Footnote 702:[ (return) ]
See Overbeck, Theologische Literatur-Zeitung, 1878, Col. 535.
Footnote 703:[ (return) ]
A full presentation of Origen's theology would require many hundreds of pages, because he introduced everything worth knowing into the sphere of theology, and associated with the Holy Scriptures, verse by verse, philosophical maxims, ethical reflexions, and results of physical science, which would require to be drawn on the widest canvas, because the standpoint selected by Origen allowed the most extensive view and the most varied judgments. The case was similar with Clement before him, and also with Tertullian. This is a necessary result of "Scripture theology" when one takes it up in earnest. Tertullian assumes, for example, that there must be a Christian doctrine of dreams. Why? Because we read of dreams in the Holy Scriptures.
Footnote 704:[ (return) ]
In c. Cels. III. 61 it is said (Lommatzsch XVIII., p. 337): επεμφθη ουν Θεος λογος καθο μεν ιατρος τοις 'αμαρτωλοις, καθο δε διδασκαλος θειων μυστηριον τοις ηδη καθαροις και μηκετι 'αμαρτανουσιν. See also what follows. In Comment. in John I. 20 sq. the crucified Christ, as the Christ of faith, is distinguished from the Christ who takes up his abode in us, as the Christ of the perfect. See 22 (Lomm. I. p. 43): και μακαριοι γε 'οσοι δεομενοι του 'υιου του Θεου τοιουτοι γεγονασιν, 'ως μηκετι αυτου χραζειν ιατρου τους κακως 'εχοντας θεραπευοντος, μηδε ποιμενος, μηδε απολυτρωσεως, αλλα σοφιας και λογου και δικαιοσυνης, 'η ει τι αλλο τοις δια τελειοτητα χωρειν αυτου τα καλλιστα δυναμενοις. Read also c. Cels. II. 66, 69: IV. 15, 18: VI. 68. These passages show that the crucified Christ is no longer of any account to the Gnostic, and that he therefore allegorises all the incidents described in the Gospels. Clement, too, really regards Christ as of no importance to Gnostics except as a teacher.
Footnote 705:[ (return) ]
Comment, in Joh. I. 9, Lomm. I. p, 20. The "mysteries" of Christ is the technical term for this theology and, at bottom, for all theology. For, in respect of the form given to it, revelation always appears as a problem that theology has to solve. What is revealed is therefore either to be taken as immediate authority (by the believer) or as a soluble problem. One thing, accordingly, it is not, namely, something in itself evident and intelligible.
Footnote 706:[ (return) ]
See Nitzsch, Dogmengeschichte, p. 136.
Footnote 707:[ (return) ]
To Origen the problem of evil was one of the most important; see Book III. of περι αρχων and c. Cels. VI. 53-59. He is convinced (1) that the world is not the work of a second, hostile God; (2) that virtues and the works arising from them are alone good in the proper sense of the word, and that nothing but the opposite of these is bad; (3) that evil in the proper sense of the word is only evil will (see c. Cels. IV. 66: VI. 54). Accordingly he makes a very decided distinction between that which is bad and evils. As for the latter he admits that they partly originate from God, in which case they are designed as means of training and punishment. But he saw that this conception is insufficient, both in view of individual passages of Holy Scripture and of natural experience. There are evils in the world that can be understood neither as the result of sin nor as means of training. Here then his relative, rational view of things comes in, even with respect to the power of God. There are evils which are a necessary consequence of carrying out even the best intentions (c. Cels. VI. 53: τα κακα εκ παρακολουθησεως γεγενηται της προς τα προηγουμενα): "Evils, in the strict sense, are not created by God; yet some, though but few in comparison with the great, well-ordered whole of the world, have of necessity adhered to the objects realised; as the carpenter who executes the plan of a building does not manage without chips and similar rubbish, or as architects cannot be made responsible for the dirty heaps of broken stones and filth one sees at the sites of buildings;" (l.c., c. 55). Celsus also might have written in this strain. The religious, absolute view is here replaced by a rational, and the world is therefore not the best absolutely, but the best possible. See the Theodicy in περι αρχων III. 17-22. (Here, and also in other parts, Origen's Theodicy reminds us of that of Leibnitz; see Denis, l.c., p. 626 sq. The two great thinkers have a very great deal in common, because their philosophy was not of a radical kind, but an attempt to give a rational interpretation to tradition.) But "for the great mass it is sufficient when they are told that evil has not its origin in God" (IV. 66). The case is similar with that which is really bad. It is sufficient for the multitude to know that that which is bad springs from the freedom of the creature, and that matter which is inseparable from things mortal is not the source and cause of sin (IV. 66, see also III, 42: το κυριως μιαρον απο κακιας τοιουτον εστι. Φυσις δε σωματος ου μιαρα ου γαρ 'η φυσις σωματος εστι, το γεννητικον της μιαροτητος εχει την κακιαν); but a closer examination shows that there can be no man without sin (III. 6l) because error is inseparable from growth and because the constitution of man in the flesh makes evil unavoidable (VII. 50). Sinfulness is therefore natural and it is the necessary prius. This thought, which is also not foreign to Irenæus, is developed by Origen with the utmost clearness. He was not content with proving it, however, but in order to justify God's ways proceeded to the assumption of a Fall before time began (see below).
