Such was the situation when, on August 17, Cornwallis was informed that Villeneuve had put to sea with, it was said, twenty-seven or twenty-eight ships-of-the-line. He at once detached toward Ferrol Sir Robert Calder with eighteen sail, keeping with himself sixteen. This division of his fleet, which is condemned by the simplest and most generally admitted principles of warfare, transferred to Villeneuve all the advantage of central position and superior force, and was stigmatized by Napoleon as a "glaring blunder." "What a chance," he wrote, upon hearing it when all was over, "has Villeneuve missed. He might, by coming upon Brest from a wide sweep to sea, have played hide and seek with Calder and fallen upon Cornwallis; or else, with his thirty ships have beaten Calder's twenty and gained a decided preponderance." [230] This censure of both admirals was just.
While the British squadrons were concentrating in the Bay of Biscay, and the happy insight and diligence of Nelson were bringing the Mediterranean ships to the critical centre of action, Napoleon, from the heights overlooking Boulogne, was eagerly awaiting news from Villeneuve, and at the same time anxiously watching the signs of the times on the Continent, where the sky was already dark with a gathering storm. The encroachments which led to the second war with Great Britain, in 1803, had excited no less distrust among the continental powers, who were indeed more immediately and disastrously affected by them; but none had then dared to move. The violation of German neutrality in 1804, by the seizure of the Duc d'Enghien on the soil of Baden, had caused a general indignation; which, on the part of Russia and Austria, was quickened into a desire to act by his execution, regarded by most as a judicial murder. Prussia shared the anger and fears of the other powers, but not enough to decide her vacillating government.
In this state of things the fall of the Addington ministry, and the consequent vigor imparted to the foreign policy of Great Britain by Pitt's second accession to power, led naturally to another coalition; the centre of which, as ever, was found in London. The czar having remonstrated vigorously, both with Napoleon and the German Diet, upon the seizure of the Duc d'Enghien, a bitter correspondence had followed, causing the rupture of diplomatic relations between France and Russia in August, 1804. For similar reasons, and at the same time, the French embassy to Sweden was recalled. Austria still temporized, though her actions excited Napoleon's suspicions.
Early in 1805 the czar sent special envoys to London, to treat concerning certain vast schemes for the reorganization of Europe in the interests of general peace. The particular object was not reached; but on the 11th of April a treaty between Great Britain and Russia was signed, the two agreeing to promote a league among the powers to stop further encroachments by Napoleon. Six weeks later the emperor was crowned King of Italy, and in June Genoa was annexed to France. This last act, contemplated by Napoleon for many years, [231] determined Austria's accession to the treaty. By her signature, given August 9, [232] the third coalition was formed. Sweden became a party to it at the same time, and Great Britain undertook to pay subsidies to all the members.
The preparations of Austria, ever deliberate, could not escape Napoleon's watchful eye. "All my news from Italy is warlike," he writes, "and indeed Austria no longer observes any concealment." [233] Yet, trusting to his enemy's slowness and his own readiness, he did not lose hope. The position was precisely analogous to those military situations in which he had so often snatched success from overwhelming numbers, by rapidly throwing himself on one enemy before the other could join. He might even yet deal his long cherished blow to Great Britain, under which, if successful, Austria also would at once succumb. On August 13, two days after learning of Villeneuve's entry into Coruña, he instructs Talleyrand to notify the emperor that the troops assembled in the Tyrol must be withdrawn to Bohemia, leaving him free to carry on his war with England undisturbed, or by November he will be in Vienna. [234] Urgent messages are the same day sent to Villeneuve to hasten and fulfil his mission, for time was pressing; threatened by Austria and Great Britain, a blow must speedily be struck. He is no longer ordered to refrain from fighting. On the contrary, if superior to the British, counting two Spanish ships equal to one French, he is to attack at all hazards. [235] "If with thirty ships my admirals fear to attack twenty-four British, we may as well give up all hope of a navy." [236]
On the 23d of August the emperor announces to Talleyrand his final and momentous decision: "My squadron sailed August 14 from Ferrol with thirty-four ships; [237] it had no enemy in sight. If it follows my instructions, joins the Brest squadron and enters the Channel, there is still time; I am master of England. If, on the contrary, my admirals hesitate, manœuvre badly, and do not fulfil their purpose, I have no other resource than to wait for winter to cross with the flotilla. That operation is risky; it would be more so if, pressed by time, political events should oblige me to postpone it to the month of April. Such being the case, I hasten to meet the most pressing danger: I raise my camp here, and by September 23 I shall have in Germany two hundred thousand men, and twenty-five thousand in Naples. I march upon Vienna, and do not lay down my arms until I have Naples and Venice, and have no more to fear from Austria. Austria will certainly thus be quieted during the winter." These words were a prophecy. The same day numerous orders, strictly preparatory as yet, were issued to the troops in Hanover, Holland, and Italy, and other provision made for the contemplated change of purpose. At the same time, still clinging to every hope of arresting Austria, and so being left free for the invasion of England, he sent Duroc to Berlin to offer Hanover to Prussia, upon condition that the latter should move troops toward Bohemia or at least make a clear declaration to Austria.
