CHAPTER IX
SEXUAL EDUCATION
In view of the dangers to which children are exposed from the side of the sexual life, the question presses whether and how it is possible to prevent these dangers arising, or, if prevention has failed, to minimise them. To enable us to answer this question, the general question of sexual education will have to be considered. In so far as sexual manifestations in the child may arise from hereditary taint, the sociologist will endeavour to prevent them by hindering marriage or procreation on the part of those likely to give birth to such children (eugenics). Our present knowledge, however, does not enable us to say, when an individual exhibits some particular tendency to sexual aberration, whether this same tendency will appear as a concrete symptom in the descendants. Apart, indeed, from certain cases of very severe taint, we are hardly in a position even to predict with any high degree of probability that the offspring will exhibit morbid endowments. There are marriages which we expect to result in the birth of congenitally defective children, and in spite of this the offspring are healthy; and conversely, we sometimes meet with affections which we are in the habit of regarding as dependent upon hereditary transmission, and yet we fail, in these cases, to find any evidence of such affections in the progenitors. And, apart from these theoretical considerations, the physician's advice is not of much importance, for experience teaches us that in questions of marriage his advice is very rarely followed.
The less power we have to operate by control of the congenital factors, the more necessary shall we feel it to be to minimise the dangers threatening the child by influencing its environment. It is true that in this department, as in others, there is much diversity of opinion regarding the limits of educability. Some contend that we can mould the child like wax, a view which prevailed especially during the "period of enlightenment" in the eighteenth century; others maintain that organic development is predetermined at the time of procreation, and that subsequent influences can have no effect. Although we must be careful not to overestimate the power of education, it would be no less erroneous to assume that development is inalterably predetermined at the time of procreation. This applies to the efficacy of educational influences in general, and to educational influences affecting the sexual life in particular. The following consideration must be given due weight. The power of the educator is limited, not merely by the child's hereditary dispositions, but also by the nature of its environment. Rudolf Lehmann, in his work on Education and the Educator (Erziehung und Erzieher), rightly points out that Rousseau, in his Émile, when discussing the problems of education, neglects too much the influences of environment. If we wish our reasoning to furnish us with results of practical value, and not to remain confined to the purely theoretical plane, we must give due weight to this consideration. This applies with equal force to the matter of sexual education. We know that the sexual impulse may be excited by innumerable external stimuli. Such stimuli are continuously in operation, and the best educator has no power to exclude their influence. The mere association of the child with persons of the opposite sex provides such stimuli. But a separation of the sexes will not do away with them, as is proved, not only by the homosexual manifestations of the undifferentiated sexual impulse, but also by those that arise transiently, at any rate, when the members of one sex are completely segregated from those of the other—as in boarding-schools, on board ship, and in prisons. The educator cannot even count on being at all times able to safeguard the child from the sight of sexual acts. In the country, but also in the town, children have opportunities for this; not only when the members of a large family sleep in a single room, and the children can watch their parents and others in the act of sexual intercourse; but in various other ways. The mere kissing of affianced lovers must in this sense be regarded as a sexual act, and how is it possible so to bring up a child that it will never have an opportunity of seeing anything of the kind? If we go further, and recognise that through the association of ideas such a sexual stimulus may arise from witnessing the coupling of animals—of dogs, for instance, in the street—we shall understand how the educator's powers are limited by the milieu in which he has to work. We have, therefore, to recognise clearly from the first, that in the education of the child the complete exclusion of sexual stimuli is impossible.
Obviously, when the external noxious influences exceed a certain measure, we may endeavour to effect an improvement by measures of general hygiene, through the activities of the central government, the municipality, or the community at large. In this connexion, we think of better housing conditions, of the separation of children from night-lodgers, and the like measures. But, even here, we must guard against making Utopian demands, after the manner of many fanatics on the subject of social hygiene, whose proposals are often quite incompatible with the maintenance of human intercourse. Independently of such impracticable demands for future reforms, the educationalist of to-day seeks to protect the child from unduly frequent sexual excitement. But sometimes the result is other than he expects. Sport is recommended to divert the mind from sexual ideas, and yet I have known cases in which marked sexual excitement has been induced in this way. I am not now referring to mechanical stimulation through bicycling or horseback-riding, of which I shall speak later; but many a child has been sexually excited through playing tennis with a girl-companion, and many a boy has been sexually excited through rowing with another. Still, the fact that here and there a child may have been sexually excited in such a way, is no reason for condemning what is invaluable to the enormous majority of children.
