Deeply impressed with the importance of St. Ruth's position, this council had serious misgivings as to the wisdom of pressing an engagement while he occupied it, and the necessity of adopting a more circuitous route was urged. But the majority considering that they had advanced so far that they could not recede without danger and disgrace, a forward movement was adopted, and the plan of battle finally arranged. It was, however, determined not to disturb their present encampment, lest the movement should be attended with a reverse, but to leave two regiments under Colonel Foulke for its protection, and that none should be allowed to proceed any farther, save such as bore arms. Ammunition was then distributed, the pioneers and grenadiers were ordered to the heads of their respective regiments, and it was arranged that the whole army should cross the river at daybreak, and be formed in array of battle by six o'clock, on ground already selected about a mile beyond it. The soldiers revelled, yet rested on their arms throughout the night, while the generals matured their plan, and the pass-word was—"Dublin."
St. Ruth remained several days on the river Suck, in a state of uncertainty as to whether Ginckle would advance directly on him, or, by taking a north-westerly route to Galway, induce him from the ground of his own selection. While there his army was also recruited by detachments from all the available garrisons still under his control; and he soon found himself again at the head of an army of 20,000 men. This force, according to the most reliable estimates, consisted of 16,000 foot of all arms and 4,000 horse; and the artillery, which had been greatly reduced by the reverse at Athlone, was now but nine brass field-pieces. Of this army, it may be said that the soldiers and officers of the subordinate rank were almost exclusively of the old Celtic race of the island, while the division and regimental commands were held by men of the same race, and by descendants of the Palesmen who had remained faithful to their king and country; and that at this time all, with hardly an exception, were of the Roman Catholic faith.
Having waited until Ginckle's design was clearly indicated, he decamped on the evening of the 9th,[65] and retiring still farther westward, halted at the village of Aughrim, and as if he had already selected his ground, pointed to the hill of Kilcommodon, and announced that there he was determined to die or retrieve his fallen fortune.
From its marked inferiority in numbers and ordnance, the Irish army here, as at the Boyne, was compelled to act strictly on the defensive, and few places in that section of country were better adapted to this purpose than that which St. Ruth had now selected.
The hill of Kilcommodon, now known as the field of Aughrim, is about three miles south-west of Ballinasloe, and is the most considerable of an irregular chain of hills extending from the western bank of the river Suck for a distance of several miles in the direction of Galway. Its position is such, that if a straight line be drawn from Drogheda, on the east of the island, to Galway on the west, none of those memorable battle-fields in its history—Drogheda, The Boyne, Athlone, Athunree, or Galway—will deviate more than a mile from it, while most of them will be directly under it; and Aughrim adds still another link to that long chain of classic associations. Notwithstanding the many changes that time has wrought since the period under consideration, the hill and the country around it look still as sad and gloomy as the thoughts they impart, and few of the old race ever pass that way without uncovering the head and offering a fervent prayer—for, together with being the last battle-field for religion and liberty, which is sufficient in itself to awaken a melancholy interest, it is also remembered by them as the field of their unburied dead.
The hill from north to south is about a mile in length, and has nowhere an elevation of more than four hundred feet. Near its southern extremity stood the church of Kilcommodon and the house of Urrachree,[66] the latter the more eastward and the more prominent feature in the events then pending; and at its northern extremity the village of Aughrim, and a castle of the same name, which, during the Cromwellian war, had been dismantled and untenanted. From its ridge to its base it was considerably less than half a mile of very gradual descent, and from the house of Urrachree to the Castle of Aughrim, along the middle of this declivity, nearly a mile and a half. Along its eastern base it was traversed by intersecting hedgerows, dividing its lower half into small fields of meadow and tillage; but from these up to its crest it was bleak, arid, and heath-covered. Outside of the hedges, and nearly parallel to them, extended a belt of marshy ground, of irregular width, scarcely exceeding a furlong at any point, through the middle of which flowed a small stream, irrigating it from end to end, losing itself in a large bog which lay on the north, and rendering the marsh difficult to infantry and impractical to cavalry. This marsh covered about two-thirds of the face of the hill, and lay closer up to Aughrim than to Urrachree, while outside of it the north-eastern side of the hill was further protected by a strip of moorland lying close to a bog, which protected it on the north and north-west. The road from Ballinasloe ran straight up to this moor, and diverged abruptly; one branch of it winding round by Urrachree, and on to Loughrea; and the other, running between the Castle of Aughrim and the northern base of Kilcommodon, led on to Kilconel, Athunree, and Galway. That by Urrachree ran all the way through firm upland; and excepting the confluents of the stream that watered the marsh, the hill on that side presented no more than ordinary obstacles to an advancing foe; but that which led to Aughrim offered considerable impediments from the manner of its formation. It lay through a common between the moor and the bog; narrow at its eastern side, and gradually expanding into an esplanade, or field, of four or five acres, and narrowing again, in its immediate approach to the castle, until it became passable for only three or four horsemen abreast.[67]—In fine, it may be said that, from the centre to the extreme right, this hill was no more than ordinarily defensible; but from that point round to the extreme left, it was well isolated, and, with little trouble, could have been rendered impregnable; at least to cavalry.
