The files of the Northwich Guardian at this period chronicle the development of a state of affairs which must be almost without parallel in any other trade. During 1883 the violent competition continued, resulting in heavy loss, the closing of many works, and a large increase in bankruptcies. In 1884, the Guardian declared that “the battle is fast becoming a war of giants.... Capital is showing itself, almost everywhere, a remorseless Juggernaut, crushing thousands of victims beneath its ponderous wheels.” In that year a proposal to form the trade into one huge company was frustrated by the bitterness of internal jealousies. Further attempts to bring all the salt proprietors into a combination for mutual protection and profit were made and abandoned from the same cause. “It is easy to make laws and regulations and to carry them out successfully when men are governed by the ordinary laws of business and common sense,” commented the Guardian in 1886, “but when sentiment or passion is allowed to interfere, it is impossible either to make sensible laws or carry them out successfully when made.”

In March, 1888, we read that “the great struggle for mastery still goes on”; in April, “the process of exhaustion is not yet complete,” and the deplorable state of the salt trade was attributed to “a few men who seem to have made more money than they know what to do with, and are spending it in seeing what amount of injury they can do to each other, and as a necessary consequence to numbers of others who are innocent of offence.” In May, a correspondent of the same journal deplored the material damage the trade was suffering through the perversity and selfishness of the salt proprietors, and he came to the conclusion that their object was “not really to do business but to kill one another out.” “Is there more morality,” he asked, “in the man of means starving out the man without means by selling, below cost of make, than there would be in stopping him on the highway and picking his pocket?... When the intention in the two cases is the same—the plunder or ruin of the opponent—how can the morality differ? It does seem a most grievous thing that when the greater number in the trade are anxious to do business at a profit to themselves ... they should be prevented because a few—a very few—should think only of themselves, and care nothing for the sufferings of others, and carry on the fight to the bitter end, causing enormous suffering and distress....” “We can see very clearly,” he concluded, “that if something is not done shortly to bring about a better state of affairs, some defensive action must be taken by those firms outside the present strife which will result in no good to the parties now responsible for the mischief.”

The “defensive action” referred to was already being formulated, and in October, 1888, was issued the prospectus of the Salt Union Limited, which was formed with a capital of £4,000,000 for the purpose of consolidating the undertakings of the Salt Proprietors in the United Kingdom, “with a view to ending reckless competition which injuriously affects the salt industry without conferring any adequate advantage on the public.” By virtue of the sixty-four agreements, covering the purchase of properties involving the inclusive payment of £3,704,519, the Union became the greatest salt proprietors in the world, and the success of the flotation was described as “almost unprecedented.” Apparently the only two newspapers that had the least dubiety concerning the success of the venture were The Times and the Northwich Guardian. The Times, while recognizing that the primary object of the movement, viz., that of “curtailing supply and creating an artificial scarcity”—would be gained if an effective monopoly could be secured, pointed out that: “The Syndicate has not acquired the control of all the mines or works at which salt is produced, and unless they do this they will not have an absolute monopoly.” The Guardian admitted that with careful management the company would prosper, but, speaking from its intimate knowledge of the spirit which animated the salt-trade, it cautiously predicted that the first few months’ operations would show whether the enterprise could go on successfully. “The scheme is a gigantic one, and may prove either a great blessing or a great curse, according to the principles on which it is conducted. Let us hope that a spirit of justice and fairness towards shareholders, servants, and the public at large will make the scheme a blessing.”

The warning voiced by The Times with regard to the Salt Union’s inefficient monopoly was justified almost immediately by the issue of prospectuses of rival salt schemes, and although opposition of this kind was treated by the Union with affected contempt, and the public was assured that the insignificant salt lands secured by rash outsiders were “such as to break the hearts of all investors who might visit them,” the fact remained, as was noted in November, 1889, that “the most remarkable thing in connection with salt has been the continuous fall in the price of Salt Union shares.” The principle on which the valuation of the Union’s acquisitions was made did not transpire, but The Times understood that “the selling price has been quite satisfactory to the vendors,” and the Chairman of the Union, in 1896, was feign to confess that “never were covenants so ingeniously framed as to cause lawsuits.” It is not overstating the case to say that the terms upon which the Salt Union purchased their properties provides one of the most amazing instances of reckless optimism in the history of comparatively modern finance, and the subsequent administration of the Company’s affairs was as unfortunate as the preliminary settlements had been disastrous. In one law case with a vendor from whom they had purchased for £600,000 a property which their own representative valued at £400,000, they had to pay a further £60,000, and they settled another action by selling for £125,000 a tract of land which they had originally acquired for £372,000. In 1895, they increased their capital to £4,200,000 by issue of further debentures to the amount of £200,000; and, in 1901, the capitalization of the Union was reduced to £2,600,000. Up to 1913, they had paid away £117,451 for directors’ fees, travelling expenses, etc., £99,236 for preliminary and Parliamentary expenses, law charges, etc., and £723,985 for administration charges, and from 1896 to 1914 they had only paid (in 1907) one dividend of ½ per cent. on the ordinary shares.

INDEX

THE END

Printed by Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Ltd., Bath, England

Transcriber’s Notes

Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they were not changed.