The strictest discipline prevailed, and the army felt the fullest confidence in their commander and in themselves, and by these means became really formidable to the enemy. During the same winter, Governor Tryon planned an expedition to Horse Neck, for the purpose of destroying the salt-works erected there, and marched with about 2000 men. Colonel Burr received early information of their movements, and sent word to General Putnam to hold the enemy at bay for a few hours, and he (Colonel Burr) would be in their rear and be answerable for them. By a messenger from him, Colonel Burr was informed by that general that he had been obliged to retreat, and that the enemy were advancing into Connecticut. This information, which unfortunately was not correct, altered Colonel Burr's route towards Mamaroneck, which enabled Tryon to get the start of him. Colonel Burr then endeavoured to interrupt him in Eastchester, according to his first plan, and actually got within cannon-shot of him; but Tryon ran too fast, and in his haste left most or all of his cattle and plunder behind him, and many stragglers, who were picked up.
I will mention another enterprise, which proved more successful, though equally hazardous. Soon after Tryon's retreat, Colonel Delancey, who commanded the British refugees, in order to secure themselves against surprise, erected a block-house on a rising ground below Delancey's bridge. This Colonel Burr resolved to destroy. I was in that expedition, and recollect the circumstances.
He procured a number of hand-grenades, also rolls of port-fire, and canteens filled with inflammable materials, with contrivances to attach them to the side of the block-house. He set out with his troops early in the evening, and arrived within a mile of the block-house by two o'clock in the morning. The colonel gave Captain Black the command of about forty volunteers, who were first to approach. Twenty of them were to carry the port-fires, &c., &c. Those who had hand-grenades had short ladders to enable them to reach the port-holes, the exact height of which Colonel Burr had ascertained. Colonel Burr gave Captain Black his instructions, in the hearing of his company, assuring him of his protection if they were attacked by superior numbers; for it was expected that the enemy, who had several thousand men at and near Kingsbridge, would endeavour to cut us off, as we were several miles below them. Burr directed those who carried the combustibles to march in front as silently as possible. That, on being hailed, they should light the hand-grenades, &c., with a slow match provided for the purpose, and throw them into the port-holes. I was one of the party that advanced. The sentinel hailed and fired. We rushed on. The first hand-grenade that was thrown in drove the enemy from the upper story, and before they could take any measure to defend it, the block-house was on fire in several places. Some few escaped, and the rest surrendered without our having lost a single man. Though many shot were fired at us, we did not fire a gun.
During the period of Colonel Burr's command, but two attempts were made by the enemy to surprise our guards, in both of which they were defeated.
After Colonel Burr left this command, Colonel Thompson, a man of approved bravery, assumed it, and the enemy, in open day, advanced to his headquarters, took Colonel Thompson, and took or killed all his men, with the exception of about thirty.
My father's house, with all his outhouses, were burnt. After these disasters our troops never made an effort to protect that part of the country. The American lines were afterwards changed, and extended from Bedford to Croton bridge, and from there, following the course of that river, to the Hudson. All the intermediate country was abandoned and unprotected, being about twenty miles in the rear of the ground which Colonel Burr had maintained.
The year after the defeat of Colonel Thompson, Colonel Green, a brave, and in many respects a valuable officer, took the command, making his headquarters at Danford's, about a mile above the Croton. This position was well chosen. But Colonel Green omitted to inform himself of the movements of the enemy, and consequently was surprised. Himself, Major Flagg, and other officers were killed, and a great part of the men were either killed or taken prisoners: yet these officers had the full benefit of Colonel Burr's system.
Having perused what I have written, it does not appear to me that I have conveyed any adequate idea of Burr's military character. It may be aided a little by reviewing the effects he produced. The troops of which he took command were, at the time he took the command, undisciplined, negligent, and discontented. Desertions were frequent. In a few days these very men were transformed into brave and honest defenders; orderly, contented, and cheerful; confident in their own courage, and loving to adoration their commander, whom every man considered as his personal friend. It was thought a severe punishment, as well as disgrace, to be sent up to the camp, where they had nothing to do but to lounge and eat their rations.
During the whole of this command there was not a single desertion. Not a single death by sickness. Not one made prisoner by the enemy; for Burr had taught us that a soldier with arms in his hand ought never, under any circumstances, to surrender; no matter if he was opposed to thousands, it was his duty to fight.
After the first ten days there was not a single instance of robbery. The whole country, under his command, enjoyed security. The inhabitants, to express their gratitude, frequently brought presents of such articles as the country afforded; but Colonel Burr would accept no present. He fixed reasonable prices, and paid in cash for every thing that was received, and sometimes, I know, that these payments were made with his own money. Whether these advances were repaid, I know not.