Let us repeat. THERE IS NO OBJECTION TO EXPERIMENTS UPON HUMAN BEINGS, WHEN THERE IS NO INVASION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. The medical student, who, out of zeal for Science, offers his body for any experimental test; the patient in the hosptial, who with adeuqate compensation for what he is asked to undergo, grants consent to some investigation which may help others, though not himself; the poor man who is satisfactorily compensated for all risks, and therefore willing to aid research,—such varieties of human experimentation do not necessarily offend the moral sense. It is the incurable injustice of experimentation upon infancy that can offer no protest but a cry; of experimentation upon the dying child, of experimentation upon the poor, the ignorant, the feeble-minded, the defenceless,—it is experimentation like this which surely deserves the condemnation of mankind.
What is the remedy for human vivisection? It lies in such legislation as shall protect those who, because of infancy, or by reason of ignorance cannot effectively protect themselves. By penalties so heavy that they cannot be safely ignored, the State must forbid the iniquitous exploitation of man by man. No such law need interfere in the slightest degree with the rights of the true physician to aid his fellow-beings; nor can we doubt that the medical profession will finally favour a reform that will indicate the broad line of demarcation separating the unquestioned privilege from the unjustifiable abuse.
CHAPTER XIX
CONCLUSION
In the preceding pages, the attempt has been made to throw light here and there, upon a great and perplexing problem. It has been seen that concerning the past history of experimentation upon living beings, much ignorance still exists; that too implicit and unquestioning trust in the statements of those favourable to unlimited experimentation has, unfortunately, not always conduced to the attainment of truth; that misstatements tinged with inaccuracy have too frequently found acceptance; and that growing out of the unrestricted use of animals in scientific inquiry, the extension of the method, by the use of human material, in certain hospitals has become an accepted procedure.
It is, indeed, an ethical problem, that confronts society, to-day. It would be no less a problem, if every claim of utility made in behalf of human and animal experimentation were proven beyond the possibility of a doubt. Even then, the ethical question would persist. The ultimate decision regarding it remains the personal duty of every man.
Attention has been called, in the preceding pages, to many statements, which a close examination would seem to prove to be misleading and inaccurate. But every discerning reader should recognize that inaccuracy or untruth does not imply the moral obliquity that pertains to intentional falsehood. An experimenter, for example, makes an assertion regarding the absolute painlessness of his vivisections. Such statement may be demonstrated, let us say, to be exceedingly doubtful, if not quite untrue. That is as far as legitimate criticism can easily go. It is quite impossible to demonstrate a conscious intent to deceive. To interpret motives, to impute falsehood is to go beyond facts into regions where facts are not to be found, except in exceedingly exceptional cases. One of thet Royal Commissioners expressed this position very clearly. "While I feel bound," wrote Dr. George Wilson, "to accept the assurances of all the expert witnesses who appeared before us, as assurances of their honest conviction that vivisectional or cutting experiments can be, and are carried out without the infliction of pain from the moment the first wound is made, … I can only accept them AS OPINIONS, to which the greatest weight should be attached, AND NOT AS STATEMENTS OF ABSOLUTE FACT so far as specific instances are concerned." This is exactly the attitude for any critic of vivisection to take. A distinguished physician, testifying before the Commissioners, declared that it was entirely possible to keep a dog in a state of anaesthesia for a week, if necessary. Experimentation in this direction, in all probability would prove the assertion to be untrue, but although such demonstration would be proof of inaccuracy and carelessness, it could not justify, in any way, the charge of dishonourable motives. In no instance, therefore, in the illustrations of inaccuracy given in the preceding pages, is there any imputation of perverse and intentional inveracity.
