“ERYXIAS”

The pseudo-Platonic dialogue, Eryxias, is of special interest for our study, since it is the only extant work in Greek literature which deals directly and exclusively with the problem of wealth.[[943]] The work presents nothing new, however, which had not already been observed by the Socratics. The statement of Heidel,[[944]] that it is “distinctly the most valuable contribution of antiquity to the science of political economy,” is therefore an exaggeration. Nevertheless, the essay is worthy of more notice than it has usually received in histories of ancient economic thought.[[945]] Whatever consideration has been given to it has been largely devoted to the question of its origin. It reveals points of contact with Plato, the later Socratics, and especially with Antisthenes, the Cynic, with whom the author seems to have been most in sympathy.[[946]]

The two theses that form the goal of the Eryxias are that the wisest men are in reality the wealthiest, and that material wealth is an evil, since they who possess most of it are the most needy of all, and hence most depraved.[[947]] The keynote of the dialogue is the question of Socrates concerning the wealthy Sicilian, “What sort of a man was he reputed to be in Sicily?”[[948]] The double thesis is illustrated concretely by Socrates, the wisest, and the Sicilian, the richest but worst of men. The first idea is prominent in Euthydemus,[[949]] and elsewhere in Plato and Xenophon.[[950]] The second is a favorite doctrine of the Cynics and Stoics,[[951]] though the general thought may be traced back to Socrates.[[952]]

Some insight is exhibited by the author into the problem of value. Like Xenophon, he defines property (χρήματα) as that which is useful, and thus recognizes this element in value.[[953]] He also distinguishes general from economic utility.[[954]] In answer to the question in respect to what particular use wealth possesses utility, he states tentatively that it is with respect to bodily needs,[[955]] an idea suggestive of the organon theory of Aristotle. By this, he doubtless means food, clothing, and shelter, which have the quality of rarity. This, however, is only a step in the argument, which has for its goal the thesis that intellectual attainments constitute the most important part of one’s wealth, and possess a very real economic value.[[956]] The author thus agrees with Plato, Xenophon, the Cynics, and the Stoics, in his emphasis upon spiritual goods. The distinction between value in use and value in exchange and the necessary dependence of the latter upon the former are also suggested in the statement that nothing can have economic value except as there is a demand for it. The money that passes current in one state may be valueless in another, as also would be the mansion of the wealthy Polytion to Scythian nomads, since there would be no demand for them.[[957]]

The Eryxias has no clear or satisfactory definition of wealth. It is recognized that wealth must be defined before its character as good or evil can be determined, but the final answer nowhere appears.[[958]] In this vagueness of result, one is strongly reminded of some of Plato’s minor dialogues. There is also a certain ambiguity throughout the work, similar to that observed in Plato,[[959]] between wealth in its strict economic sense and excessive wealth. We may gather from the course of the argument, however, that the author would define wealth as consisting of things that possess utility, and are subjects of economic demand, whether external, physical, or intellectual goods.

The attitude of the Eryxias toward wealth is an extreme version of that with which we have become familiar in the Socratics, and is best characterized as Cynic. As seen above, the author considers external wealth to be an absolute second to wisdom,[[960]] since wisdom is not only itself a means of providing material needs,[[961]] but also and especially because through it alone does any material wealth become truly valuable.[[962]] When the latter is made the summum bonum, it becomes the greatest evil. Like Plato, Jesus, and Ruskin, he insists that the kingdom of wisdom be given the first place,[[963]] for things derive their good or evil quality from the character or knowledge of the user.[[964]] The ironical account of how the Greek fathers, even of the best classes (τῶν μεγίστων δοκούντων) urge their boys to seek wealth, since without this they are of no account, is almost in the language of Pastor Wagner’s condemnation of the extreme commercialism of this age.[[965]] Material goods, when unwisely used, are a fruitful source of ills,[[966]] and excessive wealth is always evil.[[967]] However, the political motive, which prompted the hostility of Plato and Aristotle to excessive wealth, is absent from the Eryxias.

Thus far the attitude of the author does not differ very essentially from that of the Socratics, but toward the end of the dialogue the doctrine is distinctly taught that wealth is an evil per se. He argues that one’s needs are most numerous in a state of sickness, when he is in his worst condition.[[968]] One is at his best, on the other hand, when he has fewest and simplest needs.[[969]] But those who have most property are sure to need the largest provision for the service of the body.[[970]] Thus the richest, as being the most needy, are the most depraved (μοχθηρότατα διακείμενοι) and the most unhappy, and therefore external wealth is essentially evil.[[971]] Such a characteristically Cynic doctrine is essentially ascetic, and subversive of the very foundations of economics.

The Eryxias hints at a definition of capital in the distinction between the direct consumption of wealth and its use for further production.[[972]] But it is far from the author’s purpose to define capital, and he makes nothing of the distinction. The relation of money to wealth is also dealt with incidentally. Like Aristotle, he criticizes the definition of wealth as “the possession of much money,”[[973]] on the ground that the money of one country may not pass current in another, and hence cannot be true wealth.[[974]] This is suggestive of the Cynic theory of fiat money, since the examples used are those of the worthless currency of Carthage, Sparta, and Ethiopia.[[975]] But the argument proves too much, since it would be equally as effective against counting the house of Polytion as true wealth. There is, moreover, a peculiar shift in this part of the dialogue between money and property. The theory of the author is further upheld by the argument that a condition can be conceived in which our bodily needs might be supplied without silver or gold, in which case these metals would be worthless.[[976]] However, the necessity of intrinsic value for international currency is recognized,[[977]] and it seems hardly probable that the purpose of the dialogue was to contend that money is never wealth, since the very implication of the argument is that current money is wealth.[[978]]

TELES

The fragments of Teles exhibit the same extreme asceticism of the Cynics in relation to wealth.[[979]] His main thesis is that the possession of money does not free from want and need.[[980]] Many who have great possessions do not use them, because of stinginess and sordidness.[[981]] But if wealth is not used, it is useless, and cannot free from need or want.[[982]] Here we meet a different application of the criterion of “use” from that with which we have become familiar in the Socratics, the Eryxias, and Ruskin. It is based on refusal, rather than inability to use, though the other idea is in the background. The author argues further that wealth does not free from need, because the wealthy life is always insatiate (ἄπληστος),[[983]] and wealth does not change the disposition,[[984]] by which change alone the life can be freed from need and slavery.[[985]] To try to accomplish this by wealth is like attempting to cure a patient of dropsy by stuffing him with water until he bursts.[[986]] Counsel is given, therefore, not to turn one’s sons to the acquisition of wealth, but to study under Crates, who can set them free from the vice of insatiety.[[987]]