The English Secretary; or, Methode of Writing Epistles and Letters (1599) / With, a Declaration of Such Tropes, Figures, and Schemes, as Either Usually or for Ornament Sake Are Therein Required

by active 1575-1595 Angel Day

Of Epistles deliberatiue.
Chap. 10.

He next vnto these laste of this Demonstratiue kinds are nowe the Deliberatiue, the first titles whereof in order suted forth, appeare to bee Hortatorie, Dehortatorie, Swasorie, and Disswasorie. These beeing as I saide before, neerlie affined together (sauing onelie that the Hortatorie and Dehortatorie are a little more vehement, stirring and pricking then the others, yet both consisting in well aduising and counselling, the one by necessitie, the other as an inducement to thinges laudable and worthie) neede therefore in all seeming but one maner of direction in them to be followed. You shall then vnderstand that the seuerall partes in either of these Hortatorie or Swasorie, to be considered, doe principally stand vppon a diuersitie of affections, which nature as it seemeth, hath from the beginning ordained, to bee as it were stirrings or prouocations within vs, thereby to propose a direct and most readie waie vnto Vertue, or to terrifie by like degrees, or withdrawe vs from the pursuing of vices.

The motions or effects herein frequented, may bee said to bee either of praise or mislike, of hope or reward, or feare of euill to folow, of loue to well doing, or of hate vnto badnes, of emulation of others praise, glory, or reputation, of expectation thereon depending, of examples or of intreatie. By laying out of all or either of these, as occasion shall serue, consisteth the efficacie of all exhortation or aduising, pulling backe or disswading. Now how the qualities of these, or any other in generall touching the propertie they haue with Vertue or Vice, may for any turne be allotted: I must as well for this Deliberatiue kind ensuing, as for all other titles whatsoeuer, the same hereafter requiring, wholy referre the learner to the places in the chapter preceeding the Epistles Laudatorie and Vituperatorie in all things to be directed.

As touching these particularities, which wee haue tearmed Motions and affects, let vs consider if you will in seuerall, and see what efficacie by distinguishment of all their properties & partes they may beare in this writing. Praise (no doubt) in matter of exhortation or stirring vp to well doing is of most singular force, and so questionlesse is Mislike, when generallie it may bee drawne from a regarded conceite of the greatest and woorthiest, to the withdrawing from euill. For if we shall but enter into, or consider of our owne common passages: what is it I pray you that preferreth or disalloweth, giueth grace or disableth the actions and endeuours of men, but the speciall allowance or mislike that is euery where had of them? Is it not account alone that giueth encouragement vnto Vertue? Is Vertue so fullie aduaunced in anie thing as in the estimate prayse and reputation, that is attributed vnto her? No surelie. And this by insight had into the verie woorst and lowest sort of men shall you find, that there is hardlie anie lyuing of so base and contemptible a spirite, but that by Prayse and commendation, hee may bee drawne vppe to some liking of well dooing. And howebeit the issues of mens actions doe at anie time seeme to bee spotted with euill, yet desire they at the least wise for their reckoning sake, that they might bee esteemed as good.

By this appeareth the singularitie of thinges excellent, in so much as nothing is, or séemeth rightlie prayse-woorthie, but what is accounted good, so little reputation haue the perpetratours of euilles, as that of necessitie they are compelled to seeke credite, by falselie attributing vnto themselues the name of good. Howe much more then true Prayse and Mislike of thinges woorthie, or to bee despysed, may by all lykelihoode bee auailable with those of good spirite, to drawe them to Vertues.

To applie nowe this prayse in exhorting or counsailing anie one, it behooueth wee first conceyue what disposition, habiliments, or other matter of value are in him whome wee haue to deale with, furthering or conuenient to such a purpose, whereunto wee woulde exhort or perswade him, and the likelihoode of the same, greatlie to put foorth or commende: or if before time he haue behaued himselfe anie wayes well, we shall incourage him in praysing of that alreadie done; and in shewing that the more excellent the thing is, the more difficult it is to bee attained, for Difficilia quæ pulchra, and yet the difficultie not so great as the prayse, glorie and recordation thereof, shall thereby afterwards be returned honourable.

Likewise, if the state of the partie doe serue thereunto, it shall not bee amisse to put him in minde of his parentage, or that fayling, of his Fortune, Vertue, Nobilitie of minde, Wit, towardnesse, his great expectation, abilitie, age, and Discretion, all of them no lesse requiring, but this with great modeste to be deliuered, least in séeming to preferre the certaintie of those vertues which are of good account to be in him, we doe not palpably gloze with the partie, and as it were seeke to drawe from his person, or account, the things that neuer came neare him.

Now as Prayse, and the laudable estimate of euerie good action, together with the iust mislike of thinges euill, spurreth and eggeth forward to great purposes, so verie much thereunto preuaileth this other of Hope, not that which of a seruile and base humour or condition ensueth, which expecteth nothing that is frustrate of gain, and performeth all endeuours by expectation of reward, but that vertuous kinde of Hope, which enableth to the perfection and absolute summe of all worthinesse, and whose limit is honour, reputation, estimate and account: A like Companion whereunto is Loue, beeing a zealous affectation of thinges singular, which Loue produceth likewise in it selfe, not a mislike onelie, but a burning Hateof things vile, contemptible, and vnbeseeming.

As these in themselues doe each particularlie thrust forwards to goodnes, so many times Feare, or doubt of inconuenience that may ensue, terrifieth or disswadeth from euils. Commiseration of the lamentable estate of any one, prouoketh also sometimes to pittie, and disturneth in like sort manie times from reuenge. Expectatiō, as wel of Loue as of Hate, of good opinion as mislike in compassing of any thing is not the least. Shame & ignomie of the action also, the dependance whereof is oftentimes occasion sufficient of well doing, and hindrance alike, and withdrawing from euill purposes. But aboue all is the spur of Emulation, whose force gathered by a certaine kind of Enuie, of others proceedings kindleth flames of regarde to aspire vnto the like, but not that sluggish and execrable enuie bred of most wicked and detestable malice, which when it selfe cannot, nor is able to doe any thing worthie, snatcheth and continuallie gnaweth on the deserts of others, but that generous and noble kind of enuie which discreete Nature and vertue haue insinuated in our mindes, emulating by a feruent desire to compasse, or possibly to go beyond what mightily by others hath béene performed.