Hence, with the exception of Epicureanism, which Neoplatonism dreaded as its mortal enemy, every important system of former times was drawn upon by the new philosophy. But we should not on that account call Neoplatonism an eclectic system in the usual sense of the word. For in the first place, it had one pervading and all predominating interest, the religious; and in the second place, it introduced into philosophy a new supreme principle, the super-rational, or the super-essential. This principle should not be identified with the "Ideas" of Plato or the "Form" of Aristotle. For as Zeller rightly says: "In Plato and Aristotle the distinction of the sensuous and the intelligible is the strongest expression for belief in the truth of thought; it is only sensuous perception and sensuous existence whose relative falsehood they presuppose; but of a higher stage of spiritual life lying beyond idea and thought, there is no mention. In Neoplatonism, on the other hand, it is just this super-rational element which is regarded as the final goal of all effort, and the highest ground of all existence; the knowledge gained by thought is only an intermediate stage between sensuous perception and the super-rational intuition; the intelligible forms are not that which is highest and last, but only the media by which the influences of the formless original essence are communicated to the world. This view therefore presupposes not merely doubt of the reality of sensuous existence and sensuous notions, but absolute doubt, aspiration beyond all reality. The highest intelligible is not that which constitutes the real content of thought, but only that which is presupposed and earnestly desired by man as the unknowable ground of his thought." Neoplatonism recognised that a religious ethic can be built neither on sense-perception nor on knowledge gained by the understanding, and that it cannot be justified by these; it therefore broke both with intellectual ethics and with utilitarian morality. But for that very reason, having as it were parted with perception and understanding in relation to the ascertaining of the highest truth, it was compelled to seek for a new world and a new function in the human spirit, in order to ascertain the existence of what it desired, and to comprehend and describe that of which it had ascertained the existence. But man cannot transcend his psychological endowment. An iron ring incloses him. He who does not allow his thought to be determined by experience falls a prey to fancy, that is, thought, which cannot be suppressed, assumes a mythological aspect: superstition takes the place of reason, dull gazing at something incomprehensible is regarded as the highest goal of the spirit's efforts, and every conscious activity of the spirit is subordinated to visionary conditions artificially brought about. But that every conceit may not be allowed to assert itself, the gradual exploration of every region of knowledge according to every method of acquiring it, is demanded as a preliminary—the Neoplatonists did not make matters easy for themselves,—and a new and mighty principle is set up which is to bridle fancy, viz., the authority of a sure tradition. This authority must be superhuman, otherwise it would not come under consideration; it must therefore be divine. On divine disclosures, that is revelations, must rest both the highest super-rational region of knowledge and the possibility of knowledge itself. In a word, the philosophy which Neoplatonism represents, whose final interest is the religious, and whose highest object is the super-rational, must be a philosophy of revelation.
In the case of Plotinus himself and his immediate disciples, this does not yet appear plainly. They still shew confidence in the objective presuppositions of their philosophy, and have, especially in psychology, done great work and created something new. But this confidence vanishes in the later Neoplatonists. Porphyry, before he became a disciple of Plotinus, wrote a book περι της εκλογιων φιλοσοφια; as a philosopher he no longer required the "λογια." But the later representatives of the system sought for their philosophy revelations of the Godhead. They found them in the religious traditions and cults of all nations. Neoplatonism learned from the Stoics to rise above the political limits of nations and states, and to widen the Hellenic consciousness to a universally human one. The spirit of God has breathed throughout the whole history of the nations, and the traces of divine revelation are to be found everywhere. The older a religious tradition or cultus is, the more worthy of honour, the more rich in thoughts of God it is. Therefore the old Oriental religions are of special value to the Neoplatonists. The allegorical method of interpreting myths, which was practised by the Stoics in particular, was accepted by Neoplatonism also. But the myths, spiritually explained, have for this system an entirely different value from what they had for the Stoic philosophers. The latter adjusted themselves to the myths by the aid of allegorical explanation; the later Neoplatonists, on the other hand, (after a selection in which the immoral myths were sacrificed, see, e.g. Julian) regarded them as the proper material and sure foundation of philosophy. Neoplatonism claims to be not only the absolute philosophy, completing all systems, but, at the same time, the absolute religion, confirming and explaining all earlier religions. A rehabilitation of all ancient religions is aimed at (see the philosophic teachers of Julian and compare his great religious experiment); each was to continue in its traditional form, but, at the same time, each was to communicate the religious temper and the religious knowledge which Neoplatonism had attained, and each cultus is to lead to the high morality which it behoves man to maintain. In Neoplatonism the psychological fact of the longing of man for something higher, is exalted to the all-predominating principle which explains the world. Therefore the religions, though they are to be purified and spiritualised, become the foundation of philosophy. The Neoplatonic philosophy therefore presupposes the religious syncretism of the third century, and cannot be understood without it. The great forces which were half unconsciously at work in this syncretism, were reflectively grasped by Neoplatonism. It is the final fruit of the developments resulting from the political, national and religious syncretism which arose from the undertakings of Alexander the Great, and the Romans.
