Unpopular government in the United States

by Albert Martin Kales

In some cases, however, it is necessary that municipal corporations with special powers and functions and collecting taxes from a special district for a special purpose should occupy territory in which several other units of municipal government operate. For instance, the Sanitary District in Cook County properly levies taxes upon property in the city of Chicago and in part of Cook County, and builds a canal running through Cook County and Will County. How is it possible to avoid having the commissioners of such a sanitary district elected from the district where its revenues are obtained? The answer is very simple. Such commissioners should be appointed by the different municipal units of government occupying the territory included in the sanitary district. The city of Chicago, of course, should appoint the majority of the commissioners. The municipal governments outside the city of Chicago should be combined together in groups and the legislative bodies of the municipalities in each group be given a voice in the selection of commissioners for the Sanitary District. The same principle of appointment may be adopted whenever a special board with special functions is to occupy territory which includes several units of local government.

The effectiveness of the commission form of government for cities to oust extra-legal government requires the election of each commissioner from a wieldy district, i.e., one not so large but that the candidate who is willing to run may be known with a fair degree of ease by the electorate and be able with the least expense to make a personal canvass.[11] The supposed advantage of electing commissioners at large from an unwieldy district is that this method insures the candidacy and election of men prominent in the entire district and hence more fit to hold office. But this is precisely what it does not do. It is true such a plan demands candidates with a wide general reputation in the whole district. But such candidates do not come forward simply because the method of election suggests that such candidates should appear. Men with wide reputations in a large district are almost certain to be occupying offices of greater importance in the state and federal governments, or else they are not available at all for the holding of public office. The leading citizen will not as a rule be a candidate for a position in the municipal government. The available candidates are almost sure in the long run to be men whose reputations are confined to some district of the larger community. When they run for election in a district which stretches beyond the zone of their personal influence and reputation, some machinery for enlightening the voters’ ignorance as to who they are and what they stand for must be devised. This means that the candidate must have money and backing. Those requirements may seriously limit the number of candidates and therefore the choice of the voter. Furthermore, in promoting slates of candidates care will usually be taken to select men with reference to particular districts in the community at large, so that each district will feel that it has a representative on the ticket. Thus a provision for the election of commissioners at large from an unwieldy district is likely to relapse in practice into the presentation of candidates representing small districts, each with a local reputation in his own district. This becomes in substance an election of commissioners from districts and yet the range of choice by the voter resulting from the coming forward of candidates will be very much restricted because of the expense of making a canvass in the unwieldy district and the necessity for an organized support. Candidates who are successful in being elected from the unwieldy district are likely to be beholden to an organization, whether it be temporary or permanent, which has aided them in the election. A system of electing commissioners at large from an unwieldy district in a greater or less degree produces a condition which tends to keep alive the extra-legal government. On the other hand, with elections in wieldy districts the number of candidates who come forward is the largest possible. The choice of the voter is, therefore, the widest. Each candidate may become most easily personally known to the electorate. The sharp contest between individuals in a small district is always peculiarly enlightening to the electorate and stimulating to his interest in political matters. The expense of a canvass may, therefore, be reduced without lessening the amount of knowledge which the voter will obtain regarding issues and candidates. The services of an extensive organization for the purpose of directing the politically ignorant voter who to vote for would naturally give way to organizations for dispensing actual knowledge concerning candidates and conditions. The services of a highly developed and permanent machine designed to direct the politically ignorant how to vote must become of the least possible value.

The practice of the principle of selecting commissioners from wieldy districts may take several forms, depending largely upon the size of the electorate.

If the whole city is not more than a wieldy district in itself, then of course the election of all the commissioners at large is in accordance with the sound principle announced. Such election may very properly be according to any one of several plans.

First: The candidates to the number of commissioners to be selected receiving the highest vote at a single election may be declared elected, although none receive an actual majority of the votes cast. This is the simplest method. It is the one in use at Galveston, with a population of about 40,000, and seems to have given satisfaction.

Second: The commissioners elected at large may be required to receive an actual majority. If there are more than two candidates for each place, this may be secured at a single election by the voters marking their first and other choices for each of the places to be filled, so that if no election is had by a majority according to the first choice of the voters, the second and other choices may be used to indicate which ones receive an actual majority. Or a second election may be held at which only candidates in double the number of places to be filled who have received the highest number of votes at the first election are placed upon the final ballot. The second election may be required even though candidates receiving the highest votes at the first election actually receive a majority. This last is the plan adopted, apparently with good results, in Des Moines, Iowa.[12]

Third: Then there is the Hare plan of proportional representation and the single transferable vote.[13] To insure an election a candidate need only obtain a “quota” of the votes cast—i.e., that number of votes which can be obtained by the number of candidates equal to the number of places to be filled, but by no more. Thus if the electorate number 5,000 and there are 5 places to be filled, the “quota” or number of votes required for an election would be 834. Five persons could receive this number of votes, but the sixth candidate could not do so. Each voter is allowed to indicate his first, second, third, and other choices, but can indicate only one first choice and one second choice, etc. At the first count only first choices are reckoned and the candidates who have received a “quota” or more according to first choices are declared elected. If all the places have not then been filled up, the surplus votes of those candidates who have received more than the “quota” are transferred according to the names marked (2) on them. If these transfers do not bring the requisite number of candidates up to the “quota,” the lowest candidate is eliminated and his votes transferred according to the next preference, and so on until all the places are filled. The object of this plan is to give representation to minorities or to groups less than a majority.

So far as the disruption of extra-legal government by politocrats is concerned, it is doubtful if it makes any difference which of the above plans of election be adopted in commission-governed municipalities which as a whole constitute only a single wieldy district of, let us say, not to exceed 6,000 male voters and 50,000 inhabitants.

Suppose now the municipality be larger than a single wieldy district, but still small enough so that it is very plainly a unit in its interests and collective activities—let us say a city with not to exceed 25,000 male voters and a population of not more than 150,000. Here there will be a distinct danger in electing commissioners at large at a single election at which are chosen those who obtain the highest votes, even though less than a majority. If the choice is to be by a plurality at a single election the municipality should be divided into wards with a single commissioner elected from each, but no candidate should be required to reside in the ward where he stands for election. The Hare plan is entirely available and consistent with the choice of commissioners from wieldy districts. In Des Moines, Iowa, with a population of about 86,000, the double election plan seems to have been used with success. This may also be regarded as consistent in a way with the election of commissioners from wieldy districts. True, a single district with a population of 80,000 might be regarded as unwieldy for the purpose of a single election. But the double election secures the same education for the electorate that the voter would obtain in a single election in a district one-half as large. Hence a wieldy district having a double election can be considerably larger than a wieldy district having a single election.

Suppose, however, that the municipality be large enough to be readily divided into as many wieldy districts as there are commissioners to the number of from five to nine. For instance, let us assume a city of to exceed 25,000 male voters and a population exceeding 150,000. Here the district is too unwieldy for the election at large of those candidates receiving the highest votes at a single election. It may be doubted whether the double election will produce satisfactory results in the way of securing a really intelligent vote. We have probably come to a situation where the principle of electing commissioners from wieldy districts requires either a division of the city into wards with a commissioner elected from each, or else the election at large of all the commissioners by the Hare plan, in which only a “quota” of votes is required for a choice. The advantage which the Hare plan has of permitting the candidates for commissioner to come from any part of the city can be duplicated to some extent in the ward plan by not requiring any residence by candidates in the ward of the city where they stand for election. Under either arrangement candidates will in all probability come from particular districts and localities where their strength lies.