulsed all along the line, and the fighting was mostly over by 11 A.M. At noon a salute was fired, in honour primarily of the Prince of Wales's birthday; but, incidentally, doubtless, it expressed exultation over the garrison's own achievement.
Nearly two months elapsed before the attempt to carry the works by storm was renewed, and then, doubtless, because it had been recognised that there was at least a dangerous probability that the place might hold out, until it was relieved by the immense forces known to be accumulating. But the immediate result of the failure of the 9th was to dispose the Boer authorities not to risk further slaughter, but to trust rather to the slow process of famine for overcoming an endurance which neither they, nor probably the British outside, then thought could be so long protracted.