Marshall's first case of nation-wide interest, in which his argument gave him fame among lawyers throughout the country, was the historic controversy over the British debts. When Congress enacted the Judiciary Law of 1789 and the National Courts were established, British creditors at once began action to recover their long overdue debts. During the Revolution, other States as well as Virginia had passed laws confiscating the debts which their citizens owed British subjects and sequestering British property.
Under these laws, debtors could cancel their obligations in several ways. The Treaty of Peace between the United States and Great Britain provided, among other things, that "It is agreed that creditors on either side shall meet with no legal impediments to the recovery of the full value in sterling money of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted." The Constitution provided that "All treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding,"[496] and that "The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases ... between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States citizens, or subjects."[497]
Thus the case of Ware, Administrator, vs. Hylton et al., which involved the validity of a State law in conflict with a treaty, attracted the attention of the whole country when finally it reached the Supreme Court. The question in that celebrated controversy was whether a State law, suspending the collection of a debt due to a subject of Great Britain, was valid as against the treaty which provided that no "legal impediment" should prevent the recovery of the obligation.
Ware vs. Hylton was a test case; and its decision involved immense sums of money. Large numbers of creditors who had sought to cancel their debts under the confiscation laws were vitally interested. Marshall, in this case, made the notable argument that carried his reputation as a lawyer beyond Virginia and won for him the admiration of the ablest men at the bar, regardless of their opinion of the merits of the controversy.
It is an example of "the irony of fate" that in this historic legal contest Marshall supported the theory which he had opposed throughout his public career thus far, and to demolish which his entire after life was given. More remarkable still, his efforts for his clients were opposed to his own interests; for, had he succeeded for those who employed him, he would have wrecked the only considerable business transaction in which he ever engaged.[498] He was employed by the debtors to uphold those laws of Virginia which sequestered British property and prevented the collection of the British debts; and he put forth all his power in this behalf.
Three such cases were pending in Virginia; and these were heard twice by the National Court in Richmond as a consolidated cause, the real issue being the same in all. The second hearing was during the May Term of 1793 before Chief Justice Jay, Justice Iredell of the Supreme Court, and Judge Griffin of the United States District Court. The attorneys for the British creditors were William Ronald, John Baker, John Stark, and John Wickham. For the defendants were Alexander Campbell, James Innes, Patrick Henry, and John Marshall. Thus we see Marshall, when thirty-six years of age, after ten years of practice at the Richmond bar, interrupted as those years were by politics and legislative activities, one of the group of lawyers who, for power, brilliancy, and learning, were unsurpassed in America.
The argument at the Richmond hearing was a brilliant display of eloquence, reasoning, and erudition, and, among lawyers, its repute has reached even to the present day. Counsel on both sides exerted every ounce of their strength. When Patrick Henry had finished his appeal, Justice Iredell was so overcome that he cried, "Gracious God! He is an orator indeed!"[499] The Countess of Huntingdon, who was then in Richmond and heard the arguments of all the attorneys, declared: "If every one had spoken in Westminster Hall, they would have been honored with a peerage."[500]
In his formal opinion, Justice Iredell thus expressed his admiration: "The cause has been spoken to, at the bar, with a degree of ability equal to any occasion.... I shall as long as I live, remember with pleasure and respect the arguments which I have heard on this case: they have discovered an ingenuity, a depth of investigation, and a power of reasoning fully equal to anything I have ever witnessed.... Fatigue has given way under its influence; the heart has been warmed, while the understanding has been instructed."[501]
Marshall's argument before the District Court of Richmond must have impressed his debtor clients more than that of any other of their distinguished counsel, with the single exception of Alexander Campbell; for when, on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, the case came on for hearing in 1796, we find that only Marshall and Campbell appeared for the debtors.
It is unfortunate that Marshall's argument before the Supreme Court at Philadelphia is very poorly reported. But inadequate as the report is, it still reveals the peculiar clearness and the compact and simple reasoning which made up the whole of Marshall's method, whether in legal arguments, political speeches, diplomatic letters, or judicial opinions.