From February 11, when Roberts left the Modder, to March 13, when Bloemfontein was occupied, his operations and forward movement had been practically continuous. The subsequent halt, imperative as it was for the reasons stated, gave the Boers breathing time in which to recover themselves. Advance in force by the British main body was not resumed until May 2, but detachments were moved about in various directions on the near front, and on flank and rear, to occupy necessary outposts, to secure the communications, and to insure quiet among the inhabitants. During this prolonged period of recuperation and preparation the enemy resumed activity, scouring the country with their mounted men, seeking to cut off exposed parties, and by menacing the communications, to embarrass and retard the British commander in his new arrangements. In the first of these measures the Boers attained some successes; but in the second, either their numbers were too few for their object, or their habitual caution prevented resort to action in such force and at such risk as is absolutely necessary either seriously to "interrupt" communications—in the military sense of the phrase—or to produce any deterrent impression upon a commander of the experience and sound judgment of the one with whom they were dealing. Not only did they not materially threaten the communications, but it was perfectly evident that, whatever their reasons, they dared not attempt to do so.
As regards the cutting off of British detachments, of which the affairs of Reddersburg and of Koorn Spruit, near Thaba Nchu, were the most conspicuous illustrations, the only thing essential to be remarked is that such reverses on a small scale are always to be expected in war, in even the most successful campaigns. This does not mean that no blame attaches to them. Very probably in most such cases there has been carelessness or miscalculation, for which somebody merits either punishment or censure. But the Commander-in-Chief and the nation concerned have to reckon upon such mishaps; and, without affecting indifference, or neglecting to exact responsibility, they are to be regarded merely as the bruises and the barked limbs that men get in any rough sport. These they are, and usually they are nothing more. The player does not bleed to death in consequence; he simply goes on with the game. Military men, of course, understand this, but nations are too apt to be fretful as though some strange thing had happened to them.
It is not by such affairs that contests are decided—on the playground or in strategy. Lord Roberts proceeded with his preparations undisturbed by the mosquito buzzings about his ears or on his trail. At last, when ready, a second long leap was made. The British army, leaving Bloemfontein on the 2nd of May, was on the 12th at Kroonstad, over 100 miles distant. On the 24th the Vaal was crossed, and on the 31st Roberts entered Johannesburg. Five days later, on the 5th of June, the British flag was hoisted in Pretoria, the capital of the Transvaal, 250 miles from Bloemfontein. The sustained momentum of this advance, achieved in very little over a month, testifies at once to the solidity of the preparations of the British leader, and to the fruitlessness of such disseminated operations, by small bodies, as were conducted by the Boers during the British halt at Bloemfontein, and are now being carried on by Botha and De Wet. Subsidiary to the greater plan of a campaign by massed forces, they have their advantage; as a main dependence, they merely protract the agony of endurance and suffering.
Sir Redvers Buller had to await in Natal the movement of the central mass of the British force in the Orange Free State. Towards the middle of May his advance began, directed against the positions which the Boers had taken upon the Biggarsberg mountains, and on the 15th he reoccupied Dundee and Glencoe. Into the detail of these movements it is not proposed to enter. The retirement of the Boer forces before Roberts, in the Free State, uncovered the flank and endangered the communications of their brethren on the other side of the mountains. There was therefore for these nothing to do but to fall back, abandoning with a show of opposition positions whence otherwise they might have inflicted considerable loss upon the superior force assaulting them.
At the present moment, July 26, the British have communication from Johannesburg and Pretoria to the sea-coast by two routes—to Cape Town and to Durban. The actions of the Boers show that it is not in their power seriously to incommode either the one or the other. The trivial raids performed by their mounted men under De Wet and Botha may protract the sufferings of the war, and add to the close of the struggle a certain lustre of persistent resistance; but, barring events now unforeseen and scarcely to be anticipated, they cannot change the issue, which has become simply a question of endurance between combatants immeasurably unequal in resources.