This is all that need be said regarding the manner in which general influences may counteract the efforts of the educationalist. But experience shows that the good effects of education are also seriously impaired by individual factors, especially by congenital predisposition, or by a tendency acquired very early in life. Although we no longer assume that human impulses, emotions, and sentiments take their course quite independently of the influence of other psychical powers, such as the reason and the will, still, unprejudiced observation shows that the power of the reason and the will is less than many persons imagine. In very many cases we are able to see how difficult it is, in a child of ten or less, to exert any notable influence upon the impulses, the emotions, and the sentiments. This is no less true in the positive than it is in the negative aspect. In one child it may be just as difficult to induce a fondness for music or reading, as it is in another to break it of an inclination for romping or other games. The same is true of the emotions—fear, for instance. In many cases, logically planned efforts may be altogether out of relationship to the result. Above all, great weight must be laid upon the consideration that there is a tendency to overrate the effect of education in the form of precept as compared with the effect of example. A child may receive the best of instruction without result, if in its own environment it is continually seeing something precisely the opposite of that which it is being told. This applies with equal force to the sexual life, which can be influenced far more readily by example than by good teaching, if the latter, though daily repeated, conflicts with what the child sees every day in the conduct of its relatives and companions.
Although, for this reason, we must avoid forming an exaggerated idea of the utility of individual sexual education, this is not meant to imply that we should assume a perfectly passive attitude, and leave everything to the uncontrolled course of development, in order to allow the child, as the modern phrase goes, "to live its own life."
Before passing to consider details, we must consider the elementary bases of all matters connected with the education of children—namely, morality and custom. These two words are connected by their inner significance, and not merely by etymological meaning;[127] but they represent different standards for passing judgment upon our actions. Certain things conflict with established custom, without its being permissible for us to speak of them as immoral. If at a social gathering for which evening dress is the rule, a gentleman turns up in light tweeds, he is guilty of a breach of custom, but not of an immoral action. If an officer in the army, having impregnated a young girl of the working class, marries her, his action is a moral one in the positive sense, but in spite of this he commits an offence against the customs of his class. Moreover, we have to remember that an act which is immoral or opposed to custom at a certain time and among a certain people, may at another time, or among another people, be neither the one nor the other. In such matters, opinions change; and this applies also to the case of actions connected with the sexual life. Herodotus relates that in Babylon the virgins had, for a money payment, and in honour of the Goddess of Love, to give themselves to a strange man; and similar customs are reported of other peoples of antiquity.[128] In providing for the sexual education of the child, we have to take into account such changes of view; but we have also to consider the matter in relation to the present condition of our civilisation, for the child is to be a citizen of a real, not of an imaginary State.
Intimately related to custom and morality are certain psychical processes, especially the sentiment of shame. This is aroused by actions which are considered immoral by ourselves or by members of our environment, and by actions which conflict with established custom. The child detected in a lie is ashamed, either because the act is immoral, or more often because the act is by others regarded as immoral; for the opinion of others plays a great part in the causation of shame. The man who has forgotten to put on his necktie, and in that condition appears in public, is ashamed, because he has committed a breach of custom. This dependence of the sense of shame upon morality and custom is true above all in matters of sex. A girl who is undressing in a hotel room, and has forgotten to bolt the door, so that a strange man suddenly enters by mistake, is ashamed; equally ashamed is a girl who encounters an exhibitionist with his penis exposed. These examples suffice to show that the sentiment of shame, which is associated with great discomfort, is a safeguard against immorality and against breaches of custom.
Similar relations exist for the sense of disgust, which is allied to the sense of shame. Shame is felt in the performance of an action disgusting to others, if against one's will one is watched in the process. Defæcation is usually effected in some retired place: in the onlooker, defæcation arouses disgust; whilst by the person defæcating, if he knows that he is being observed, shame is felt. Normal sexual intercourse between a man and a woman, objectively regarded, is a no less unæsthetic act than pseudo-coitus between two men. None the less, in most persons, the sight of the former act arouses less disgust than that of the latter. This difference depends upon the fact that by most persons homosexual intercourse is also felt to be immoral. In this relationship between the sense of disgust and immorality, it is often impossible to determine what is primary and what is secondary. A mutual retroaction occurs: the sense of disgust is increased, because the act is regarded as immoral; and, on the other hand, a strong sense of disgust may increase the perception of immorality. The same mutual relationships with the ideas of morality are found in connexion with the sense of shame. Beyond question, the sentiments of shame and of disgust are closely connected with the ideas of custom and morality; for shame and disgust arise especially in connexion with matters which conflict with our ideas of morality. It will, therefore, readily be understood that in moral education it is of the greatest importance what are the processes in connexion with which the instructor seeks to arouse the sentiments of shame and disgust; and, on the other hand, it is obvious that the ideas of morality induced by education, favour the development, in certain specific relationships, of the sentiments of shame and disgust.