The power of National taxation, therefore, was necessary, Marshall asserted. "There must be men and money to protect us. How are armies to be raised? Must we not have money for that purpose?" If so, "it is, then, necessary to give the government that power in time of peace, which the necessity of war will render indispensable, or else we shall be attacked unprepared." History, human nature, and "our own particular experience, will confirm this truth." If danger should come upon us without power to meet it, we might resort to a dictatorship; we once were on the point of doing that very thing, said he—and even Henry and Mason did not question this appeal of Marshall to the common knowledge of all members of the Convention.

"Were those who are now friends to this Constitution less active in the defense of liberty, on that trying occasion, than those who oppose it?" scathingly asked Marshall. "We may now ... frame a plan that will enable us to repel attacks, and render a recurrence to dangerous expedients unnecessary. If we be prepared to defend ourselves, there will be little inducement to attack us. But if we defer giving the necessary power to the general government till the moment of danger arrives, we shall give it then, and with an unsparing hand."

It was not true, asserted Marshall, that the Confederation carried us through the Revolution; "had not the enthusiasm of liberty inspired us with unanimity, that system would never have carried us through it." The war would have been won much sooner "had that government been possessed of due energy." The weakness of the Confederation and the conduct of the States prolonged the war. Only "the extreme readiness of the people to make their utmost exertions to ward off solely the pressing danger, supplied the place of requisitions." But when this danger was over, the requisition plan was no longer effective. "A bare sense of duty," said he, "is too feeble to induce men to comply with obligations."

It was plain, then, Marshall pointed out, that "the government must have the sinews of war some other way." That way was by direct taxation which would supply "the necessities of government ... in a peaceable manner"; whereas "requisitions cannot be rendered efficient without a civil war."

What good would it do for Congress merely to remonstrate with the States, as Henry had proposed, if we were at war with foreign enemies? There was no danger that Congress, under the Constitution, would not lay taxes justly, asserted Marshall; for if members of Congress laid unjust taxes, the people would not reëlect them. Under the Constitution, they were chosen by the same voters who elected members of the State Legislature. These voters, said he, "have nothing to direct them in the choice but their own good." Men thus elected would not abuse their power because that would "militate against their own interest.... To procure their reelection, it will be necessary for them to confer with the people at large, and convince them that the taxes laid are for their own good."

Henry had asked whether the adoption of the Constitution "would pay our debts." "It will compel the states to pay their quotas," answered Marshall. "Without this, Virginia will be unable to pay. Unless all the states pay, she cannot.... Economy and industry are essential to our happiness"; but the Confederation "takes away the incitements to industry, by rendering property insecure and unprotected." The Constitution, on the contrary, "will promote and encourage industry."

The statement of the Anti-Constitutionalists that the extent of the country was too great for a strong National Government was untrue, argued Marshall. Also, said he, this objection was from writers who criticized those governments "where representation did not exist." But, under the Constitution, representation would exist.

Answering Henry's objection, that there were no effective checks in the Constitution, Marshall inquired, "What has become of his enthusiastic eulogium on the American spirit?" There, declared Marshall, was the real check and control. "In this country, there is no exclusive personal stock of interest. The interest of the community is blended and inseparably connected with that of the individual. When he promotes his own, he promotes that of the community. When we consult the common good, we consult our own." In such considerations were found the greatest security from an improper exercise of power.

"Is not liberty secure with us, where the people hold all powers in their own hands, and delegate them cautiously, for short periods, to their servants, who are accountable for the smallest mal-administration?... We are threatened with the loss of our liberties by the possible abuse of power, notwithstanding the maxim that those who give may take away. It is the people that give power, and can take it back. What shall restrain them? They are the masters who give it, and of whom their servants hold it."

Returning to the subject of amendments, "what," asked Marshall, "shall restrain you from amending it, if, in trying it, amendments shall be found necessary.... When experience shall show us any inconvenience, we can then correct it.... If it be necessary to change government, let us change that government which has been found to be defective." The Constitution as it stood filled the great objects which everybody desired—"union, safety against foreign enemies, and protection against faction [party]—against what has been the destruction of all republics."