The issue was already decided. On the 13th of August, after three fruitless attempts, Villeneuve got to sea with his twenty-nine ships-of-the-line. The frigate "Didon" was sent to seek the Rochefort squadron and direct it also upon Brest. Yet the unfortunate admiral was even then hesitating whether he should go there with his vastly greater force, and the orders were likely seriously to endanger the smaller division. As he sailed, he penned these significant words to the Minister of Marine: "The enemy's forces, more concentrated than ever, leave me little other resource than to go to Cadiz." [238]
Shortly after he cleared the harbor the wind shifted to north-east, foul for his purpose. The fleet stood to the north-west; but the ships were badly handled and several received damage. On the morning of the 15th they were two hundred and fifty miles west-north-west from Cape Finisterre; the wind blowing a moderate gale, still from the north-east. Three ships of war were in sight,—two British, the third the frigate that had been sent to seek the Rochefort squadron, but which had been captured. A Danish merchantman reported that they were lookouts from a hostile body of twenty-five ships. The story had no foundation, for Cornwallis had not yet divided his fleet; but Villeneuve pictured to himself his inefficient command meeting a force with which it was wholly unable to cope. Losing sight of the great whole of which his own enterprise was but a part, though one of vital importance, his resolution finally broke down. That evening he ordered the fleet to bear up for Cadiz. On the 20th [239] it was sighted from the three ships commanded by Collingwood, who with a small division of varying strength had watched the port since the previous May. With steady judgment, that admiral in retiring kept just out of gunshot, determined, as he said, not to be driven into the Mediterranean without dragging the enemy too through the Straits. Villeneuve had little heart to pursue. That afternoon he anchored in Cadiz, where were then assembled thirty-five French and Spanish ships-of-the-line. Collingwood at once resumed his station outside. That night one ship-of-the-line joined him, and on the 22d Sir Richard Bickerton arrived with four from the Mediterranean. On the 30th Calder appeared, bringing with him the eighteen detached by Cornwallis. In compliance with his orders he had been before Ferrol, found the port empty, and, learning that Villeneuve had sailed for Cadiz, had hastened to re-enforce the blockade. With twenty-six ships-of-the-line Collingwood held the enemy securely checked, and remained in chief command until the 28th of September, when Nelson arrived from England.
Thus ended, and forever, Napoleon's profoundly conceived and laboriously prepared scheme for the invasion of England. If it be sought to fix a definite moment which marked the final failure of so vast a plan, that one may well be chosen when Villeneuve made signal to bear up for Cadiz. When, precisely, Napoleon learned the truth, does not appear. Decrès, the Minister of Marine, had however prepared him in some measure for Villeneuve's action; and, after a momentary outburst of rage against the unfortunate admiral, he at once issued in rapid succession the directions, by which, to use his own graphic expression, his legions were made to "pirouette," and the march toward the Rhine and Upper Danube was begun. "My decision is taken," he writes to Talleyrand, August 25; "my movement is begun. Three weeks hence I shall be in Germany with two hundred thousand men." During that and the two following days order after order issued from his headquarters; and on the 28th he wrote to Duroc that the army was in full movement. To conceal his change of purpose and to gain all-important time, by lulling the suspicions of Austria, he himself remained at Boulogne, with his eyes seemingly fixed seaward, until the 3d of September, when he went to Paris. On the 24th he left the capital for the army, on the 26th he was at Strasbourg, and on the 7th of October the French army, numbering near two hundred thousand, struck the Danube below Ulm; cutting off some eighty thousand Austrians there assembled under General Mack. On the 20th, the day before Trafalgar, Ulm capitulated; thirty thousand men laying down their arms. Thirty thousand more had been taken in the actions preceding this event. [240] On the 13th of November French troops entered Vienna, and on the 2d of December the battle of Austerlitz was won over the combined Russians and Austrians. On the 26th the emperor of Germany signed the Peace of Presburg. By it he relinquished Venice with all other possessions in Italy, and ceded the Tyrol to Bavaria, the ally of France.
Austria was thus quieted for three years, but the expedition against Great Britain was never resumed. In the course of the following year difficulties arose between Prussia and France, which led to war and the overthrow of the North German kingdom at Auerstadt and Jena. Yet another campaign was needed to bring Russia to peace in 1807. Meanwhile the Boulogne flotilla was rotting on the beach. In October, 1807, Decrès, by Napoleon's orders, made an inspection of the boats and the four ports. Of the twelve hundred of the former, specially built for the invasion, not over three hundred were fit to put to sea; of the nine hundred transports nearly all were past service. The circular port at Boulogne was covered two feet deep with sand; those of Vimereux and Ambleteuse, three feet. A very few years more would suffice to bury them. [241] In 1814 an English lady, visiting Boulogne after Napoleon's first abdication, noted in her journal that the mud walls of the encampment were still to be seen on the heights behind the town,—the crumbling record of a great failure.