To cultivate an extensive commercial intercourse with Africa, I have already observed, that the best method, the simplest, and that which is, from contingent circumstances, the most likely to succeed, is the plan which I have pointed out in the following prospectus. I shall now offer several reasons why this plan is superior to any other hitherto suggested.

The riches of the Arabs of Sahara generally, as well as of that part which I have contemplated as a convenient spot for establishing a colony, and for opening a communication with Sudan, consists exclusively in camels. The independence of a man is there ascertained by the number of camels he possesses; it is not said, how many thousand dollars has he? or, what quantity of gold does he possess? or, what land has he? but, how many camels does he own? The master of these, aptly denominated, ships of the Desert, is urged by interest to let on hire his camels, as the master of a ship of the ocean is urged by interest to seek freight for his ship. And it is observed, that the ferocious appearance among the Arabs, (which is too often assumed,) subsides in proportion to the intercourse they have with merchants, who negociate with them for the transport of their goods. Thus, at the depôts for camels between the cultivated country and the Desert, viz. at Akka, Tatta, Ufran, and Wedinoon, the ferocity of the Arabs is greatly lost in the commercial spirit and endeavour to let their camels on hire to the merchants. The Mograffra, the Woled Abbusebah, and the Tejakant Arabs, therefore, who possess the Sahara, from the shores of the Atlantic to the confines of Timbuctoo, would act in concert with the colony, and would have a joint interest in promoting their commercial views. The Brabeesh Arabs who receive, occasionally, tribute from Timbuctoo, would also find it expedient to promote the commerce of Sudan, and the prosperity of Timbuctoo; both which would necessarily be united to their own interest, and would provide a demand for their camels.

If the profits of this commerce, when once established and secured to the British, were to be cent. per cent., the whole would remain a bonus to the colony. There would be no shereef of Fezzan, or bashaw of Tripoli, to take their share of the profits, in any shape, in exchange for the privilege of being suffered to pass through their country. But, on the contrary, the Arabs of the Mograffra and other tribes would find it so evidently their interest and advantage to be friendly with us, that we might absolutely have the entire command of the Desert, from the shores of the Atlantic to the city of Timbuctoo, which would eventually throw such a weight of power into our hands, as to make even that city itself, in a manner, tributary to us.

A plan of this kind should be executed upon a grand national scale, and be pursued with discretion and perseverance.

An attempt to penetrate to Timbuctoo, through Ashantee, and establish a commerce through that country, might meet with temporary success; but I apprehend that we should labour under the same inconveniences, and be subject to the same arbitrary imposts and exactions, whether in the shape of duties, part of the profits, or otherwise, as we should, by opening a communication through Tripoli. There would be a present or douceur to the king of Ashantee; others to the princes of the adjoining territories; and, finally, (taking the character of this king to be as represented by the late traveller in that country, Mr. Bowdich), might we not reasonably anticipate that, on the first dispute respecting the division of the profits, the king of Ashantee would order all the English out of his country, and, to terminate the dispute, plunder them of their property? But, perhaps the establishment of a colony in Ashantee, conjoined to one in Sahara, might not be objectionable. We should then have two routs to the grand emporium of central Africa: if one failed, the other would remain open for our countrymen to recover their property and to return by; and thus, in establishing a commercial intercourse with the interior of Africa, through two routes, we should secure, at the same time, our retreat, by one of them, and not remain at the mercy of the barbarous king of Ashantee, or any other African potentate, who might be urged, from jealousy or avarice, to sacrifice our people, when once he had them in his power!

PROSPECTUS OF A PLAN

FOR FORMING A

NORTH AFRICAN OR SUDAN COMPANY

To be instituted for the purpose of establishing an extensive Commerce with, and laying open to British Enterprise, all the Interior Regions of North Africa.