55. I become Brahman, that is, I cease to have mundane existence through beholding the soul in Brahman; the result of this would be the abolition of sorrow, etc., but in no way absolute Oneness.
56. I become Brahman also through beholding Brahman in the soul [Footnote: Another reading is __brahma.ny âtmanirîksha.nât__]; the result would be the abolition of His being out of sight [Footnote: __I.e.__ it would be always __videre videntem__], but in no way Oneness.
57. It must not be said that by continued meditation with intent thought a man becomes Brahman; there will only enter into him a little merit; as we see indeed in the case of worms, bees, and the like [Footnote: Cf. Hitopadeša, Introd. šl. 45.];
58. By devotedly worshipping Brâhmans without ceasing, a Šûdra will never become a Brâhman; there may enter into him a little merit, but one of the Šûdra caste will never become a Brâhman.
59. The venerable author of the Aphorisms himself established a duality when he spoke of the application of the terms "object" and "agent" [Footnote: In Vedânta S. i. 2. 4, it is shown that certain passages in the Upanishads refer to Brahman and not the embodied soul, "because of the application therein of the terms object and agent;" as __e.g.__ in the passage of the Chhândogya Upan. iii. 14, "I shall attain it when I have departed from hence." These words imply an agent who attains and also an object which is attained, __i.e.__ Brahman. Ša"nkara in his comment on i. 2. 11 illustrates this by the passage in the Katha Upanishad iii. 1, "The two, drinking the due reward from their works, in this world entered the cave, in the highest place of the supreme soul" (sc. the heart)]; and thus has it been explained by the author of the commentary by quoting passages of the Veda which imply duality, as that which says "the two entered the cave."
60. The soul is also shown to be different [from Brahman] by the evidence of Šm.riti [Footnote: Cf. Vedânta Sûtras i. 2. 6, where Ša"nkara quotes the passage from the Bhagavad Gîtâ (xviii. 61), "The Lord of all beings abides in the region of the heart,—causing all beings to revolve by his illusion as though mounted on a machine.">[; thus their difference is proved to be essential. If it were not so, how could the Commentator have used such an expression as "the worshipper" and "the worshipped" [Footnote: He uses this very expression __upâsyopâsakabhâva__ in his Comment. on i. 2. 4.]?
61. I am sometimes happy, sometimes miserable; He, the supreme Soul, is always essentially happy. Such is the difference,—then how can there be identity between these two different substances?
62. He is eternally self-luminous and unobscured,— intensely pure, the one witness of the world; not so is the individual soul,—thus a thunderbolt falls on the tree of the theory of Identity.
63. For those who maintain the identity of the individual and supreme soul, the hypothesis of a __dvandva compound__ [Footnote: __I.e.__ in the word __jîvâtmânau__] is precluded; or they bring forward such words as __d.rishadupala__ as parallel cases [Footnote: I suppose that this means that the __dvandva__ compound __d.rishadupala__ has some analogy to one like __jîvâtmânau__, which involves identity, as the upper and lower millstone form one instrument; but there (in accordance with Pâ.n. 2. 2. 34, __vârtt.__) the less important word meaning the upper and smaller stone (__upalâ__) is placed last (cf. 2. 2. 31)]; the __dvandva__ is only consistent with "difference," but in no way with "identity."
64. Where identity is the meaning, there arises the __karmadhâraya__ compound,—for [such a __karmadhâraya__ as] __nîlotpala__ "the blue-lotus" is used as implying that the two members of the compound refer to the same subject [Footnote: But __jîvâtmânau__ is a __dvandva__, not a __karmadhâraya__ compound.]