There was now a lull in the combat. I was waiting for the remainder of the First Corps to come up, and Heth was reorganizing his shattered front line, and preparing to bring his two other brigades forward. The remnant of Archer's brigade was placed on the right, and made to face south against Buford's cavalry, which, it was feared, might attack that flank. What was left of Davis' brigade was sent to the extreme left of the line, and Pegram's artillery was brought forward and posted on the high ground west of Willoughby's Run.
Thus prepared, and with Pender's strong division in rear, ready to cover his retreat if defeated, or to follow up his success if victorious, Heth advanced to renew the attack.
As I had but four weak infantry brigades at this time against eight larger brigades which were about to assail my line, I would have been justified in falling back, but I determined to hold on to the position until ordered to leave it. I did not believe in the system, so prevalent at that time, of avoiding the enemy. I quite agreed with Reynolds that it was best to meet him as soon as possible, for the rebellion, if reduced to a war of positions, would never end so long as the main army of the Confederates was left in a condition to take the field. A retreat, too, has a bad effect on the men. It gives them the impression that their generals think them too weak to contend with the enemy. I was not aware, at this time, that Howard was on the ground, for he had given me no indication of his presence, but I knew that General Meade was at Taneytown; and as, on the previous evening, he had informed General Reynolds that the enemy's army were concentrating on Gettysburg, I thought it probable he would ride to the front to see for himself what was going on, and issue definite orders of some kind. As Gettysburg covered the great roads from Chambersburg to York, Baltimore, and Washington, and as its possession by Lee would materially shorten and strengthen his line of retreat, I was in favor of making great sacrifices to hold it.
While we were thus temporarily successful, having captured or dispersed all the forces in our immediate front, a very misleading despatch was sent to General Meade by General Howard. It seems that General Howard had reached Gettysburg in advance of his corps, just after the two regiments of Cutler's brigade, which had been outflanked, fell back to the town by General Wadsworth's order. Upon witnessing this retreat, which was somewhat disorderly, General Howard hastened to send a special messenger to General Meade with the baleful intelligence that the First Corps had fled from the field at the first contact with the enemy, thus magnifying a forced retreat of two regiments, acting under orders, into the flight of an entire corps, two-thirds of which had not yet reached the field. It is unnecessary to say that this astounding news created the greatest feeling against the corps, who were loudly cursed for their supposed lack of spirit and patriotism.
About 11 A.M., the remainder of the First Corps came up, together with Cooper's, Stewart's, Reynolds', and Stevens' batteries. By this time the enemy's artillery had been posted on every commanding position to the west of us, several of their batteries firing down the Chambersburg pike. I was very desirous to hold this road, as it was in the centre of the enemy's line, who were advancing on each side of it, and Calef—exposed as his battery was—fired over the crest of ground where he was posted, and notwithstanding the storm of missiles that assailed him, held his own handsomely, and inflicted great damage on his adversaries. He was soon after relieved by Reynolds' Battery "L" of the 1st New York, which was sustained by Colonel Roy Stone's brigade of Pennsylvania troops, which I ordered there for that purpose. Stone formed his men on the left of the pike, behind a ridge running north and south, and partially sheltered them by a stone fence, some distance in advance, from which he had driven the rebel skirmish line, after an obstinate contest.
It was a hot place for troops; for the whole position was alive with bursting shells, but the men went forward in fine spirits and, under the impression that the place was to be held at all hazards, they cried out, "We have come to stay!" The battle afterward became so severe that the greater portion did stay, laying down their lives there for the cause they loved so well. Morrow's brigade remained in the woods where Reynolds was killed, and Biddle's brigade was posted on its left in the open ground along the crest of the same ridge, with Cooper's battery in the interval. Cutler's brigade took up its former position on the right of the road. Having disposed of Wadsworth's division and my own division, which was now under the command of Brigadier General Rowley, I directed General Robinson's division to remain in reserve at the Seminary, and to throw up a small semicircular rail intrenchment in the grove in front of the building. Toward the close of the action this defence, weak and imperfect as it was, proved to be of great service.
The accompanying map shows the position of troops and batteries at this time.
It will be seen that Heth's division is formed on the western ridge which bounds Willougby's Run and along a cross-road which intersects the Chambersburg road at right angles.
Pender's division, posted in the rear as a support to Heth, was formed in the following order by brigades: Thomas, Lane, Scales, and McGowan (under Perrin); the first named on the rebel left and Perrin on the right. To sustain Heth's advance and crush out all opposition, both Pegram's and McIntosh's artillery were posted on the crest of the ridge west of the Run.
While this was going on, General Howard, who was awaiting the arrival of his corps, had climbed into the steeple of the seminary to obtain a view of the surrounding country. At 11.30 A.M. he learned that General Reynolds was killed, and that the command of the three corps (the First, Eleventh, and Third) constituting the Left Wing of the army devolved upon him by virtue of his rank. He saw that the First Corps was contending against large odds and sent back for the Eleventh Corps to come up at double-quick. Upon assuming command of the Left Wing he turned over his own corps to Major-General Carl Schurz, who then gave up the command of his division to General Barlow. Howard notified General Meade of Reynolds' death, but forgot to take back or modify the false statement he had made about the First Corps, now engaged before his eyes, in a most desperate contest with a largely superior force; so that General Meade was still left under the impression that the First Corps had fled from the field.