This relation of slavery, Aristotle argues, is not only natural and necessary, but also beneficial for those who are so constituted.[[651]] Just as the body is benefited by the rule of the soul, and domestic animals by the rule of man, so it is distinctly to the advantage of the “natural slave” to be ruled by a rational master. This is universally true, wherever one class of persons is as inferior to another as is the body to the soul.[[652]]
The philosopher’s frank admissions, in which he opposes the doctrine that slavery is founded on mere force, are fatal to his first argument on the natural slave. He admits that nature does not always consummate her purpose; that the souls of freemen are sometimes found in the bodies of slaves, and vice versa;[[653]] that it is difficult to distinguish the quality of the soul, in any event;[[654]] that the claim that slavery is neither natural nor beneficial has in it a modicum of truth, as there are sometimes merely legal slaves, or slaves by convention;[[655]] that slavery based on mere might without virtue is unjust;[[656]] that captives of war may be wrongly enslaved;[[657]] that only those who actually deserve it, should meet this fate;[[658]] that the accidents of life may bring even the noblest of mankind into slavery;[[659]] and that only non-Greeks are ignoble and worthy of it.[[660]] He even insists that the terms “slave-master,” “freeman,” “slave,” when rightly used, imply a certain virtue or the lack of it, and therefore that to be justly a master, one must be morally superior.[[661]] The question of the possession of the higher virtues by slaves is recognized by him to be a difficult problem, for an affirmative answer breaks down his distinction of “natural” slave, yet it seems paradoxical to deny these virtues to him as a human being.[[662]] Nor can the difficulty be avoided by positing for the slave a mere difference in degree of virtue, for the distinction between ruler and subject must be one of kind.[[663]] In any event, temperance and justice are necessary even for good slave service.[[664]] Aristotle therefore evades the difficulty, and begs the question by concluding that both master and slave must share in virtue, but differently, in accord with their respective stations.[[665]]
With this admission, he places slaves on a higher plane than free artisans, in that he denies virtue to such classes, since it cannot be produced in them, except as they are brought into contact with a master.[[666]] He thus makes slavery a humanitarian institution, and the slave a real member of the family.[[667]] But the admission most fatal to his theory is in agreeing that the slave qua man may be a subject of friendship,[[668]] and in advocating his manumission as a reward for good behavior. With this, the attempted distinction between him, qua slave and qua man, utterly breaks down, and the existence of natural slaves is virtually denied.[[669]] Thus the great champion of slavery in the ancient world, by his very defense of it, repudiates its right as a natural institution. His actual conception of the relation is, indeed, not far from the ideal of Plato, a union for the best mutual service of rulers and ruled, in which the slave receives from his master a moral exchange value for his physical service.[[670]]
There is a certain economic and moral truth, also, in the attitude of Aristotle toward slavery, that, as Ruskin has observed,[[671]] higher civilization and culture must have a foundation of menial labor, and that the only justification of such a situation is in the assumption that some are naturally fitted for the higher, and some for the lower, sphere.[[672]] Such modern laborers are not technically slaves, but Aristotle would insist that they are in a still worse condition, since they are deprived of the humanizing and moralizing influences of a rational master. The plausibility of such a contention would be well illustrated by the wretched condition of multitudes of negroes after the Civil War, as also by the hopeless life of a large portion of the modern industrial army. Moreover, the economic slavery of many of the common toilers today is less justifiable than the domestic slavery advocated by Aristotle, for it too often means a life of indolence and self-indulgence for the masters, instead of that Greek leisure which gave opportunity for higher activity.[[673]]
MONEY
To the theory of money Aristotle makes a substantial contribution. He agrees with Plato that money found its origin in the growth of necessary exchange, which in turn resulted from an increased division of labor. Unlike Plato, however, he gives a detailed history of the development of money.[[674]] Before its invention, all exchange was by barter.[[675]] But with the growth of commerce, barter became difficult, and a common medium of exchange was agreed upon.[[676]] Something was chosen that was a commodity, having intrinsic value (ὁτῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ ὄν) and that was easy to handle (εὐμεταχείριστον) in the business of life such as iron, silver, or other metal.[[677]] It was first uncoined, defined merely by size and weight.[[678]] Finally, to avoid the inconvenience, it was given a stamp (χαρακτήρ) representative of the quantity (σημεῖον τοῦ πόσου).[[679]] Thus arose the use of money as a convenience in necessary exchange, but once having arisen, it became the foundation of false finance and retail trade, which are pursued as a science of gain.[[680]] All this accords well with the facts as now accepted, yet how utterly different is Aristotle’s standpoint from that of the modern historian of economic institutions is revealed by his last statement, and indeed by the setting of the entire passage. His history of money is merely incidental to his purpose of showing that money is the parent and the very life of the false finance which he decries.
