I waited until the artillery had gone and then rode back to the town with my staff. As we passed through the streets, pale and frightened women came out and offered us coffee and food, and implored us not to abandon them.
Colonel Livingston of my staff, who had been sent on a message, came back to the Seminary, not knowing that we had left. He says the enemy were advancing toward the crest very cautiously, evidently under the impression there was an ambuscade waiting for them there. They were also forming against cavalry.
On the way I must have met an aide that Howard says he sent to me with orders to retreat, but I do not remember receiving any message of the kind.
I observe that Howard in his account of the battle claims to have handled the First and Eleventh Corps from 11 A.M. until 4 P.M.; but at 11 A.M. his corps was away back on the road, and did not arrive until about 1 P.M.
The map previously given on page 125 demonstrates that we were a mere advance guard of the army, and shows the impossibility of our defending Gettysburg for any length of time.
The First Corps was broken and defeated, but not dismayed. There were but few left, but they showed the true spirit of soldiers. They walked leisurely from the Seminary to the town, and did not run. I remember seeing Hall's battery and the 6th Wisconsin regiment halt from time to time to face the enemy, and fire down the streets. Both Doles and Ramsey claim to have had sharp encounters there. Many of the Eleventh Corps, and part of Robinson's division, which had been far out, were captured in the attempt to reach Steinwehr's division on Cemetery Hill, which was the rallying point.
When I arrived there I found General Howard, surrounded by his staff, awaiting us at the main gate of the cemetery. He made arrangements to hold the road which led up from the town, and which diverged to Baltimore and Taneytown, by directing me to post the First Corps on the left in the cemetery, while he assembled the Eleventh Corps on the right. Soon after he rode over to ask me, in case his own men (Steinwehr's division) deserted their guns, to be in readiness to defend them. General Schurz about this time was busily engaged in rallying his men, and did all that was possible to encourage them to form line again. I understood they were told that Sigel had just arrived and assumed command, a fiction thought justifiable under the circumstances. It seemed to me that the discredit that attached to them after Chancellorsville had in a measure injured their morale and esprit-de-corps, for they were rallied with great difficulty.
About 3.30 P.M., General Hancock arrived with orders from General Meade to supersede Howard. Congress had passed a law authorizing the President to put any general over any other superior to rank if, in his judgment, the good of the service demanded it, and General Meade now assumed this power in the name of the President. Owing to the false despatch Howard had sent early in the day, Meade must have been under the impression that the First Corps had fled without fighting. More than half of them, however, lay dead and wounded on the field, and hardly a field officer had escaped.
Hancock being his junior, Howard was naturally unwilling to submit to his authority and, according to Captain Halstead of my staff, who was present, refused to do so. Howard stated in a subsequent account of the battle that he merely regarded General Hancock as a staff officer acting for General Meade. He says "General Hancock greeted me in his usual frank and cordial manner and used these words, 'General Meade has sent me to represent him on the field.' I replied, 'All right, Hancock. This is no time for talking. You take the left of the pike and I will arrange these troops to the right.' I noticed that he sent Wadsworth's division, without consulting me, to the right of the Eleventh Corps to Culp's Hill, but as it was just the thing to do I made no objection." He adds that Hancock did not really relieve him until 7 P.M. Hancock, however, denies that he told Howard he was merely acting as a staff officer. He says he assumed absolute command at 3.30 P.M. I know he rode over to me and told me he was in command of the field, and directed me to send a regiment to the right, and I sent Wadsworth's division there, as my regiments were reduced to the size of companies.
Hancock was much pleased with the ridge we were on, as a defensive position, and considered it admirably adapted for a battle-field. Its gentle slopes for artillery, its stone fences and rocky boulders to shelter infantry, and its ragged but commanding eminences on either flank, where far-reaching batteries could be posted, were great advantages. It covered the principal roads to Washington and Baltimore, and its convex shape, enabling troops to reinforce with celerity any point of the line from the centre, or by moving along the chord of this arc, was probably the cause of our final success. The enemy, on the contrary, having a concave order of battle, was obliged to move troops much longer distances to support any part of his line, and could not communicate orders rapidly, nor could the different corps co-operate promptly with each other. It was Hancock's recommendation that caused Meade to concentrate his army on this ridge, but Howard received the thanks of Congress for selecting the position. He, doubtless, did see its advantages, and recommended it to Hancock. The latter immediately took measures to hold it as a battle-ground for the army, while Howard merely used the cemetery as a rallying point for his defeated troops. Hancock occupied all the prominent points, and disposed the little cavalry and infantry he had in such a way as to impress the enemy with the idea that heavy reinforcements had come up. By occupying Culp's Hill, on the right, with Wadsworth's brigade, and posting the cavalry on the left to take up a good deal of space, he made a show of strength not warranted by the facts. Both Hill and Ewell had received some stunning blows during the day, and were disposed to be cautious. They, therefore, did not press forward and take the heights, as they could easily have done at this time, but not so readily after an hour's delay, for then Sickles' corps from Emmetsburg, and Slocum's corps from Two Taverns, began to approach the position. The two rebel divisions of Anderson and Johnson, however, arrived about dusk, which would have still given the enemy a great numerical superiority.