Dec. 24.—It is impossible to keep cool while reading Burnside's report. Once more this report justifies and corroborates Prince Napoleon's judgment on American generals, i. e., that their plan of campaigns will always be deficient in practice, like the theoretical war-exercises of schoolboys. From this sweeping and terribly true charge, however, we must except the Grants and the—alas! how few!—Rosecranses.
The report says, "but for the fog," etc. All lost battles in the world had for cause some buts—except the genuine but—in the brains of the commander.
"How near we came to accomplishing," etc.—is only a repetition of what, ad nauseam, is recorded by history as lamentations of defeated generals.
"The battle would have been far more decisive." Of course it would have been so, if—won.
"As it was, we were very near success," etc. So the man who takes the chance in the lottery. He has No. 4, and No. 3 wins the prize.
The apostrophe to the heroism of the soldiers is sickly and pale. The heroism of the soldiers! It is as brilliant, as pure, and as certain as the sun.
The attack was planned, (see paragraph 2 of the report,) on the circumstance or supposition that the enemy extended too much his line, and thus scattered his forces. But in paragraph 4, Burnside stated that the fog, (O, fog!) etc., gave the enemy twenty-four hours' time to concentrate his forces in his strong positions—when the calculation based on the enemy's division of forces failed, and the attack lost all the chances considered propitious.
The whole plan had for its basis probabilities and impossibilities—schoolroom speculations—instead of being, as it ought to have been, as every plan of a battle should be, based on the chances of the terrain, by the position of the enemy, and other conditions, almost wholly depending upon which the armies operate. It is natural that martial Hooker objected to it.
Oh! could I have blood, blood, blood, instead of ink!
Constructing the bridge over the Rappahannock, our engineers were killed in scores by the sharp-shooters of the enemy. Malediction on those imbecile staffs! The A B C of warfare, and of sound common sense teach, that such works are to be made either under cover of a powerful artillery fire, or, what is still better, if possible, a general sends over the river in some way, with infantry to clear its banks, and to dislodge the enemy. In such cases one engineer saved, and time won, justify the loss of almost twenty soldiers to one workman. Some one finally suggested an expedition and they did at the end what ought to have been done at the start. O West Point! thy science is marvellous! The staff treated the construction of a bridge over the Rappahannock as if it were building some railroad bridge, in times of peace!