Neoplatonism is consequently a stage in the history of religion; nay, its significance in the history of the world lies in the fact that it is so. In the history of science and enlightenment it has a position of significance only in so far as it was the necessary transition stage through which humanity had to pass, in order to free itself from the religion of nature and the depreciation of the spiritual life, which oppose an insurmountable barrier to the highest advance of human knowledge. But as Neoplatonism in its philosophical aspect means the abolition of ancient philosophy, which, however, it desired to complete, so also in its religious aspect it means the abolition of the ancient religions which it aimed at restoring. For in requiring these religions to mediate a definite religious knowledge, and to lead to the highest moral disposition, it burdened them with tasks to which they were not equal, and under which they could not but break down. And in requiring them to loosen, if not completely destroy, the bond which was their only stay, namely, the political bond, it took from them the foundation on which they were built. But could it not place them on a greater and firmer foundation? Was not the Roman Empire in existence, and could the new religion not become dependent on this in the same way as the earlier religions had been dependent on the lesser states and nations? It might be thought so, but it was no longer possible. No doubt the political history of the nations round the Mediterranean, in their development into the universal Roman monarchy, was parallel to the spiritual history of these nations in their development into monotheism and a universal system of morals; but the spiritual development in the end far outstripped the political: even the Stoics attained to a height which the political development could only partially reach. Neoplatonism did indeed attempt to gain a connection with the Byzantine Roman Empire: one noble monarch, Julian, actually perished as a result of this endeavour: but even before this the profounder Neoplatonists discerned that their lofty religious philosophy would not bear contact with the despotic Empire, because it would not bear any contact with the "world" (plan of the founding of Platonopolis). Political affairs are at bottom as much a matter of indifference to Neoplatonism as material things in general. The idealism of the new philosophy was too high to admit of its being naturalised in the despiritualised, tyrannical and barren creation of the Byzantine Empire, and this Empire itself needed unscrupulous and despotic police officials, not noble philosophers. Important and instructive, therefore, as the experiments are, which were made from time to time by the state and by individual philosophers, to unite the monarchy of the world with Neoplatonism, they could not but be ineffectual.
But, and this is the last question which one is justified in raising here, why did not Neoplatonism create an independent religious community? Since it had already changed the ancient religions so fundamentally, in its purpose to restore them, since it had attempted to fill the old naive cults with profound philosophic ideas, and to make them exponents of a high morality, why did it not take the further step and create a religious fellowship of its own? Why did it not complete and confirm the union of gods by the founding of a church which was destined to embrace the whole of humanity, and in which, beside the one ineffable Godhead, the gods of all nations could have been worshipped? Why not? The answer to this question is at the same time the reply to another, viz., why did the Christian church supplant Neoplatonism? Neoplatonism lacked three elements to give it the significance of a new and permanent religious system. Augustine in his confessions (Bk. VII. 18-21) has excellently described these three elements. First and above all, it lacked a religious founder; secondly, it was unable to give any answer to the question, how one could permanently maintain the mood of blessedness and peace: thirdly, it lacked the means of winning those who could not speculate. The "people" could not learn the philosophic exercises which it recommended as the condition of attaining the enjoyment of the highest good; and the way on which even the "people" can attain to the highest good was hidden from it. Hence these "wise and prudent" remained a school. When Julian attempted to interest the common uncultured man in the doctrines and worship of this school, his reward was mockery and scorn.
Not as philosophy and not as a new religion did Neoplatonism become a decisive factor in history, but, if I may say so, as a frame of mind.[455] The feeling that there is an eternal highest good which lies beyond all outer experience and is not even the intelligible, this feeling, with which was united the conviction of the entire worthlessness of everything earthly, was produced and fostered by Neoplatonism. But it was unable to describe the contents of that highest being and highest good, and therefore it was here compelled to give itself entirely up to fancy and aesthetic feeling. Therefore it was forced to trace out "mysterious ways to that which is within", which, however, led nowhere. It transformed thought into a dream of feeling; it immersed itself in the sea of emotions; it viewed the old fabled world of the nations as the reflection of a higher reality, and transformed reality into poetry; but in spite of all these efforts it was only able, to use the words of Augustine, to see from afar the land which it desired. It broke this world into fragments; but nothing remained to it, save a ray from a world beyond, which was only an indescribable "something."
