"Third.—The absence of General Barlow's brigade, which I had previously located in reserve, and in echelon with Colonel Von Gilsa's, so as to cover his right flank."
The first proposition implies that Howard did not know Jackson intended to attack his right, and therefore did not prepare for him in that direction, but as his front was well fortified, and his flank unprotected, it was plainly his duty to strengthen the weak part of his line. To suppose that Jackson would run a great risk, and spend an entire day in making this long circuit for the purpose of assailing his enemy in front, is hardly reasonable; for he could have swung his line around against it at once, had he desired to do so.
The fierce rush of the rebels, who came in almost simultaneously with the pickets, first struck General Von Gilsa's two small regiments and the two guns in the road, the only force that actually fronted them in line.
Von Gilsa galloped at once to Howard's Headquarters at Dowdall's Tavern to ask for immediate reinforcements. He was told, "he must hold his post with the men he had, and trust to God;" information which was received by the irate German with objurgations that were not at all of an orthodox character.
Devens' division, thus taken in flank, was driven back upon Schurz's division, and the being unable to form, was heaped up after some resistance on Steinwehr's division, in the uttermost confusion and disorder. Steinwehr had only Buschbeck's brigade with him; the other—that of Barlow—having been sent out to reinforce Sickles; but he formed line promptly, behind a weak intrenchment, which had been thrown across the road, and with the aid of his artillery kept Jackson at bay for three-quarters of an hour. Howard exerted himself bravely then, and did all he could to rally the fugitives; but Rodes' division, which attacked him, was soon reinforced by that of Colston, and the two together folded around his flanks, took his line in reverse, and finally carried the position with a rush; and then Buschbeck's brigade retired in good order through the flying crowd, who were streaming in wild disorder to the rear past Hooker's headquarters.
And now, with the right of our line all gone, with a yawning gap where Sickles' corps and Williams' division had previously been posted, with Lee thundering against the centre and left, and Jackson taking all our defences in reverse, his first line being close on Chancellorsville itself, it seemed as if the total rout of the army was inevitable.
Just before this attack, Hooker had decided to interpose more force between the wings of the rebel army, in order to permanently dissever Jackson from the main body. If Sickles had been allowed to attack the left flank of the enemy opposite the Furnace, as he requested permission to do earlier in the afternoon, this co-operative movement could hardly have failed to produce great results; afterward it was too late to attempt it. As already stated, Williams' division struck Anderson in front on Birney's left, and Geary attacked McLaws across the Plank Road to the right of Hancock. Geary found the enemy strongly posted, and as he made no progress, returned to his works. When the rout of the Eleventh Corps took place, Williams also hastened back, but was fired upon by Jackson's troops, who now occupied the intrenchments he had left. Sickles thinks if this had not occurred several regiments of the enemy would have been cut off from the main body.
CHAPTER V. JACKSON'S ADVANCE IS CHECKED.
The constantly increasing uproar, and the wild rush of fugitives past the Chancellorsville House, told Hooker what had occurred, and roused him to convulsive life. His staff charged on the flying crowd, but failed to stop them, and it became necessary to form a line of fresh troops speedily, as Jackson was sweeping everything before him. It was not easy to find an adequate force for this emergency. The whole line was now actively engaged, Slocum being attacked on the south, and Couch and Meade on the east. Fortunately, Berry's division was held in reserve, and was available. They were true and tried men, and went forward at once to the rescue. Berry was directed to form across the Plank Road, drive the rebels back, and retake the lost intrenchments; an order easy to give, but very difficult to execute. The most he could do, under the circumstances, was to form his line in the valley opposite Fairview, and hold his position there, the enemy already having possession of the higher ground beyond.
Before Berry went out, Warren had stopped several of the Eleventh Corps batteries, and had formed them across the Plank Road, behind the position of the infantry. Winslow's Battery D, of the 1st New York, and Dimick's Battery H, of the 1st United States, were already there, with Hooker in person, having anticipated the movement. These guns were very destructive, and were the principal agent in checking the enemy. As soon as they had formed in line, Warren gave orders to Colonel Best, Chief of Artillery to the Twelfth Corps, to post more batteries on the eminence called Fairview, to the rear and left of the others.