axis.
To sum up, we can say that in the Euclidean geometry there are (in a given space of reference) preferred systems of co-ordinates, the Cartesian systems, which transform into each other by linear orthogonal transformations. The distance
between two points of our space of reference, measured by a measuring rod, is expressed in such co-ordinates in a particularly simple manner. The whole of geometry may be founded upon this conception of distance. In the present treatment, geometry is related to actual things (rigid bodies), and its theorems are statements concerning the behaviour of these things, which may prove to be true or false.
One is ordinarily accustomed to study geometry divorced from any relation between its concepts and experience. There are advantages in isolating that which is purely logical and independent of what is, in principle, incomplete empiricism. This is satisfactory to the pure mathematician. He is satisfied if he can deduce his theorems from axioms correctly, that is, without errors of logic. The question as to whether Euclidean geometry is true or not does not concern him. But for our purpose it is necessary to associate the fundamental concepts of geometry with natural objects; without such an association geometry is worthless for the physicist. The physicist is concerned with the question as to whether the theorems of geometry are true or not. That Euclidean geometry, from this point of view, affirms something more than the mere deductions derived logically from definitions may be seen from the following simple consideration.
Between
points of space there are