And yet the significance of Neoplatonism in the history of our moral culture has been, and still is, immeasurable. Not only because it refined and strengthened man's life of feeling and sensation, not only because it, more than anything else, wove the delicate veil which even to-day, whether we be religious or irreligious, we ever and again cast over the offensive impression of the brutal reality, but, above all, because it begat the consciousness that the blessedness which alone can satisfy man, is to be found somewhere else than in the sphere of knowledge. That man does not live by bread alone, is a truth that was known before Neoplatonism; but it proclaimed the profounder truth, which the earlier philosophy had failed to recognise, that man does not live by knowledge alone. Neoplatonism not only had a propadeutic significance in the past, but continues to be, even now, the source of all the moods which deny the world and strive after an ideal, but have not power to raise themselves above æsthetic feeling, and see no means of getting a clear notion of the impulse of their own heart and the land of their desire.
Historical Origin of Neoplatonism.
The forerunners of Neoplatonism were, on the one hand, those Stoics who recognise the Platonic distinction of the sensible and supersensible world, and on the other, the so-called Neopythagoreans and religious philosophers, such as Posidonius, Plutarch of Chæronea, and especially Numenius of Apamea.[456] Nevertheless, these cannot be regarded as the actual Fathers of Neoplatonism; for the philosophic method was still very imperfect in comparison with the Neoplatonic, their principles were uncertain, and the authority of Plato was not yet regarded as placed on an unapproachable height. The Jewish and Christian philosophers of the first and second centuries stand very much nearer the later Neoplatonism than Numenius. We would probably see this more clearly if we knew the development of Christianity in Alexandria in the second century. But, unfortunately, we have only very meagre fragments to tell us of this. First and above all, we must mention Philo. This philosopher, who interpreted the Old Testament religion in terms of Hellenism, had, in accordance with his idea of revelation, already maintained that the Divine Original Essence is supra-rational, that only ecstasy leads to Him, and that the materials for religious and moral knowledge are contained in the oracles of the Deity. The religious ethic of Philo, a combination of Stoic, Platonic, Neopythagorean and Old Testament gnomic wisdom, already bears the marks which we recognise in Neoplatonism. The acknowledgment that God was exalted above all thought, was a sort of tribute which Greek philosophy was compelled to pay to the national religion of Israel, in return for the supremacy which was here granted to the former. The claim of positive religion to be something more than an intellectual conception of the universal reason, was thereby justified. Even religious syncretism is already found in Philo; but it is something essentially different from the later Neoplatonic, since Philo regarded the Jewish cult as the only valuable one, and traced back all elements of truth in the Greeks and Romans to borrowings from the books of Moses.
The earliest Christian philosophers, especially Justin and Athenagoras, likewise prepared the way for the speculations of the later Neoplatonists by their attempts, on the one hand, to connect Christianity with Stoicism and Platonism, and on the other, to exhibit it as supra-Platonic. The method by which Justin, in the introduction to the Dialogue with Trypho, attempts to establish the Christian knowledge of God, that is, the knowledge of the truth, on Platonism, Scepticism and "Revelation", strikingly reminds us of the later methods of the Neoplatonists. Still more is one reminded of Neoplatonism by the speculations of the Alexandrian Christian Gnostics, especially of Valentinus and the followers of Basilides. The doctrines of the Basilidians(?) communicated by Hippolytus (Philosoph. VII. c. 20 sq.), read like fragments from the didactic writings of the Neoplatonists: Επει ουδεν ην ουχ 'υλη, ουκ ουσια, ουκ ανουσιον, ουχ 'απλουν, ου συνθετον, ουκ ανοητον, ουκ αναισθητον, ουκ ανθρωπος ... ουκ ων θεος ανοητως, αναισθητως αβουλως απροαιρετως, απαθως, ανεπιθυμητιος κοσμον ηθελησε ποιησαι ... 'Ουτως ουκ ων θεος εποιησε κοσμον ουκ οντα εξ ουκ οντων, καταβαλομενος και 'υποστησας σπερμα τι εν εχον πασαν εν 'εαυτω της του κοσμου πανσπερμιαν. Like the Neoplatonists, these Basilidians did not teach an emanation from the Godhead, but a dynamic mode of action of the Supreme Being. The same can be asserted of Valentinus who also places an unnamable being above all, and views matter not as a second principle, but as a derived product. The dependence of Basilides and Valentinus on Zeno and Plato is, besides, undoubted. But the method of these Gnostics in constructing their mental picture of the world and its history, was still an uncertain one. Crude primitive myths are here received, and naively realistic elements alternate with bold attempts at spiritualising. While therefore, philosophically considered, the Gnostic systems are very unlike the finished Neoplatonic ones, it is certain that they contained almost all the elements of the religious view of the world, which we find in Neoplatonism.