Notwithstanding the hazard and delay of ocean travel,[742] Talleyrand managed to communicate at least once with his sympathizers in America, whom he told that the envoys' "pretensions are high, that possibly no arrangement may take place, but that there will be no declaration of war by France."[743]
Jefferson was alert for news from Paris. "We have still not a word from our Envoys. This long silence (if they have been silent) proves things are not going on very roughly. If they have not been silent, it proves their information, if made public, would check the disposition to arm."[744] He had not yet received the letter written him March 17, by his agent, Skipwith. This letter is abusive of the Administration of Washington as well as of that of Adams. Marshall was "one of the declaiming apostles of Jay's Treaty"; he and Pinckney courted the enemies of the Revolutionary Government; and Gerry's "paralytic mind" was "too weak" to accomplish anything.[745]
The envoys' first dispatches, sent from Paris October 22, 1797, reached Philadelphia on the night of March 4, 1798.[746] These documents told of the corrupt French demands and machinations. The next morning President Adams informed Congress of their arrival.[747] Two weeks later came the President's startling message to Congress declaring that the envoys could not succeed "on terms compatible with the safety, the honor, or the essential interests of the nation" and "exhorting" Congress to prepare for war.[748]
The Republicans were dazed. White hot with anger, Jefferson writes Madison that the President's "insane message ... has had great effect. Exultation on the one side & a certainty of victory; while the other [Republican] is petrified with astonishment."[749] The same day he tells Monroe that the President's "almost insane message" had alarmed the merchants and strengthened the Administration; but he did not despair, for the first move of the Republicans "will be a call for papers [the envoys' dispatches].[750] In Congress the battle raged furiously; "the question of war & peace depends now on a toss of cross & pile,"[751] was Jefferson's nervous opinion.
But the country itself still continued French in feeling; the Republicans were gaining headway even in Massachusetts and Connecticut; Jefferson expected the fall elections to increase the Republican strength in the House; petitions against war measures were pouring into Congress from every section; the Republican strategy was to gain time. Jefferson thought that "the present period, ... of two or three weeks, is the most eventful ever known since that of 1775."[752]
The Republicans, who controlled the House of Representatives, demanded that the dispatches be made public: they were sure that these papers would not justify Adams's grave message. If the President should refuse to send Congress the papers it would demonstrate, said the "Aurora," that he "suspects the popularity of his conduct if exposed to public view.... If he thinks he has done right, why should he be afraid of letting his measures be known?" Let the representatives of the people see "the whole of the papers ... a partial communication would be worse than none."[753]
Adams hesitated to reveal the contents of the dispatches because of "a regard for the personal safety of the Commissioners and an apprehension of the effect of a disclosure upon our future diplomatic intercourse."[754] High Federalist business men, to whom an intimation of the contents of the dispatches had been given, urged their publication. "We wish much for the papers if they can with propriety be made public" was Mason's reply to Otis. "The Jacobins want them. And in the name of God let them be gratified; it is not the first time they have wished for the means of their destruction."[755]
Both Federalists who were advised and Republicans who were still in the dark now were gratified in their wish to see the incessantly discussed and mysterious message from the envoys. The effect on the partisan maneuvering was as radical and amusing as it is illuminative of partisan sincerity. When, on April 3, the President transmitted to Congress the dispatches thus far received, the Republicans instantly altered their tactics. The dispatches did not show that the negotiations were at an end, said the "Aurora"; it was wrong, therefore, to publish them—such a course might mean war. Their publication was a Federalist trick to discredit the Republican Party; and anyway Talleyrand was a monarchist, the friend of Hamilton and King. So raged and protested the Republican organ.[756]
Troup thus reports the change: The Republicans, he says, "were very clamorous for the publication [of the dispatches] until they became acquainted with the intelligence communicated. From that moment they opposed publication, and finally they carried a majority against the measure. The Senate finding this to be the case instantly directed publication."[757] The President then transmitted to Congress the second dispatch which had been sent from Paris two weeks after the first. This contained Marshall's superb memorial to Talleyrand. It was another blow to Republican hopes.
The dispatches told the whole story, simply yet with dramatic art. The names of Hottenguer, Bellamy, and Hauteval were represented by the letters X, Y, and Z,[758] which at once gave to this picturesque episode the popular name that history has adopted. The effect upon public opinion was instantaneous and terrific.[759] The first result, of course, was felt in Congress. Vice-President Jefferson now thought it his "duty to be silent."[760] In the House the Republicans were "thunderstruck."[761] Many of their boldest leaders left for home; others went over openly to the Federalists.[762] Marshall's disclosures "produced such a shock on the republican mind, as has never been seen since our independence," declared Jefferson.[763] He implored Madison to write for the public an analysis of the dispatches from the Republican point of view.[764]