The Principles of Masonic Law / A Treatise on the Constitutional Laws, Usages and Landmarks of Freemasonry

by Albert Gallatin Mackey

To this question I feel compelled to reply, that such testimony is generally admissible; but, as there are special cases in which it is not, it seems proper to qualify that reply by a brief inquiry into the grounds and reasons of this admissibility, and the mode and manner in which such testimony is to be taken.

The great object of every trial, in Masonry, as elsewhere, is to elicit truth; and, in the spirit of truth, to administer justice. From whatever source, therefore, this truth can be obtained, it is not only competent there to seek it, but it is obligatory on us so to do. This is the principle of law as well as of common sense. Mr. Phillips, in the beginning of his great "Treatise on the Law of Evidence," says: "In inquiries upon this subject, the great end and object ought always to be, the ascertaining of the most convenient and surest means for the attainment of truth; the rules laid down are the means used for the attainment of that end."

Now, if A, who is a Freemason, shall have committed an offense, of which B and C alone were cognizant as witnesses, shall it be said that A must be acquitted for want of proof, because B and C are not members of the Order? We apprehend that in this instance the ends of justice would be defeated, rather than subserved. If the veracity and honesty of B and C are unimpeached, their testimony as to the fact cannot lawfully be rejected on any ground, except that they may be interested in the result of the trial, and might be benefited by the conviction or the acquittal of the defendant. But this is an objection that would hold against the evidence of a Mason, as well as a profane.

Any other rule would be often attended with injurious consequences to our institution. We may readily suppose a case by way of illustration. A, who is a member of a lodge, is accused of habitual intemperance, a vice eminently unmasonic in its character, and one which will always reflect a great portion of the degradation of the offender upon the society which shall sustain and defend him in its perpetration. But it may happen—and this is a very conceivable case—that in consequence of the remoteness of his dwelling, or from some other supposable cause, his Brethren have no opportunity of seeing him, except at distant intervals. There is, therefore, no Mason, to testify to the truth of the charge, while his neighbors and associates, who are daily and hourly in his company, are all aware of his habit of intoxication.

If, then, a dozen or more men, all of reputation and veracity, should come, or be brought before the lodge, ready and willing to testify to this fact, by what process of reason or justice, or under what maxim of masonic jurisprudence, could their testimony be rejected, simply because they were not Masons? And if rejected—if the accused with this weight of evidence against him, with this infamy clearly and satisfactorily proved by these reputable witnesses, were to be acquitted, and sent forth purged of the charge, upon a mere technical ground, and thus triumphantly be sustained in the continuation of his vice, and that in the face of the very community which was cognizant of his degradation of life and manners, who could estimate the disastrous consequences to the lodge and the Order which should thus support and uphold him in his guilty course? The world would not, and could not appreciate the causes that led to the rejection of such clear and unimpeachable testimony, and it would visit with its just reprobation the institution which could thus extend its fraternal affections to the support of undoubted guilt.

But, moreover, this is not a question of mere theory; the principle of accepting the testimony of non-masonic witnesses has been repeatedly acted on. If a Mason has been tried by the courts of his country on an indictment for larceny, or any other infamous crime, and been convicted by the verdict of a jury, although neither the judge nor the jury, nor the witnesses were Masons, no lodge after such conviction would permit him to retain his membership, but, on the contrary, it would promptly and indignantly expel him from the Brotherhood. If, however, the lodge should refuse to expel him, on the ground that his conviction before the court was based on the testimony of non-masonic witnesses, and should grant him a lodge trial for the same offense, then, on the principle against which we are contending, the evidence of these witnesses as "profanes" would be rejected, and the party be acquitted for want of proof; and thus the anomalous and disgraceful spectacle would present itself—of a felon condemned and punished by the laws of his country for an infamous crime, acquitted and sustained by a lodge of Freemasons.

But we will be impressed with the inexpediency and injustice of this principle, when we look at its operation from another point of view. It is said to be a bad rule that will not work both ways; and, therefore, if the testimony of non-masonic witnesses against the accused is rejected on the ground of inadmissibility, it must also be rejected when given in his favor. Now, if we suppose a case, in which a Mason was accused before his lodge of having committed an offense, at a certain time and place, and, by the testimony of one or two disinterested persons, he could establish what the law calls an alibi, that is, that at that very time he was at a far-distant place, and could not, therefore, have committed the offense charged against him, we ask with what show of justice or reason could such testimony be rejected, simply because the parties giving it were not Masons? But if the evidence of a "profane" is admitted in favor of the accused, rebutting testimony of the same kind cannot with consistency be rejected; and hence the rule is determined that in the trial of Masons, it is competent to receive the evidence of persons who are not Masons, but whose competency, in other respects, is not denied.

It must, however, be noted, that the testimony of persons who are not Masons is not to be given as that of Masons is, within the precincts of the lodge. They are not to be present at the trial; and whatever testimony they have to adduce, must be taken by a committee, to be afterwards accurately reported to the lodge. But in all cases, the accused has a right to be present, and to interrogate the witnesses.

The only remaining topic to be discussed is the method of taking the testimony, and this can be easily disposed of.

The testimony of Masons is to be taken either in lodge or in committee, and under the sanction of their obligations.