On this hill St. Ruth drew up his army, and encamped along its ridge; selecting as the site of his own tent one of two Danish raths that stood near its summit, and which commanded a view, not only of the hill itself, but of the country for several miles around it. On the morning of the 10th he formed his line of battle; his right resting on Urrachree, his left towards Aughrim, and his centre on its mid-slope between his camp and the hedgerows. Each division consisted of two front and two rear lines; the former of infantry, and the latter of cavalry; and in this position, with banners displayed and pickets well advanced to the river, he was observed by Ginckle during his reconnoissance on the same evening, and this he maintained until the morning of the 12th, to indicate to his enemy that he accepted and awaited the battle.
Such was St. Ruth's disposition, and such the ground which he had selected to countervail the vast superiority of his enemy in men and resources; and how far his skill contributed to that result now demands a passing notice. The hedges which wound along the base of the hill were in themselves no unimportant feature of defence for his infantry. But as some regiments of these were hastily raised levies, he had them also adapted to the offensive action of his cavalry, on which, from its well-established reputation, he had been led to place most reliance. They were accordingly opened at proper intervals, so as to admit of flanking and direct charges, both of infantry and cavalry, against such bodies of the enemy as should succeed in crossing the marsh and penetrating beyond any of these successive lines; and this disposition embraced the whole of his centre, and portions of his right and left. In the squares formed by these hedges his musketeers were to be stationed, while above them, in the direction of his camp, squadrons of his choicest cavalry stood opposite to each direct intersection, while the remainder of the hill, from these up to the camp, was cleared from all obstructions to the deploying of succors to either wing of battle. For the defence of the Castle of Aughrim and the pass which approached it, which were on his extreme left, he selected two regiments of musketeers and foot dragoons, and placed a battery of two pieces on an elevation between the castle and Kilcommodon, so directed as to rake the pass all the way between the esplanade and the grounds around the castle. On the side of Urrachree, where the country was open, and the hedges more broken and diversified, he ran additional connecting trenches, and placed some companies of musketeers in the house and its outer walls, which stood considerably in advance of his main line on that side. The seven pieces of artillery which remained, after detaching two for the defence of the pass at Aughrim, were disposed in the following manner: On the north-eastern face of Kilcommodon, almost over against the castle, was constructed a battery of three pieces, so directed as to throw a raking fire across the pass itself, a portion of the marsh, and the esplanade beyond it, to prevent the enemy's enlarging there; and the remaining four pieces were placed on his inner right, and directed over a portion of the marsh and the road leading up to Urrachree. But before his centre there were no cannon whatever; either because he deemed it less necessary, or that he wished to invite the enemy's infantry to cross, where he was sure to break them by repeated cavalry charges, and overwhelm them by his more agile infantry while recrossing the marsh in disorder. His line being quite an extended one for the number of troops under his control, he had no reserve of infantry, but a choice body of cavalry was held behind the north-western side of Kilcommodon, out of view of the enemy, within convenient support of his right, and actually but a rear line of his left, and extreme left at Aughrim.
As the battle of Aughrim, together with deciding the fate of Ireland and the dynasty of the House of Stuart, had also an indirect bearing, of scarcely secondary import, on the military affairs of the continent, it has been a subject of much more critical comment than that ordinarily bestowed on military events; and the historians of each successive period, down to the present, have visited the disposition of St. Ruth's army with praise or animadversion, each, no doubt, in accordance with his own peculiar views of what should or should not have been done by a general. While all approve the selection of the ground, as manifesting a keen perception of what a defensive position should be, nearly all censure some one or other of the arrangements made for its defence. His design of letting the enemy cross at his centre and beating them afterwards; the placing of his cavalry reserve so far from his right; and his neglect of the Pass of Aughrim, which was by nature so defensible; have been the subject of severe criticism, and the whole plan, or that of allowing the enemy to cross at any point, has been compared by the Duke of Berwick, to a similar error of the celebrated Marshal Crequi, which had been attended by a great disaster. But as the cavalry reserve had not been needed on the right during the action, and as all the enemy's forces which crossed at the centre had been successfully repulsed, the testimony of the duke, who was not on the ground, and of all who sustained that view, may be dismissed without comment. But what does really seem defective in his plan of defence, was the neglect of the Pass of Aughrim, which could have been rendered, with little labor, impregnable to either infantry or cavalry; and in view of his very inferior artillery, this omission seems totally irreconcilable, excepting on the ground that he believed the force left for its defence entirely adequate, as indeed they should have been, had they looked in time to their appointments.
Of the ground, also, it may be said that subsequent writers have attached more importance to it than it really deserved. Whatever features the hand of time may have defaced, it could never have been more than ordinarily defensible, excepting on its northern extremity, where it is still hemmed round by an extensive bog. Its advantages are thus briefly summed up in one sentence by the English chaplain: "Here we had a view of their whole army, posted as before described, by which posture they had the advantage by at least 1,000 men"[68]—no unusual advantage in the selected site of a battle-field.