Footnote 708:[ (return) ]
See Mehlhorn, Die Lehre von der menschlichen Freiheit nach Origenes (Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte, Vol. II., p. 234 ff.)
Footnote 709:[ (return) ]
The distinction between Valentinus and Origen consists in the fact that the former makes an æon or, in other words, a part of the divine pleroma, itself fall, and that he does not utilise the idea of freedom. The outline of Origen's system cannot be made out with complete clearness from the work περι αρχων, because he endeavoured to treat each of the first three parts as a whole. Origen's four principles are God, the World, Freedom, Revelation (Holy Scripture). Each principle, however, is brought into relation with Christ. The first part treats of God and the spirits, and follows the history of the latter down to their restoration. The second part treats of the world and humanity, and likewise closes with the prospect of the resurrection, punishment in hell, and eternal life. Here Origen makes a magnificent attempt to give a conception of bliss and yet to exclude all sensuous joys. The third book treats of sin and redemption, that is, of freedom of will, temptation, the struggle with the powers of evil, internal struggles, the moral aim of the world, and the restoration of all things. A special book on Christ is wanting, for Christ is no "principle"; but the incarnation is treated of in II. 6. The teachers of Valentinus' school accordingly appear more Christian when contrasted with Origen. If we read the great work περι αρχων, or the treatise against Celsus, or the commentaries connectedly, we never cease to wonder how a mind so clear, so sure of the ultimate aim of all knowledge, and occupying such a high standpoint, has admitted in details all possible views down to the most naive myths, and how he on the one hand believes in holy magic, sacramental vehicles and the like, and on the other, in spite of all his rational and even empirical views, betrays no doubt of his abstract creations. But the problem that confronts us in Origen is that presented by his age. This we realise on reading Celsus or Porphyry (see Denis l.c., p. 613: "Toutes les théories d'Origène, même les plus imaginaires, représent l'état intellectuel et moral du siècle où il a paru"). Moreover, Origen is not a teacher who, like Augustine, was in advance of his time, though he no doubt anticipated the course of ecclesiastical development. This age, as represented by its greatest men, sought to gain a substructure for something new, not by a critical examination of the old ideas, but by incorporating them all into one whole. People were anxious to have assurance, and, in the endeavour to find this, they were nervous about giving up any article of tradition. The boldness of Origen, judged as a Greek philosopher, lies in his rejection of all polytheistic religions. This made him all the more conservative in his endeavours to protect and incorporate everything else. This conservatism welded together ecclesiastical Christianity and Greek culture into a system of theology which was indeed completely heterodox.
Footnote 710:[ (return) ]
The proof from prophecy was reckoned by Origen among the articles belonging to faith, but not to Gnosis (see for ex. c. Cels. II. 37); but, like the Apologists, he found it of great value. As far as the philosophers are concerned, Origen always bore in mind the principle expressed in c. Cels. VII. 46: προς ταυτα δ'ημεις φησομεν 'οι μελετησαντες μηδενι απεχθανεσθαι των καλως λεγομενων; καν 'οι 'εξω της πιστεως λεγωυσι καλως. In that same place it is asserted that God in his love has not only revealed himself to such as entirely consecrate themselves to his service, but also to such as do not know the true adoration and reverence which he requires. But as remarked above, p. 338, Origen's attitude to the Greek philosophers is much more reserved than that of Clement.
Footnote 711:[ (return) ]
See, for ex., c. Cels. VI. 6, Comment in Johann. XIII. 59, Lomm. II., p. 9 sq.