On the other hand, Ewell, having obtained a foothold, swore he would not be driven out, and hastened to reinforce Johnson with Daniel's and O'Neill's brigades from Rodes' division.
As soon as objects could be discerned in the early gray of the morning our artillery opened fire. As Johnson, on account of the steep declivities and other obstacles, had not been able to bring any artillery with him, he could not reply. It would not do to remain quiet under this fire, and he determined to charge, in hopes of winning a better position on higher ground. His men—the old Stonewall brigade leading—rushed bravely forward, but were as gallantly met by Kane's brigade of Geary's division and a close and severe struggle ensued for four hours among the trees and rocks. Ruger's division of the Twelfth Corps came up and formed on the rebel left, taking them in flank and threatening them in reverse. Indeed, as the rest of our line were not engaged, there was plenty of support for Geary. Troops were sent him, including Shaler's brigade, which took the front, and was soon warmly engaged in re- establishing the line.
At about 11 A.M., finding the contest hopeless, and his retreat threatened by a force sent down to Rock Creek, Johnson yielded slowly and reluctantly to a charge made by Geary's division, gave up the position and withdrew to Rock Creek, where he remained until night.
Our line was once more intact. All that the enemy had gained by dogged determination and desperate bravery was lost from a lack of co-ordination, caused perhaps by the great difficulty of communicating orders over this long concave line where every route was swept by our fire.
Lee had now attacked both flanks of the Army of the Potomac without having been able to establish himself permanently on either. Notwithstanding the repulse of the previous day he was very desirous of turning the left, for once well posted there he could secure his own retreat while interposing between Meade and Washington. He rode over with Longstreet to that end of the line to see what could be done. General Wofford, who commanded a brigade of McLaws' division, writes in a recent letter to General Crawford, United States Army, as follows: "Lee and Longstreet came to my brigade Friday morning before the artillery opened fire. I told him that the afternoon before, I nearly reached the crest. He asked if I could not go there now. I replied, 'No, General, I think not.' He said quickly, 'Why not?' 'Because,' I said, 'General, the enemy have had all night to intrench and reinforce. I had been pursuing a broken enemy and the situation was now very different.'"
Having failed at each extremity, it only remained to Lee to retreat, or attack the centre. Such high expectations had been formed in the Southern States in regard to his conquest of the North that he determined to make another effort. He still had Pickett's division, the flower of Virginia, which had not been engaged, and which was full of enthusiasm. He resolved to launch them against our centre, supported on either flank by the advance of the main portion of the army. He had hoped that Johnson's division would have been able to maintain its position on the right, so that the Union centre could be assailed in front and rear at the same time, but Johnson having been driven out, it was necessary to trust to Pickett alone, or abandon the whole enterprise and return to Virginia.
Everything was quiet up to 1 P.M., as the enemy were massing their batteries and concentrating their forces preparatory to the grand charge—the supreme effort—which was to determine the fate of the campaign, and to settle the point whether freedom or slavery was to rule the Northern States.
It seems to me there was some lack of judgment in the preparations. Heth's division, now under Pettigrew, which had been so severely handled on the first day, and which was composed in a great measure of new troops, was designated to support Pickett's left and join in the attack at close quarters. Wilcox, too, who one would think had been pretty well fought out the day before, in his desperate enterprise of attempting to crown the crest, was directed to support the right flank of the attack. Wright's brigade was formed in rear, and Pender's division on the left of Pettigrew, but there was a long distance between Wilcox and Longstreet's forces on the right.
At 1 P.M., a signal gun was fired and one hundred and fifteen guns opened against Hancock's command, consisting of the First Corps under Newton, the Second Corps under Gibbon, the Third Corps under Birney, and against the Eleventh Corps under Howard. The object of this heavy artillery fire was to break up our lines and prepare the way for Pickett's charge. The exigencies of the battle had caused the First Corps to be divided, Wadsworth's division being on the right at Culp's Hill, Robinson on Gibbon's right, and my own division intervening between Caldwell on the left and Gibbon on the right. The convex shape of our line did not give us as much space as that of the enemy, but General Hunt, Chief of Artillery, promptly posted eighty guns along the crest—as many as it would hold—to answer the fire, and the batteries on both sides suffered severely in the two hours' cannonade. Not less than eleven caissons were blown up and destroyed; one quite near me. When the smoke went up from these explosions rebel yells of exultation could be heard along a line of several miles. At 3 P.M. General Hunt ordered our artillery fire to cease, in order to cool the guns, and to preserve some rounds for the contest at close quarters, which he foresaw would soon take place.
My own men did not suffer a great deal from this cannonade, as I sheltered them as much as possible under the crest of the hill, and behind rocks, trees, and stone fences.