95. All these qualities, sovereignty, creation, and the like, eternally belong to the Supreme Lord; how then can He be "without qualities" who is thus "possessed of qualities"? he theory of a void of qualities is mere disputation.
96. The adorable one possesses knowledge, volition, and creative power; how then can he be destitute of qualities? or, if he is destitute of qualities, how can he be set forth by the Vedas? How can the absence of qualities be predicated of the sea of qualities, and yet all remonstrance be silent? Ponder it well in thine own mind, and then determine what is right.
97. A substance without attributes, like the sky-flower, is not admitted either in the Veda or in the world; if the knowledge of such a thing were derived from the Veda, the Veda itself would then cease to be an authority.
98. [The Vedântin may reply] "The bunch of Darbha grass [Footnote: This is the __prastara__ or bundle of sacred grass, which plays an important part in the sacrificial ritual, cf. Taittirîya S. i. 7. 4, "__yajamâna.h prastara.h,__" where Sâya.na remarks, "__yajamânavad yâgasâdhanatvât prastare yajamânatvopachâra.h.__" This description of the grass as the sacrificer is really only meant as metaphorical praise, since the actual attributes of the sacrificer are evidently absent from the grass. (Cf. Mîmâ.msâ Sûtras, i. 4. 23.)] is said to be the sacrificer, as it is the means of performing the sacrifice; [as the Darbha grass is understood by this description,] even though the attributes thus ascribed are not found in it, so is Brahman understood when we ascribe certain qualities [as 'truth,' etc., even though these qualities are precluded in a being without qualities]."
99. [I answer] A thorough Vedântin like thee does not accept any where the existence of qualities or that which possesses qualities; but if imagined qualities are done away with [by deeper insight], real qualities are nowhere done away with [Footnote: Clearer insight abolishes imagined attributes, as __e. g.__ the supposed snake in the rope; but real attributes remain untouched, and we hold Brahman's attributes to be real.—I read __abâdha.h__ in I. 2.].
100. If Brahman is understood to be destitute of qualities, then "truth," etc., will not be applicable to Him; but, if so, there arises a contradiction in such passages [of Šruti] as "he is the truthful," etc. [Footnote: I do not know where this passage occurs, but the kindred word __satyadharman__ is applied to several deities in the Rigveda.]
101. When the existence of such a thing as a quality is admitted, we can imagine it in something else [Footnote: The Vedântins hold that nothing exists besides Brahman; and yet, although they thus deny the existence of any other thing or quality, they hold that certain qualities are imagined to exist in him, forgetting that only one who has seen silver can imagine __rajatatva__ in nacre.]; but to imagine that nacre is silver, we must first know clearly what silver is.
102. This universe is based on the soul as its site, being imagined in it by ignorance; some teachers would describe it as an illusory emanation [Footnote: It is a favourite doctrine of the Vedânta that ignorance, as being imagined by ignorance, is itself false.]; but this is not a pleasing doctrine to me.
103. It cannot be said that all this universe is false; since it is really the plaything of Hari, who is eternally engaged in sport [Footnote: Manu, i. 80, "There are numberless Manvantaras, creations and destructions numberless; the being supremely exalted performs all this, as in sport, again and again.">[
104. The external world is not like a dream; for in dreams there is sleep and a host of imperfections; what we eat or drink in dreams gives us no enjoyment, but these things are enjoyable in our waking state.