“all the while
Sonorous metal blowing martial sounds.”
Arrived at the custom house, he will tell the collector that he must collect no more duties under any of the tariff laws. This he will be somewhat puzzled to say, by the way, with a grave countenance, considering what hand South Carolina herself had in that of 1816. But, sir, the collector would, probably, not desist at his bidding. Here would ensue a pause; for they say, that a certain stillness precedes the tempest. Before this military array should fall on custom house, collector, clerks, and all, it is very probable some of those composing it would request of their gallant commander-in-chief to be informed a little upon the point of law; for they have doubtless a just respect for his opinions as a lawyer, as well as for his bravery as a soldier. They know he has read Blackstone and the constitution, as well as Turenne and Vauban. They would ask him, therefore, something concerning their rights in this matter. They would inquire whether it was not somewhat dangerous to resist a law of the United States. What would be the nature of their offence, they would wish to learn, if they, by military force and array, resisted the execution in Carolina of a law of the United States, and it should turn out, after all, that the law was constitutional. He would answer, of course, treason. No lawyer could give any other reason. John Fries,[5] he would tell them, had learned that some years ago. How, then, they would ask, do you propose to defend us? We are not afraid of bullets, but treason has a way of taking people off that we do not much relish. How do you propose to defend us? ‘Look at my floating banner,’ he would reply; ‘see there the nullifying law!’ Is it your opinion, gallant commander, they would then say, that if we should be indicted for treason, that some floating banner of yours would make a good plea in bar? ‘South Carolina is a sovereign State,’ he would reply. That is true; but would the judge admit our plea? ‘These tariff laws,’ he would repeat, ‘are unconstitutional, palpably, deliberately, dangerously.’ That all may be so; but if the tribunals should not happen to be of that opinion, shall we swing for it? We are ready to die for our country, but it is rather an awkward business, this dying without touching the ground. After all, this is a sort of hemp-tax, worse than any part of the tariff.
“Mr. President, the honorable gentleman would be in a dilemma like that of another great general. He would have a knot before him which he could not untie. He must cut it with his sword. He must say to his followers, defend yourselves with your bayonets; and this is war—civil war.”
Mr. Webster continued to show that to resist by force the execution of a law of the United States was treason, and that the Courts of the United States could take no notice of a State law to authorize persons to commit that grave crime. Said he, the common saying that a State cannot commit treason herself, is nothing to the purpose. Can it authorize others to do so? If John Fries[5] had produced an act of Pennsylvania annulling the law of Congress, would it have helped his case? Talk about it as we will, these doctrines go the whole length of revolution. They are incompatible with any peaceable administration of the government. They lead directly to disunion and civil commotion, and therefore it is, that at the commencement, when they are first found to be maintained by respectable men, and in a tangible form, that I enter my protest against them all. Mr Webster proceeded to show that the people of the United States have not chosen the State authorities as their guardians against encroachments from the general government. Said he:
“Sir, the people have not trusted their safety, in regard to the general constitution, to these hands. They have required other security, and taken other bonds. They have chosen to trust themselves, first to the plain words of the instrument, and to such construction as the government, itself, in doubtful cases, should put on its own powers, under their oaths of office, and subject to their responsibility to them; just as the people of a State trust their own State governments with a similar power. Secondly, they have reposed their trust in the efficacy of frequent elections, and in their own power to remove their own servants and agents, whenever they see cause. Thirdly, they have reposed trust in the judicial power, which, in order that it might be trustworthy, they have made as respectable, as disinterested, and as independent as practicable. Fourthly, they have seen fit to rely, in case of necessity, or high expediency, on their known and admitted power to alter or amend the constitution, peaceably and quietly, whenever experience shall point out defects or imperfections. And finally, the people of the United States have at no time, in no way, directly or indirectly, authorized any State legislature to construe or interpret their instrument of government; much less to interfere, by their own power, to arrest its course and operation.
“If, sir, the people in these respects had done otherwise than they have done their constitution could neither have been preserved nor would it have been worth preserving. And if its plain provisions shall now be disregarded, and these new doctrines interpolated in it, it will become as feeble and helpless a being as enemies, whether early or more recent, could possibly desire. It will exist, in every State, but as a poor dependent on State permission. It must borrow leave to be, and will be no longer than State pleasure, or State discretion sees fit to grant the indulgence and to prolong its poor existence.
“But, sir, although there are fears, there are hopes also. The people have preserved this their own chosen Constitution for forty years, and seen their happiness, prosperity and renown grow with its growth, and strengthen with its strength. They are now generally strongly attached to it. Overthrown by direct assault, it cannot be; evaded, undermined, nullified it will not be, if we and those who succeed us here, as agents and representatives of the people shall conscientiously and vigilantly discharge the two great branches of our public trust faithfully to preserve and wisely to administer it.”
We believe that after perusing the evidence already advanced, every reasonable, unprejudiced person must come to the conclusion that the fathers of our country established the government of the United States with the full understanding and intent that it should be supreme, so far as its delegated authority extended. That it was a unit and capable of sustaining itself by force, if necessary. Mr. Madison’s views are repeatedly expressed on this point, explaining the advantages of conferring sufficient powers upon the general government to enable it to suppress internal violence and insurrection, thus providing against the civil commotion that had overthrown other republics of a weaker and less binding obligation on the part of the members composing them. See pages 24, 25 and 26 of this book. The papers here referred to are the more important on account of being written while the question of adoption or rejection of the Constitution was being discussed before the people. Again, on pages 30 to 32, the defects and imperfections of the old confederation in relation to the principles of legislation for the States in their collective capacities, showing more fully that the intention was to create a government for the people of the United States that should be binding on all persons, or combination of persons, for all time to come. And again, on page 34, is another quotation from the joint production of Madison, Jay and Hamilton, showing that the government was expected to reach individuals without the aid, and independent of, State authority. And still another quotation, on pages 35 and 36, goes to show that there was a full understanding that the people were conferring certain powers upon the general government, and of course taking them from the States for the purpose of forming one great, inseparable and indissoluble nation. There is not a particle of evidence to prove that the people contemplated reserving or recognizing any State distinction or State sovereignty, so far as the powers of the general government were concerned; but the whole drift of evidence goes to show that they were conscious of the necessity of uniting themselves under one grand government, making themselves one people, reserving only to the States or themselves such powers as were thought necessary to regulate their local affairs, leaving the States in nearly the same relation to the general government that a city municipality is to the government of the State in which it is located; but all must owe obedience to the government of the United States.
But this is not all the evidence we have on this subject. As we review the history of the government, we find that Washington, Jackson, Webster, Clay, and in fact nearly every statesman of any prominence in our political history have either by their acts or words committed themselves to this same policy. The proclamation of General Jackson, and the extracts given of Mr. Webster’s arguments, are the key-stone to the arch; they are both conclusive in themselves, and comment by me would be but a weak advocate of their masterly and unanswerable arguments, hence I close the subject, conscious of having proven to the satisfaction of myself at least, and, I trust, to some of my doubting Democratic friends and weak-hearted Republican brethren, that we at least have a government, established by our forefathers, constituting us one nation, one people, with one common country and destiny. Whether we shall be found brave enough to defend it and perpetuate it is a question which the God of nations only knows, and time alone will reveal to man.