October 15.—Our head-quarters at Fairfax Court House. It is not a retreat. O no! It is only splendid backward manœuvring!
As far as the Virginia campaign is concerned, the situation to-day is below that previous to the first Bull Run. Lee menacing, going we know not where; guerrillas in the rear of our army, at the gates—literally and geographically at the gates of Alexandria and of Washington. Previous to the first Bull Run, the country bled not; to-day the people is minus thousands and thousands of its children, and to see Lee twenty to thirty miles from Washington! What will be the manœuvring to-morrow?
Warren fought well, but if Sykes was within supporting distance, why did they not annihilate the rebel corps? Two corps ought not to have been afraid to be cut off from the rest of the army distant only a few miles. Or perhaps orders exist not to bring about a general engagement? All is now possible and probable. Our great plans may not yet be ripe.
When the smoke and dust of the manœuvring will be over, I heartily wish that our losses in the retreat may prove innocent and as insignificant as they are reported to be.
On the outside, Lee's movement appears as brilliant as it is desperate. Has not this time Lee overshot the mark? Cunctator Meade may have some lucid moment, and punish Lee for his impertinence. And every and any thing can be done with our brave boys, provided they are commanded and generaled.
In military sciences and history, it would be said that Lee has ramené tambour battant Meade under the defences of Washington. Such a result obtained without a battle, counts among the most splendid military accomplishments, and reveals true generalship.
October 17.—Meade was decided to retreat, even before Lee began to move, say the knowing ones, say the military authorities. If Meade wanted not to go to Culpepper Court-house, or to march towards the enemy, or to occupy the head waters of those rivers, then why was our army promenaded in that direction? To amuse the people? to increase losses in men and in material? Was it done without any plan? I supposed, and the country supposed, that Meade marched south to fight Lee where he would have found him; but it turns out that it was done in order to bring Lee towards Washington and towards the Potomac. What a snare!
October 17.—The electoral victory in Pennsylvania marks a new evolution in the internal polity of the country. It is the victory of the younger and better men as represented by Curtin, by Coffey, etc., over the old hacks, old sepulchres, old tricposters and over men who sucked the treasury and the people's pocket; they did it scientifically, thoroughly, and with a coolness of masters. Oh! could other States therein imitate Pennsylvania, then, the salvation of the country is certain.
October 17: Evening.—The knowing ones promise a battle for to-morrow. Yes, if Lee will. But if not, will Meade attack Lee? who I am sure will continue his movement and operation whatever these may be. We are at guessing.
Repeatedly and repeatedly it is half-officially trumpeted to the country, that this or that general selected his ground and awaits a battle. It reminds one of the wars in Italy during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. And if the general who forced backwards his antagonist, if he prefers not to attack, but continues to manœuvre, what becomes of the select, own ground? Who ever read that Alexander, or Cesar, or Frederic, or Napoleon, or even captains of lesser fame, selected their ground? All of them fought the enemy where they found him, or by skillful manœuvring hemmed the enemy or forced him to abandon his select position. Cases where a general can really force the antagonist to attack such a select, own ground, such cases are special, and very rare.