SECTION I.
The arguments considered which oppose the doctrine of Spectres.
Among the opinions of the present day, which render it neither clear nor dark, is that of materialism, which maintains the position that all exercises of the mind are the exercises of matter more or less refined and organized: Therefore, when this material organization ceases, all cogitation must cease: Body and soul, life and intelligence die together. Thought, and the capacity of thought have no existence between death and the last day. Now if this position and inference be true, the doctrine of Spectres is overthrown at once. Sure we may be that what never exists can never really appear, however I may be deluded by my own imagination, or the artifice of others. This position therefore, before we proceed, demands particular discussion.
If thought be the entire effect of material form, and excellent thought of excellent form, as these philosophers seem to suppose, it follows that the more excellent the body is the more excellent will be the mind. But facts shew the contrary. The goose, which sometimes appears in elegant human form, we despise; while we admire the fables of Æsop and the sublime verse of that poet, who was told what is the mark of interrogation. “But although the externals of body may be deformed, yet the internals of it may be well organized and refined.” What says the anatomist respecting the ourang outang? “Not only the externals, but the internals of his body resemble those of man, particularly the tongue and the brain. There appears no difference between them; yet the animal is dumb and has not so much sagacity even to provide for herself as the elephant or the beaver.” However certain laws and dispensations of Divine Providence, accommodated to the rude apprehensions of mankind in early ages, punished the posterity of sinners; yet it is one of the first dictates of reason as well as of a better covenant, that justice does not require any person to be rewarded or punished for the virtues or vices of another.[1] If soul and body die together; if all intelligence and cogitation cease from that moment to the last day, what becomes of personal identity and accountability? The essence of personality is intelligence. Every intelligent being is a person, and every person an intelligent being.[2] Therefore the uninterrupted continuation of any particular intelligence, necessarily implies his personal identity; whatever body, or whatever garment he may, or may not, happen to wear. Therefore, premising deference, personal identity does not necessarily comprise the whole man, soul and body, as Dr. Watts supposes, nor is it the mere consciousness of my past and present experience compared, as Mr. Locke supposes; for this my very consciousness presupposes that existence of which I am conscious. I may have committed faults and performed virtuous actions in time past, which now I do not remember, and therefore not conscious of them; still those actions were mine, whether I am conscious of them or not, and so far as any one can prove them to be mine, so far he can prove me to be the same person that I was in the time when those actions were performed. For more instruction, the reader may consult that excellent dissertation of Bishop Butler, on this topic; from which I extract a few lines: “As upon two triangles being compared or viewed together, there arises to the mind the idea of similitude; or upon twice two and four, the idea of equality—so likewise upon comparing the consciousness of one’s self in any two moments, there immediately arises to the mind the idea of personal identity. And as the two former comparisons not only give us the ideas of similitude and equality, but also shew us that two triangles are alike, and twice two and four are equal—so the latter comparison not only gives us the idea of personal identity, but also shows us the identity of ourselves in those two moments, that is, the present and that immediately past; or the present and that of a month, a year, or twenty years past. Or in other words, by reflecting upon that which is myself now, and that which was myself twenty years ago, I discern they are not two, but one and the same self. But the consciousness of what is past, does thus ascertain our personal identity to ourselves, yet to say that it makes personal identity, is to say that a person has not existed a single moment, nor done one action but what he can remember, and none but what he reflects upon. And one should really think it self evident that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute personal identity, any more than knowledge in any other case can constitute the truth which it presupposes.”
If this account of personal identity be just, then, by the doctrine here opposed, death puts an end to it. Affection, thought, intelligence, consciousness, all are no more, and therefore the person is no more. And as he is no more, nothing can be his. Now existence is entitled to no reward, deserves no punishment: is guilty of nothing and accountable for nothing. In a future day something may be raised up just like him in body and natural faculties of mind. But for this something, creation, not resurrection, is the appropriate term. Now can we conceive that the person struck entirely out of existence a thousand years ago, and this person newly created in his likeness, should be one and the same? No, we can as well conceive that two small houses built a thousand miles apart, and entirely resembling each other, are one and the same house. These new persons, if they reason, as some of us do, will think it somewhat strange that they should be accountable for crimes said to have been committed by them long before they were created. This doctrine, however, affords comfort and encouragement to all distinction of sinners in this world. Our punishment in a future state, say they, will not be inflicted upon us, (for after death we shall exist no more) but upon our representatives who shall bear our names, and be made to think that they were we. Let us then eat and drink, for to-morrow we die. Let us imitate those noble animals around us, which innocently deceive, kill and take possession; for to-morrow we shall exist no longer. What a foul reproach then does this doctrine exhibit against the wisdom and equity of the righteous Governor of the world? We now attend to the language of scripture respecting this opinion. The parable of the rich man and Lazarus, is grounded on the hypothesis that some persons are happy or miserable in the separate state, while others are living in the present world. The text, “Absent from the body and present with the Lord,” by the subtle philosophy of this enlightened age, signifies that after we, as persons, have been annihilated for some ages, a number of