I have made sufficiently clear, I hope, my disagreement with the views of the extreme antivivisection party concerning all phases of biological experimentation. The weakest point in the antivivisection position has always seemed to me the condemnation of every kind of experimentation on animals, however painless. Yet how is it possible to expect public agreement with this position in every case? A few weeks ago, it was announced in the public press, that in one of the departments of Columbia University in New York, a series of experiments were being made to determine, if possible, the comparative food value of two articles in general use. If, for instance, a certain number of mice were fed from day to day upon pure butter, and an equal number upon the artificial product known as "oleo-margarine," would there be any perceptible difference in growth and general condition, and, if so, in favour of which group? This is an experiment upon animals; but it is one against which it would be difficult to bring forward any objection which the general public would very eagerly endorse. Distinctions must be made, between that which is cruel and that which is humane. "AGAINST PERFECTLY PAINLESS EXPERIMENT," said Sir Benjamin Ward Richardson, "carried out for purely experimental and great objects by men who themselves regret the necessity or expediency, and who only act under a strict sense of duty, no reasonable mind can raise an objection."
On the other hand, let me reiterate acknowledgment of the vast indebtedness which the cause of humaneness owes to the opponents of all vivisection. Always and everywhere, the extremist helps in the progress of reform. But for a few hated and despised abolitionists, negro slavery might still be a recognized American institution; it was not Henry Clay or Daniel Webster who did most to hasten its downfall. That antivivisectionists have made mistakes, perhaps their most ardent advocate would be willing to concede. On the other hand, how great has been their service! But for extremists such as Frances Power Cobb of England and Elizabeth Stuart Phelps-Ward of America and a host of others whose hearts were aflame with indignation at cruelty and at the seeming duplicity which denied its existence, the whole question would have sunk into the abeyance in which in France or Germany, it to-day exists. They kept it alive. And what have not the antivivisectionists suffered by detraction, by ridicule, by misrepresentation and personal abuse! The most eloquent woman to whom I have ever listened, English only by adoption, faced without flinching some of the most skilled vivisectors and controversialists of Great Britain, who endeavoured in vain to weaken the force of her testimony; and the examination of Miss Lind-ap-Hageby by certain of the vivisecting members of the Royal Commission seems to me a more brilliant instance of the presentation of ideals under adverse circumstances than is afforded by any similar examination of man or woman in modern times. Personal disagreement with universal condemnation of all vital experimentation has been sufficiently stated; but one view of the antivivisectionists applies equally to the prohibition of painful experiments. "I believe," said Miss Lind, "that the abolution of vivisection will be accompanied by great changes and great developments in the whole science of medicine; that new methods of healing will come in, and higher methods, as we know that the coarser medication and the coarser drugging are going out of fashion."[1] The same view was expressed by Dr. Kenealy, another witness, regarding the prohibition of all animal experimentation. "I think it would give the finest possible impulse to medical science; that we are surrounded by all these problems of disease and degeneration and suffering in human kind; and that if we were to devote our attention to man, and to all the valuable human material surrounding us, instead of wasting valuable time and talent on dogs and guinea-pigs, we should make rapid and immense advance in the relief of human suffering."[2] Somewhat the same sentiment has been expressed by others not opposed to animal experimentation. "It may be admitted," said Sir Benjamin Ward Richardson, whose scientific zeal, no one can question, "that whether painful experimentation be useful or useless, it has had one indifferent effect; it has diverted the minds of men too strongly from methods of research that not only lie open to the curious mind, but which lie temptingly open." And speaking of medical treatment for disease, he says: "Treatment at this time is a perfect Babel…. Two men scarcely ever write the same prescription for the same disease or the same symptom. I have watched the art of prescribing for fifty years, and I am quite sure that divergence of treatment is at this moment far greater than it ever was in the course of that long period. The multiplication of remedies, begotten of experiment, is the chief reason of so much disagreement… … The modern student has before him a new duty. The experiment of experiment that lies before him therapeutically, is to learn what diseases will recover by mere attention to external conditions without any medicines, and what will not."[3]
[1] Evidence before Royal Commission, Q. 7,627 [2] Ibid., Q. 6,776 [3] "Biological Experimentation," by Sir Benjamin Ward Richardson, F.R.S. Pp. 73, 109.