He is also more explicit than the other Greek theorists on the function of money. He clearly recognizes the two functions noted by Plato,[[681]] but he deals with them in a much more detailed manner. His discussion grows out of his theory of distributive justice presented in the Ethics.[[682]] Money was introduced as the exchangeable representative of demand (ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας),[[683]] since diverse products must be reduced to some common denominator.[[684]] It is thus a medium of exchange, acting as a measure of all inferior and superior values, by making them all commensurable (συμβλητά).[[685]]
The other important function of money recognized is as a guaranty (ἐγγυητής) of future exchange. It represents the abiding, rather than the temporary, need, and is thus a standard of deferred payments.[[686]] The importance of money in the fulfilment of these functions is great, in the opinion of Aristotle. The possibility of fair exchange, or indeed the very existence of organized society depends upon it.[[687]]
He is also clearer than Plato and Xenophon in his definition of the relation between money and wealth. He severely criticizes the current mercantilistic theory of his day, which identified wealth with a quantity of current coin (νομίσματος πλῆθος).[[688]] He immediately follows this, however, with a more extended presentation of the opposite error of the Cynics, that money is mere trash (λῆρος), depending for its value entirely upon convention (νόμῳ). This theory, he points out, is based on the fact that, if money ceased to be recognized as legal tender, it would be useless; that it satisfies no direct necessity; and that one might starve like Midas, though possessed of it in superabundance.[[689]]
Aristotle is here somewhat ambiguous as to his own attitude toward this doctrine. He fails to object that money does not necessarily become valueless when it ceases to be legal tender, and that a similar argument might be used to prove that clothing is not wealth. Instead, he uses the idea as a means of refuting the opposite error, which is more obnoxious to him, and on the basis of it he plunges into his discussion of the true and false finance.[[690]] This, together with a passage in the Ethics, might point to the conclusion that he agreed with the doctrine of the Cynics on money. He states that it was introduced by agreement (κατὰ συνθήκην); that, owing to this, it is called νόμισμα, because its value is not natural but legal; and that it may, at any time, be changed or made useless.[[691]] In the light of other evidence, however, it seems probable that he here meant to emphasize merely the fact that the general agreement of a community is necessary before anything can be used as a symbol of demand. In stating that it may be made useless, he probably referred to money itself, rather than the material of it, which is, of course, true. His determined opposition to the mercantile theory of money, as the basis of false finance, caused him to appear to subscribe to the opposite error. That, in actual fact, he did recognize the necessity of intrinsic value as an attribute of money is clearly evidenced by another passage, where he specifies it. He says that the material chosen as money was a commodity and easy to handle.[[692]] This can mean only that it is subject to demand and supply, like any other object of exchange. This inference is substantiated by another passage, which declares that the value of money fluctuates, like that of other things, only not in the same degree.[[693]] Moreover, in his enumeration of the diverse kinds of wealth, money is regularly included.[[694]] It seems evident, therefore, that he did not fall a victim of either error, but recognized that, though money is only representative wealth, yet it is itself a commodity, whose value changes with supply and demand, like other goods.[[695]] Since he understood the use of money as a standard of deferred payments, he also saw clearly the necessity of a stable monetary standard.[[696]]