new persons, just then created, who shall be our very selves, will be present with the Lord. But in view of the simple christian, who knows but little, the plain meaning of the text is, that in the very same hour and minute, while we are absent from this corruptible body, we are present with the Lord. Such an ignorant christian is not able to conceive how a person, and a similar person residing on the two opposite shores of the vast duration of nihility, can be one and the same person, any more than to conceive how a person and a similar person, residing at the same time on the opposite shores of the vast Atlantic, can be one and the same person. Our Lord said to the penitent thief, “This day shalt thou be with me in paradise;” that is, before the close of this natural day thou shalt be with me in heaven. So the penitent thief in his state of ignorance would naturally understand it. But Priestlian subtilty requires this paraphrase, “This day shalt thou die, soul and body, and remain personally annihilated about two thousand years.” Then a person entirely new shall begin to exist, and shall erroneously imagine that within a few months he had committed a theft, that within a few hours he had been crucified, and obtained a promise which was now completely fulfilled. All this deception will take place, because he will be you. However, by intercourse with others, he and you will discover these chronological errors, and that those things which you had done, suffered and enjoyed, took place about two thousand years before you, that is, before the second you, existed. It was well for the thief that he knew not, and believed not, this paraphrase; otherwise that promise would have been a poor, cold consolation to him. The Sadducees denied the resurrection, and the existence of angel and spirit, and their denial of the former was grounded on their denial of the latter. They seemed to admit, that, if spirits existed in a separate state, they might assume bodies. But as there were no such spirits in their view, the inference was certain, that no such transition could take place. Therefore the argument of our Saviour attacked the very foundation of their theory, by shewing that the patriarchs, though dead for many years, and their bodies not raised, were still alive, while Moses stood at the burning bush.[3] Our Lord cited these words, addressed to Moses at that time, “I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob;” and then says, “God is not the God of the dead, but of the living, for all live unto him.” That is to say, they do not live unto man. In his natural view, they are dead in every respect. They see no life in his body, nor any where else; still they live unto God. In his view they have life, thought, affection and intelligence. Therefore those dead patriarchs were alive at the time when Moses beheld the burning bush. “Fear not them which kill the body, saith our Lord, but are not able to kill the soul.”[4] But why? What is the reason they are not able to kill the soul? If soul and body die together—if death destroys the essential properties of the soul as well as of the body, certainly they, who are able to kill the body, are able to kill the soul. But the words now cited were uttered by him who could not err; and for the writer it is impossible to conceive how words could be framed to make a proposition more plain and intelligible. But in this age of light and darkness, many, who believe in immortality and the separate state, utterly deny that any departed soul ever returns or becomes visible to our bodily eyes. Of this persuasion are the authors of the American Cyclopedia. Their arguments, which demand attention, are the following: The first argument contemplates the ignorance and vulgarity associated with the opinion which maintains the existence of Spectres. “It is true there were many Christians in former times, who gave full credit to such narratives; these were times of great ignorance and superstition. But since philosophy and christianity have walked hand in hand, the faith of ghosts has been more and more renounced, invariably.” So it seems that if a pious man has learning enough, he is perfectly secure from all such delusions. But is this representation entirely consonant with facts? That christian literature has invariably renounced this opinion is by no means correct. Not only was the faith of Spectres supported by some of the most learned and eminent characters of antiquity, but moderns, illustrious both in theology and philosophy, even since the Protestant Reformation, have given their decided opinion in favor of this doctrine. Among others, are Doctor Lightfoot, Mr. Flavel, Mr. Hervy, Mr. Addison, Doctor Samuel Johnson, and the excellent Mr. Swedenbourg. Will it be proved that all these modern names are entirely ignorant either of theology or philosophy?
“What more frequent in times of popery than apparitions? Says President Mather, it would fill a volume to rehearse them; yet we may not run into the other extreme, that all such reports have no reality.” But what do philosophers know respecting this affair more than other people? What lesson in the whole circle of science has ever determined the question, whether sounds or forms were ever produced by unembodied spirits? What ancient Sadducee or modern materialist has ever yet proved that the human thoughts have not a separate existence by vehicle, or in some other way?
Had our authors told us that the belief of Spectres has been rejected invariably wherever philosophy and modern infidelity have gone hand in hand, the sentence would have been perfectly accurate. The christian world affords no infidel who would not ridicule the following letters.
We see an age of light and darkness—of improvement and misimprovement. Ignorance is supported, when we believe too much, or when we believe too little. And a wise mariner will stand aloof both from Scylla and Charybdis—from the prejudice of superstition and the prejudice of modernism.
The foundation of theology is the Sacred Scriptures, and there we find the doctrine of apparitions. Samuel appeared to Saul when he applied for advice to the witch of Endor.[5] There is however no proof that his appearance was the effect of her own power. Two things terrified her: one was the discovery of Saul; the other was, Aliem, a god, rising out of the earth. How could she be terrified merely by the expected effect of her own invention? It is most reasonable to suppose that the event exceeded her expectation—that Samuel really appeared—not to flatter Saul by a sentence of double meaning, like the heathen oracles; but to speak like himself—to reprove Saul for coming there, and to denounce that terrible sentence upon him and his house, which might naturally be expected from that faithful prophet.