[* Napoleon says 100,000 men on the rolls are only equivalent to about 80,000 muskets in action. It is doubtful if Hooker had over 113,000 men for actual combat. Lieut.-Colonel W. T. Forbes, Assistant Adjutant General, who has had access to the records, after a careful estimate, places the number as follows. First Corps, 16,000; Second Corps, 16,000; Third Corps, 18,000; Fifth Corps, 15,000; Sixth Corps, 22,000; Eleventh Corps, 15,000; Twelfth Corps, 11,000; total infantry and artillery, 113,000; Pleasanton's cavalry, 1,500; total effective force, 114,500. He estimates Lee's army at 62,000, which the Confederate authorities, Hotchkiss and Allan, place as follows: Anderson's and McLaws' divisions of Longstreet's Corps, 17,000; Jackson's Corps, 33,500; Stuart's Cavalry, 2,700; Artillery, 5,000; add 4,000 on engineer, hospital duty, etc. This estimate is exclusive of Stoneman's force.]
Both armies had spent the winter in much needed rest, after the toilsome and exhausting marches and bloody battles which terminated Lee's first invasion of Maryland. The discipline of our army was excellent, and it would have been hard to find a finer body of men, or better fighting material than that assembled on this occasion, in readiness to open the spring campaign. Hooker was justly popular with his troops. They had confidence in his ability as a general, and he had gained their good will by anticipating their wants, and by generously grating furloughs to those who were pining from home- sickness; trusting that old associations and the honor of the men would induce them to rejoin their colors when the leaves of absence had expired. In this way he almost stopped the desertion which had been so prevalent under Burnside. Only one portion of the army was dissatisfied; the position recently occupied by General Franz Sigel, the favorite commander of the Eleventh Corps, had been given to General O. O. Howard. The numerous Germans in that corps were discontented at the change. They cared little for Howard's reputation as the Havelock of the army; an appellation he had gained from his zeal as a Congregationalist. They felt, when their countryman Sigel was deprived of his command, that it was a blow to their nationality, and therefore lost some of the enthusiasm which always accompanies the personal influence of a popular leader.
The rainy season was nearly over, the time had come for action, and it was essential to strike a decisive blow before the term of service of the nine months' and two years' men had drawn to a close. Hooker's plan of campaign was simple, efficacious, and should have been successful. The rebels occupied a long line and could not be strong everywhere. He resolved to make a pretence of crossing with three corps, under Major-General Sedgwick, below Fredericksburg, while the remaining four corps under Major-General Slocum made a detour and crossed twenty-seven miles above at Kelly's Ford. The latter were then to march down the river against the left flank of the rebel army and re-open Banks' Ford; thus re-uniting the two wings of the army and giving a secure line of retreat in case of disaster. When this was accomplished it was proposed to give battle in the open country near the ford, the position there being a commanding one and taking the whole line of rebel works on the heights of Fredericksburg in reverse. Owing to his great preponderance of force, Hooker had little reason to doubt that the result would be favorable to our arms. To carry out this plan and make it a complete surprise to the enemy it became necessary to leave Gibbon's division of Couch's corps behind, for as his encampment at Falmouth was in full view of the Confederate forces on the opposite side, to withdraw it would have been to notify them that some unusual movement was going on. So far the idea was simply to crush the opposing army, but Hooker's plan went farther and involved the capture of Lee's entire force. To accomplish this he directed Stoneman to start two weeks in advance of the main body with ten thousand cavalry, cross at the upper fords of the Rappahannock, and sweep down upon Lee's communications with Richmond, breaking up railroads and canals, cutting telegraph wires, and intercepting supplies of all kinds. As the rebel commissariat found great difficulty in keeping more than four days' rations on hand at a time, Stoneman's raid would almost necessarily force Lee to fall back on his depots and give up Fredericksburg. One column under Averell was to attack Culpeper and Gordonsville, the other under Buford to move to Louisa Court House, and thence to the Fredericksburg Railroad. Both columns were to unite behind the Pamunkey, and in case our army was successful Stoneman was directed to plant his force behind some river in an advantageous position on Lee's line of retreat, where he could detain the rebel army until Hooker could again assail it and compel it to surrender. A brave programme! Let us see how it was carried out.
It was an essential part of Hooker's project that the cavalry should begin operations two weeks before the infantry. If they did their work thoroughly, Lee would be out of provisions, and his retreat would give us all the moral effect of a victory. The rebel cavalry at the time being reduced to about 3,000 men, it was not supposed that Stoneman would encounter any serious resistance. He accordingly started on April 13th to carry out his instructions, but another rain storm, which made the river unfordable, and very bad roads, detained him until the 28th. It has been suggested that he might have crossed higher up, but cavalry officers who were there, tell me that every ravine had become an impassable river. Hooker became impatient and refused to wait any longer; so when the water subsided, all—infantry, artillery, and cavalry—were sent over together. The result was that the battle was ended before Stoneman got fairly to work, and his operations had little or no effect in obstructing Lee's movements.
