Petroleum

by Albert Lidgett

Germany, too, saw this; before the war it had been practically dependent upon regular supplies from the United States as well as from Roumania, but the bulk of its requirements came from the former mentioned country. With its States’ oil shipments cut off, it turned its attention to securing at least part of its stocks from the neutral North-Western European countries, which, in their turn, were likewise dependent upon America. The ruse worked for some time, and the unsuspecting American exporters shipped cargoes to Denmark, Norway, and Sweden with little idea that the bulk of these were ultimately to find their way into Germany. It was only when the figures were published in the States as to the abnormally large quantities of petroleum products that had been sent to the European neutral countries that, to the thinking mind, it became obvious something was wrong.

I can modestly claim to have called the attention of the British Government to this underhand proceeding early in 1915, when I not only gave them details of cargoes which had been delivered to various North-Western European ports en route to Germany, but also managed to secure the names of vessels all laden with such supplies, which at that time were crossing the Atlantic. Mr. Winston Churchill, to his credit be it said, acted without delay, and within a few days, as the vessels passed the North of Scotland, they were stopped, and—well, to cut a long story short, this country got the petroleum products which, in accordance with the original plan, would have gone to Germany. Some time afterwards there came a voice of protest from one or two interested persons in those neutral countries, for they declared that not a single barrel of petroleum had gone over to Germany, but evidence was soon forthcoming to show how well Germany’s ruse had worked for some months, and a prosecution in one of those countries made against an importing firm, for actually sending petroleum supplies into Germany, effectively closed the protest from those who would have liked the enemy’s desires to have been undisturbed.

There is not the slightest doubt that Germany at that time was in dire straits for sufficient petroleum products for its military purposes: had the war been somewhat delayed in its commencement, she would have been far better prepared, for, under the auspices of the Government, there had been laid down an elaborate programme for the importation and distribution of Roumanian petroleum products throughout Germany. As it was, the country was unprepared, and, though in other directions every possible precaution had been taken to carry through an elaborate military programme of offence, the prospective dearth of sufficient supplies of petroleum products necessitated the enforcing of the most stringent regulations with regard to the uses of all petroleum products, excepting for military purposes.

The taking of the Galician fields from the Central Armies by Russia gave a serious set-back to Germany’s military plans, and it was only when the Russians had to withdraw from Lemberg that the enemy was able to count upon sufficient supplies to meet his military requirements. To an extent, he was even then doomed to disappointment, for, when his armies arrived on the Galician fields, they found that practically the whole of the petroleum reserves had been destroyed, and a large number of the prolific producing wells more or less permanently damaged. Nor, to my mind, was the advance into Roumania prompted by the idea of territorial gains so much as to secure control of the country’s oil-fields. Here, again, Germany’s desires were in part thwarted, for the efforts of the British Military Mission, to which I refer elsewhere, had been eminently successful.

From that time onward, however, Germany’s supplies of petroleum products were secured, and that she turned them to account was a matter of common knowledge. Germany, naturally, greatly valued the acquisition of the Roumanian oil-fields, and it must be to its people a great disappointment that the whole of these immensely prolific regions for oil production are now permanently removed from the nation’s grasp.

Unfortunately, the British Government did not seriously appreciate the importance of petroleum products in war as well as peace until the war cloud of 1914 was about to burst. It had taken no notice of the suggestions made from time to time that in our own country there might be vast petroleum reserves awaiting development, and it had not even shown any encouragement to the Scottish shale-oil industry. All that it had done, and even this was on the eve of war, was to invest over £2,000,000 in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Ltd., for the development of the Persian oil-fields, so that the Navy could secure ample supplies of fuel oil. But here, however, there were difficulties ahead, for the Persian fields are in the interior of the country and have to rely upon pipe-lines to bring the supplies to the coast.

Everything, therefore, depended upon the security of the pipe-line, and the idea which was in the minds of many who opposed the scheme as to the possibility of supplies being cut off by the activities of the insurgents, was by no means a mistaken one; the pipe-line was, in fact, partially destroyed, and the transport of fuel oil held up for a long time.

As a nation, we have all along had to depend upon imported petroleum products, and, inasmuch as our supplies could be drawn at will from a variety of producing countries, the idea that we might at one time find ourselves cut off from supply does not appear to have occurred to many. No sooner had the war started, however, than we found, owing to the closing of the Dardanelles, that both Russia and Roumania could no longer attend to our requirements, while the Far East, owing to the great ocean journey necessitated to this country (and the quickest way lay through the Mediterranean) could not maintain regular shipments with us. It is fortunate that we found the United States willing, and from the start very desirous, to do all that was possible to help us out of a difficulty; while Mexico, with its wealth of British oil interests, catered in every way for the meeting of the enormous demands we made upon its resources.

To say that petroleum products have played a highly-important part in the conduct of the war is but to under-estimate facts. The importance of their part has been equal to that of the supply of guns and shells, and, when the statement was made in the House of Commons in 1917 that adequate supplies of petroleum were quite as essential as men and munitions, petroleum’s part was then not over-stated. Rather would I say it was on the contrary, for, had there been at any time a dearth of any classification of petroleum products, then the vast naval and army organization, both on and across the water, would immediately have lost its balance, and our great fighting units would automatically have become useless. Just think of it for a moment.

To-day, our great naval fighters—take the Queen Elizabeth, for instance—rely upon fuel oil for purposes of power, while our second and third line units must also have it, for, whether it be fuel oil or the lighter products of the oil refinery—I refer to motor spirit—it matters not, so far as supply is concerned. The whole of our winged fleets in the air must, of necessity, be useless unless they can regularly draw large quantities of motor spirit, and the volume they consume, even on a single trip, would surprise many, though it is not possible here to enter into figures.