Footnote 96:[ (return) ]
Along the north coast of Cuba, between it and the Bahama Banks.
Footnote 97:[ (return) ]
The Ville de Paris, to which Troude attributes 104 guns. She was considered the biggest and finest ship of her day.
Footnote 98:[ (return) ]
This reproduced the blunder of Byng, between whose action and the one now under discussion there is a marked resemblance.
Footnote 99:[ (return) ]
I.e. she had stopped.
Footnote 100:[ (return) ]
Hood himself.
Footnote 101:[ (return) ]
Letters of Lord Hood, p. 32. Navy Records Society. My italics. Concerning the crucial fact of the signal for the line of battle being kept flying continuously until 5.30 P.M., upon which there is a direct contradiction between Hood and the log of the London, it is necessary to give the statement of Captain Thomas White, who was present in the action in one of the rear ships. "If the London's log, or the log of any other individual ship in the fleet, confirm this statement," (that Hood was dilatory in obeying the order for close action), "I shall be induced to fancy that what I that day saw and heard was a mere chimera of the brain, and that what I believed to be the signal for the line was not a union jack, but an ignis fatuus conjured up to mock me." White and Hood also agree that the signal for the line was rehoisted at 6.30. (White: "Naval Researches," London, 1830, p. 45.)
Footnote 102:[ (return) ]
"Letters of Lord Hood." Navy Records Society, p. 35.