To confuse the enemy as much as possible, demonstrations had been made at both ends of the line. On April 21st a small infantry force was sent to threaten Kelly's Ford. On the same day, I went with part of my division down the river to Port Conway, opposite Port Royal, twenty miles below Fredericksburg, made a pretence of crossing in pontoons, and built fires in every direction at night, to give the impression of a large force. On the 24th General Wadsworth went on an expedition to the same place, and two regiments under Colonel Morrow, 24th Michigan, crossed over in boats, and returned. Those movements caused Jackson to strengthen his force in that quarter. On the 27th, the storm having abated, Meade's corps (the Fifth), Howard's corps (the Eleventh), and Slocum's corps (the Twelfth), the whole being under the command of General Slocum, left camp for Kelly's Ford, each accompanied by three batteries. A detachment was thrown over, in boats, on the evening of the 28th, which dispersed the picket guard; and by the next morning the entire force was across the river and on their way to the Rapidan, the Fifth Corps taking the direction of Elley's Ford and the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps that of Germania Ford. Stoneman's cavalry crossed at the same time with the others, and moved to Culpeper, where he halted for a time to reorganize his force, and get rid of surplus horses, baggage, etc., which were sent to the rear. The next day Averell kept on to Rapidan Station with 4,000 sabres, to engage W. H. F. Lee's rebel brigade, so that it could not interfere with the operations of the main body, which moved southeast across Morton's Ford and Raccoon Ford to Louisa Court House, where the work of destruction was to begin. Stoneman's further movements will be related hereafter. One small brigade of three regiments with two batteries was placed under the command of General Pleasonton and directed to report to General Slocum, to precede the infantry on the different roads.
Stuart, who commanded two brigades of rebel cavalry, under Fitz Hugh Lee and W. H. F. Lee, and whose duty it was to watch these upper fords, received news of the crossing at 9 P.M., on the 28th.
The turning column reached Chancellorsville with but little opposition, as both Lee and Stuart thought it was making for Gordonsville and the Virginia Central Railroad. In consequence of this miscalculation, Stuart planted himself at Brandy Station. When he found that he was out of position and that it was too late to prevent the crossing at Germania Ford, he made a circuit with Fitz Hugh Lee's brigade to get between Slocum and Lee, and sent W. H. F. Lee's brigade to impede Stoneman's operations. The passage of Germania Ford turned Elley's Ford and United States Ford, and Mahone's and Posey's brigades, who were on guard there, retreated on Chancellorsville, where Anderson had come up with Wright's brigade too late to prevent the crossing.
By 6 P.M. on the 30th, Hooker found himself in command of four corps at Chancellorsville, with another—that of Sickles—near at hand. Anderson fell back to Tabernacle Church as our troops advanced, and began to fortify a line there. Stuart sent Fitz Hugh Lee's brigade, which was very much exhausted, to Todd's Tavern for the night, while he started with a small escort, to explain the situation to General Lee at Fredericksburg. On the road, not far from Spottsylvania, he came unexpectedly upon one of Pleasonton's regiments, the 6th New York Cavalry, numbering about 200 men, which was returning from a reconnoissance it had made in that direction. He avoided the encounter and sent back to Todd's Tavern, at first for a regiment, but subsequently for the entire brigade. When there reinforcements came up a furious cavalry contest took place, with charges and counter-charges, and hand to hand combats. It was not without an element of romance, in that lonely spot, far from either army, under the resplendent light of the full moon; recalling, in the words of a Southern chronicler, some scene of knightly glory. Our troops were surrounded, but cut their way out with the loss of their gallant commander, Lieutenant-Colonel McVicar, who led them in the charge.
Meanwhile the other portion of the contemplated movement had also been going forward. On the 28th, the Sixth Corps, under Sedgwick, and the First Corps, under Reynolds, were moved down near the river, three or four miles below Fredericksburg, and bivouacked there in a pouring rain. As it was possible that the two corps might be attacked when they reached the other side, the Third Corps, under Sickles, was posted in the rear as a reserve.
The next day two bridges were laid down at Franklin's old crossing for the Sixth Corps, and two more a mile below for the First Corps. Men in rifle-pits on the other side impeded the placing of the pontoons for a while, but detachments sent over in boats stormed their intrenchments, and drove them out. Brooks' division of the Sixth Corps and Wadsworth's division of the First Corps then crossed and threw up tête du ponts. The enemy made no other opposition than a vigorous shelling by their guns on the heights, which did but little damage. A considerable number of these missiles were aimed at my division and at that of General J. C. Robinson, which were held in reserve on the north side of the river; but as our men were pretty well sheltered, there were but few casualties.