INDEX
Admiralty, the British, utmost credit due to its efforts in transporting troops and material, [86].
American colonies, the, action of, in the old wars contrasted with colonial action of to-day, [77].
Army Reserve, 25,000 men called out, [32].
Army Service Corps, the, [103].
Australasia and the war, [75].
Australia supplies wheat to the Transvaal, [16].
Barbed-Wire obstacles at battle of Elandslaagte, [54];
defences at Magersfontein, [163].
Barter's, Colonel, brave deed at Modder River, [158].
Barton, Major-General, advances to Chieveley, [217].
Beira, port of, [11].
Belmont, battle of, [148]-150.
Bethlehem, [15].
Biggarsberg Range, [39], [48].
Black week of the war for the British, [168].
Bloemfontein, [11];
occupied by the British, [305].
Boers, original plan of campaign of the, [9], [26];
helped by nature of the country, [21];
their decided superiority in numbers at the beginning of hostilities, [25], [36];
ultimatum, the, [31];
guns, position of, betrayed by their flashes, [52];
procrastination, [58], [123], [129];
forces, estimation of the, [116];
trenches and tactics, [133], [144], [163];
losses in battle, difficulty of arriving at the truth respecting, [202].
Bonaparte, [111].
Brabant, General, [311].
British Army, first order to mobilize issued, [32];
gallantry and skill of the, at the opening of the campaign, [27];
officers' "stupidity," Captain Mahan's striking question on it, [201].
British Columbia and the war, [77].
British Cabinet decides to send 2,000 men to Natal, [29].
British Navy and transport service, splendid tribute to, [86] et seq.
Buffalo River, [37], [40].
Buller, General Sir Redvers, arrives at Cape Town to take chief command, [68];
assumes the command in Natal, [195].
Buluwayo, [11].
Campaign, the, compared with that of 1881, [117];
its enormous difficulties unforeseen by the British Government and people, [73];
the question as to its future conduct at the time of General Buller's arrival, [132].
Canada and the war, [75].
Canadian Regiment, gallant conduct of the, at Paardeberg, [289].
Cape, the, [4];
seized by the British 1795, again in 1806, [5].
Cape Police, the, and the defence of Kimberley, [137].
Cape Route, the, may not be equal to carrying the traffic of the Suez Canal in war time, [100].
Cattle and sheep the chief wealth of the Boer farmers, [8].
Chamberlain, Mr. Joseph, [28];
and the Colonies, [83].
Clark, Rear-Admiral Bouverie, great credit due to, as Director of Transports, [86].
Clements, General, takes Colesberg, [176].
Clery, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Francis, [195].
Codrington, Colonel, at Modder River battle, [156].
Colenso, effect of reverses at, [81];
battle of, [220]-232;
occupied by Buller's army, February 19, [296].
Colesberg taken by General Clements, [176].
Colonial Government of Natal calls for Imperial aid, [29].
Colonies, the, and the transports, [71];
splendid response of the, [74] et seq.
"Communications dominate war," [73].
Congestion at docks, wharves, and railroads in South Africa and its cause, [99].
Country, its nature favours defence, [20].
Cronje, General, and President Kruger, anecdote of, [122];
recalled from Kimberley to oppose Methuen's advance, [147];
leaves his entrenchments at Magersfontein, and commences his retreat towards Bloemfontein, [275];
surrounded and captured at Paardeberg, [275]-291
De Aar Junction, strategic importance of, [11], [33], [104].
"Defence exhausts quicker than offence," [44].
Delagoa Bay, a thorn in the side of the British, [3].
Denniss, Lieut., gallant conduct and death of—"not in vain," [245].
Devonshire Regiment, the, "save Ladysmith," [247].
Diaz, Bartholomew, [3].
Driefontein, battle of, [304].
Dundee, [22];
battle of Talana Hill, near, [43].
Dundonald, Lord, enters Ladysmith, [303].
Durban, [9].
Dutch settle at the Cape in 1652, [4].